No. 52540-9-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: July 12, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 01-2-07719-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/11/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Anthony P Wartnik.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Brian K Boddy, Attorney at Law, 825 7th St. S, Kirkland, WA 98033.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Jane Parry Ewers, Turner Stoeve Gagliardi PS, 1212 N Washington Ste 202, PO Box 5210, Spokane, WA 99205-0210.
David Mark Soderland, Attorney at Law, 900 4th Ave Ste 3003, Seattle, WA 98164-1049.
BAKER, J
High school student Victoria Woo was injured before school hours in an automobile accident while returning to campus. She brought suit against the District claiming that it was liable because a district employee had allegedly instructed her to return home to change clothes. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. We hold that no breach of the District’s duty to supervise was shown. We also conclude that any alleged instruction given to Victoria was not the legal cause of her injury. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
In 2000, Victoria Woo, a sophomore attending Rainer Beach High School in Seattle, was seriously injured in a vehicular accident. That morning, Victoria’s mother dropped her off at school approximately 15 minutes before classes were to begin. Victoria mistakenly believed it was pajama day, and had dressed accordingly. According to Victoria’s mother, the school registrar, Ms. Mar, told Victoria that `she should go home and change so that she could sell candy after school.’[1]
Victoria left the school and went across the street to a grocery store. There, she saw several friends and asked one for a ride home to change her clothes. On the way back to school, the vehicle she was riding in crossed the centerline and crashed head-on into a pickup truck. Victoria suffered massive head injuries and has been comatose since the accident. Her parents sued the Seattle public schools arguing that the District had a duty to supervise Victoria, and that it failed to adequately supervise her on the morning of the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District.
II
A school district has a special relationship with its pupils, predicated on the district’s role as a substitute parent.[2] The legal duty of the district is one of reasonable care, that is, such care as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. `The basic idea is that a school district has the power to control the conduct of its students while they are in school or engaged in school activities, and with that power goes the responsibility of reasonable supervision.’[3]
This case tests the limit of a school district’s potential liability to its students. Each party advances arguments which we believe are too inflexible to fit comfortably within our tort caselaw. The District points out that the injury-causing event occurred away from the school grounds and before classes had begun for the day. It therefore asserts that it had no duty whatsoever regarding the safety of Victoria Woo. Woo, on the other hand, infers that because she had arrived at the school earlier that day, and left in response to a school employee’s direction, the District is legally responsible for whatever happened to her while away from the school.
We reject the District’s interpretation of the law because a district’s liability for reasonable supervision of its students will, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond normal school hours and beyond the physical confines of the school grounds. Many cases have recognized potential liability during school-sanctioned or sponsored activities during nonschool hours and at locations separated from the school itself.[4] And a district would certainly have potential legal exposure for injuries to its students while they were using school-provided transportation to and from school before and after regular school hours. And we can envision, without here deciding, a factual scenario where liability could be imposed on a district for injuries suffered by a student sent off campus, based on factors such as the student’s very young age or disability, or the unusual risks posed by the surrounding area.
But because no such unusual factors were present in this case, we reject the assertion that the District is somehow exposed due to an injury suffered by a high school sophomore riding in an acquaintance’s automobile on a public street while returning to school.
For purposes of the summary judgment motion, we will assume that a school employee advised Victoria that she should change her attire because she was not dressed properly to sell cookies after school. No evidence suggests that Victoria was given a directive to do so within a matter of minutes. The District did not select her mode of transportation, nor does the record indicate any knowledge of that choice on the part of the District. No reasonable jury could conclude that the District breached a legal duty of supervision by suggesting to Victoria that she change her clothing. We reject Woo’s arguments for another reason, as well. The connection between the alleged negligent act and the injury is simply too attenuated to be reasonably foreseeable. Between the alleged negligent act and her injury, Victoria left school, went across the street to the grocery store, obtained a ride home, changed clothes, got back into her friend’s car, and began the return trip to school. The person who drove Victoria home had a valid license. There was no law or district policy preventing students from leaving campus, or from transporting other students to and from campus. Victoria’s harm was not substantially caused by any possible negligence by the District. Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged negligence was not the factual or legal proximate cause of her injury. Woo cites to two cases to support her position. Neither case is on point. In Taggart v. State,[5] our Supreme Court evaluated the state’s duty to supervise a parolee who injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that had the state properly supervised its parolee, she would not have been assaulted. The court concluded that because the state had failed to supervise, it was liable for the eventual injuries to third-parties.[6] The court also explained that there was a need to hold the state accountable for how it supervises parolees.[7]
In Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Market, Inc.,[8] a grocery store sold alcoholic beverages to minors. These minors then provided the alcohol to other minors. The court found the grocery store liable for injuries to one of the other minors because it had violated statutory prohibitions against selling alcohol to minors.[9] The court concluded that it was foreseeable that other minors would consume alcohol purchased illegally by minors.[10] The court also explained that there was a strong public policy in favor of holding stores accountable for selling alcohol to minors.
This case involves neither third-party liability nor a statutory violation. Instead, we must determine at what point a chain of events becomes too attenuated to impose liability. And unlike Schooley and Taggert, public policy considerations do not strongly weigh in favor of extending the chain of liability to include attenuated instances such as this.
AFFIRMED.
KENNEDY and BECKER, JJ., concur.
(1931) (recognizing possible district liability for student injured while participating in football game).
(1998).