No. 65829-8-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: April 25, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 08-2-12124-1, Hollis R. Hill, J., entered October 15, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Grosse and Schindler, JJ.
APPELWICK, J.
Before filing a tort action against the State or against State employees, a plaintiff is required by statute to file an administrative claim with Risk Management. Strict compliance with this claim filing procedure is required and the failure to comply requires dismissal of the lawsuit. In this case, because Richardson filed a lawsuit against a Department of Labor and Industries inspector for actions taken in his capacity as an inspector without first filing an administrative claim as required by statute, summary judgment dismissal was proper.
FACTS
Wayne Roy Richardson owns a business called Mini-Dozer Work. The business is licensed as a Washington state business, but Richardson is not a licensed contractor under chapter 18.27
RCW. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) cited Richardson in 1999 and 2001 for performing work without properly registering as a contractor. Richardson was previously convicted of the misdemeanor crime of unregistered contracting in district court.
Richardson filed a tort claim against the Department with the Office of Financial Management, Risk Management Division in 2005. He alleged malicious prosecution based upon citations for unregistered contracting issued by the Department between October 1998 and October 2005. He further claimed the Department’s referral of his violations to the prosecuting attorney was unlawful. Richardson’s tort claim was denied at the administrative level.
In 2006, Construction Compliance Inspector Matthew Jackson, acting on behalf of the Department, cited Richardson again after he placed an advertisement offering to perform landscaping and excavation work for which he was required to be licensed as a contractor. An administrative law court upheld the infraction, rejecting Richardson’s arguments that his landscape work did not fall within the definition of work performed by a contractor under the contractor’s registration statute, chapter 18.27 RCW. The superior court dismissed Richardson’s appeal.
In 2008, the Department received a complaint from a business owner who had hired Richardson’s company to repair two parking lots at his auto repair shop and to replace concrete in front of the business. As a result of that complaint, Jackson issued two infractions to Richardson, for submitting a bid and for performing work for which he was required to be licensed as a contractor.
Shortly thereafter, on April 9, 2008, Richardson filed a lawsuit against Jackson. Richardson claimed that Jackson colluded with the Department to generate revenue by forcing individuals to register as contractors who were not required to do so. Richardson relied on Jackson’s conduct of issuing citations in 2006 and 2008. He also argued that Jackson failed to comply with the contractor’s registration statute, engaged in malicious prosecution, and that his actions violated a number of other laws including the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW.
Jackson moved for summary judgment arguing that Richardson failed to comply with claim filing procedures for claims against the State because he did not file his claim with Risk Management as required by RCW 4.92.100. Alternatively, Jackson maintained that he was entitled to summary judgment because Richardson could not establish that his actions violated the contractor’s registration statute or any other law. The trial court granted the motion and Richardson appeals.
ANALYSIS
An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a summary judgment motion, engaging in the same review as the trial court. Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas County, 118 Wn.2d 852, 854, 827 P.2d 1000 (1992). Summary judgment is granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). All reasonable inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party. Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 168, 177, 125 P.3d 119 (2005). Summary judgment is proper when a reasonable person could come to only one conclusion based on the evidence. Id.
Before filing a tort action against the State of Washington or against State employees, a plaintiff is required to file a claim with Risk Management. RCW 4.92.100; Levy v. State, 91 Wn. App. 934, 941, 957 P.2d 1272 (1998). Former RCW 4.92.100 (2006) provided that “[a]ll claims against the state, or against the state’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct shall be presented to and filed with the risk management division.”[1]
The filing requirements of former RCW 4.92.100 are jurisdictional, and create a condition precedent to filing suit against government bodies. Levy, 91 Wn. App. at 941. Failure to strictly comply with the filing requirements will result in dismissal. Reyes v. City of Renton, 121 Wn. App. 498, 502, 86 P.3d 155 (2004); Pirtle v. Spokane Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 81., 83 Wn. App. 304, 309, 921 P.2d 1084 (1996).
On appeal, Richardson primarily challenges the validity of the infractions issued by Jackson acting on behalf of the Department and Jackson’s compliance with the contractor’s registration statute. But, Richardson does not dispute the fact that he failed to file a claim with Risk Management based upon the specific infractions at issue. To the extent that Richardson argues that his 2005 administrative claim satisfies the claim filing requirements because he alleged a “continuous tort against Mathew Jackson,” we disagree. Jackson was not named in the 2005 claim, nor do the specific date parameters encompass the actions that his lawsuit is based upon. In short, Richardson fails to persuade us that the requirements of the claim filing statute do not apply or were satisfied in this case. Summary judgment on this basis was properly granted.
Moreover, although it is not necessary to reach the merits of Richardson’s claims on appeal, we observe that even if Richardson had complied with the claim filing statute, summary judgment would have been appropriate on the alternative ground that Richardson failed to establish any unlawful conduct. The essential premise of Richardson’s argument is that the actions taken against him by the Department were invalid because he was not required to register as a contractor in order to perform outside landscaping work not attached to a physical structure. Indeed, at the summary judgment hearing below, Richardson agreed with court’s characterization that he works as an “earth mover” and argued that he was not required to register because he was not “attaching anything permanently to a structure.” In Coronado v. Orona, 137 Wn. App. 308, 315-16, 153 P.3d 217
(2007), Division Three of this court rejected a similar contention, concluding that performance of landscaping work which requires the use of heavy equipment falls within the scope of work performed by a contractor under chapter 18.27 RCW and requires licensing under the statute. The statute clearly establishes that submitting a bid, advertising, or performing the work of a contractor without registration is a gross misdemeanor. RCW 18.27.020(2)(a). RCW 18.27.225 does not require a hearing before an administrative law court before an infraction may be issued. Richardson failed to establish that the inspector’s actions of issuing infractions or referring his violations to the prosecuting attorney were inconsistent with or contrary to the contractor’s registration statute.
Richardson raises additional, mostly procedural, arguments. For instance, he claims that Jackson’s summary judgment motion was untimely. But, the evidence in the record establishes that the motion for summary judgment was filed and served more than 28 days prior to the hearing on the motion. See CR 56(c). Nor is there any evidence supporting Richardson’s allegations of improper contact between the court and defense counsel. No authority supports his claim that a court order was required to allow the Attorney General’s Office to represent a state employee. Finally, contrary to Richardson’s argument, findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary to support a decision on a motion for summary judgment. See CR 52(a)(5). Because all of these arguments are without merit, we reject them.
In conclusion, because Richardson failed to file an administrative claim, a mandatory prerequisite to filing tort action against a state employee, we affirm the trial court’s order of summary judgment. We deny Richardson’s request for statutory attorney fees and costs on appeal.