TWIGG v. ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT, 50 Wn. App. 594 (1988)

749 P.2d 745

THOMAS TWIGG, ET AL, Appellants, v. ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT, Respondent. THE CITY OF ABERDEEN, Respondent, v. OLE E. FELDT, ET AL, Petitioners.

Nos. 8064-8-II; 8065-6-II; 8143-1-II; 8653-1-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
February 11, 1988.

[1] Courts of Limited Jurisdiction — Municipal Corporations — Municipal Courts — Independent of Justice Court System — Election — Substantial Compliance. The provisions of former RCW 3.50.470, whereby a municipality could elect to continue the operation of a municipal court independent of the justice courts, have been substantially complied with when there is substantial evidence of an intention by the municipality to not participate in the justice court system but to continue its own court, even though no formal resolution or ordinance was adopted to that effect.

Nature of Action: Municipal court prosecutions of defendants Feldt and Kerrigan for driving while intoxicated. Defendants Twigg and Naillon sought writs of prohibition in superior court to prevent municipal court

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prosecutions for several offenses. All challenged the jurisdiction of the municipal court.

Municipal Court: The Municipal Court for Aberdeen, Nos. 23990, 84-1442, Gordon L. Godfrey, J., on March 31, 1983 and September 6, 1984, entered judgments on verdicts of guilty to the DWI charges.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, Nos. 83-1-00072-9, 84-1-00144-8, John W. Schumacher, J., and Robert L. Charette, J. Pro Tem., on August 31, 1984, and March 11, 1985, affirmed the convictions of defendants Feldt and Kerrigan. In Nos. 84-2-00290-1, 84-2-00291-0, the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, John H. Kirkwood, J., on July 30, 1984, denied the applications for writs of prohibition.

Court of Appeals: Holding that the municipality had met the statutory requirements for continuing the operation of a municipal court and that the court had jurisdiction over the offenses, the court affirms the judgments and the denial of the writs.

J.A. Heard, Steven R. Johnson, and Johnson, Heard Shearer, for appellants Twigg, et al.

Jack L. Burtch, for petitioner Feldt.

Michael Markham, City Attorney, and Ruth A. Nelson, Assistant, for respondents.

ALEXANDER, J.

Ole Feldt and James Kerrigan each appeal orders of the Grays Harbor Superior Court affirming their Aberdeen Municipal Court convictions for traffic offenses. Thomas Twigg and James Naillon appeal orders of the Grays Harbor County Superior Court denying their applications for writs of prohibition, prohibiting the Aberdeen Municipal Court from entertaining charges against them. All of the defendants argue to this court, in this consolidated appeal, that the Aberdeen Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over their persons and the subject matter of the offenses charged against them. We affirm.

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Each of the appeals has reached us in a slightly different fashion. Briefly, we will outline the facts pertaining to each case.

OLE FELDT
Feldt was charged in the Aberdeen Municipal Court on March 23, 1982, with the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was convicted of the offense after a jury trial and was sentenced on March 31, 1983. Feldt appealed his conviction to the Grays Harbor County Superior Court, where he claimed that the Aberdeen Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court rejected this argument and affirmed his conviction. He appealed to this court and we granted discretionary review.[1]

JAMES KERRIGAN
Kerrigan was arrested on June 1, 1984, in Aberdeen and was charged in the Aberdeen Municipal Court with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Kerrigan moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Kerrigan was then found guilty of the charge and was sentenced. He appealed his conviction to the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, which affirmed. He appealed to this court.[2]

THOMAS TWIGG AND JAMES NAILLON
Twigg and Naillon were arrested in Aberdeen on January 4, 1984. Twigg was charged in Aberdeen Municipal Court

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with obstructing a public servant. Naillon was charged in the same court with the offense of driving while license suspended and failure to cooperate with an officer. Twigg and Naillon filed applications in Grays Harbor County Superior Court for a writ prohibiting the Aberdeen Municipal Court from entertaining or disposing of their cases. They each claimed that the Aberdeen Municipal Court was invalidly organized and, consequently, lacked subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over their persons. The Superior Court denied their applications. They each sought reconsideration, which was denied. They appeal.

JURISDICTION OF ABERDEEN MUNICIPAL COURT
The appellants all contend that the legal entity, the Aberdeen Municipal Court, ceased to exist on January 9, 1967, and that the court purporting to be the Aberdeen Municipal Court was, therefore, without jurisdiction after that date. In order to understand the appellants’ arguments, it is necessary to set out some legislative history, as well as the pertinent history of the Aberdeen Municipal Court.

A Justice Court Act
In 1961 the Legislature adopted a statute relating to what were then known as “justice courts.” Laws of 1961, ch. 299 (codified as RCW 3.50). This act permitted counties such as Grays Harbor to opt, by action of its county commissioners, to be bound by the provisions of the act. RCW 3.30.020. The effect of adoption of the provisions of the act by a board of county commissioners was to transfer the jurisdiction and authority of municipal courts in the county to the justice court. As a consequence, the enforcement of city or town ordinances would then fall to the new justice court. The act provided, however, that any city or town “may elect” to continue its municipal court under preexisting statutes relating to municipal courts. Laws of 1961, ch. 299, § 96.

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The Grays Harbor Board of County Commissioners chose, by ordinance, to come under the justice court act on July 5, 1966. Their action was to be effective on January 9, 1967.

In 1970, the continued validity of the Aberdeen Municipal Court was challenged in the Superior Court in Benn v. City of Aberdeen, Grays Harbor County cause 59569. The Superior Court ruled that because the City of Aberdeen had failed to establish its own municipal court, pursuant to the provisions of the then-existing RCW 3.50.060,[3] the Aberdeen Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over Benn. Subsequently, the Aberdeen City Council passed a resolution May 20, 1970, which indicated Aberdeen’s election to continue to operate its municipal court under the statutes relating to municipal courts as they existed prior to 1961.

All of the appellants contend that because of the county commissioners’ action in 1966 to make the justice court act applicable to Grays Harbor County, the Aberdeen Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction on and after January 9, 1967. They contend that Aberdeen did not “elect” by timely resolution or ordinance to continue its municipal court.

At the time the county commissioners of Grays Harbor County adopted the ordinance making the justice court act applicable to that County, RCW 3.50.060 provided in pertinent part:

On or after January 2, 1966, a city or town electing to establish a municipal court pursuant to this chapter shall do so by resolution adopted not more than ten days before January 2, 1966 or any fourth year thereafter.

(Italics ours.) Laws of 1961, ch. 299, § 55. The appellants contend that this section applies, and they argue that the

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City of Aberdeen did not demonstrate its election to establish a municipal court by resolution, as required by the statute.

Aberdeen counters by arguing that RCW 3.50.060 does not apply because the City of Aberdeen was not establishing a municipal court, but was simply maintaining its already established municipal court.

[1] We agree with Aberdeen. In our judgment, RCW 3.50.060
does not apply here. The applicable statute was former RCW 3.50.470 (Laws of 1961, ch. 299, § 96), which relates to the continuation of existing municipal courts. That statute did not require that a city’s election to continue its municipal court be made by resolution or ordinance.[4]

In our ruling, we rely, to some extent, on the recent case o Hoquiam v. Strid, 46 Wn. App. 457, 461, 731 P.2d 8 (1987). In that case, this court had occasion to look at the justice court act of 1961. We pointed out in Strid that section 96 of the act specifically permitted cities and towns to continue their existing municipal court system. Strid, 46 Wn. App. at 459. In the Strid case, Hoquiam, unlike Aberdeen, had passed a resolution which indicated Hoquiam’s election to continue its municipal court, rather than have the jurisdiction of its court pass to the justice court of Grays Harbor County. Strid, 46 Wn. App. at 458. However, Hoquiam adopted its resolution before
January 9, 1967, the date the justice court act became effective in Grays Harbor County. Strid, 46 Wn. App. at 458. Strid contended that Hoquiam’s premature election to continue its municipal court was an insufficient election. Strid, 46 Wn. App. at 459. We disagreed, saying that “[w]here the law is silent as to the mode of procedure, no particular formality in the enactment of an ordinance need be adopted. In the absence

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of other requirements it is only necessary that there be sufficient proof of the will of the governing body.'” (Citations omitted. Italics ours.) Strid, 46 Wn. App. at 460.

Here, even though Aberdeen apparently did not announce its election to continue its then existing municipal court by adopting a resolution or ordinance, it sufficiently expressed the will of its government by adopting a budget for the municipal court, presumably by ordinance, and by continuing to employ persons to operate it.[5]

Our decision is buttressed further by the case of Enumclaw v. Hunt, 35 Wn. App. 470, 667 P.2d 145 (1983). There Enumclaw, like Aberdeen, continued to operate its municipal court after the Legislature adopted the justice court act in 1961. In upholding the jurisdiction of the Enumclaw Municipal Court, the court identified section 96 of the Laws of 1961, ch. 299, as a “grandfather clause.” Enumclaw, 35 Wn. App. at 473. The court appeared to suggest that by not participating in the justice court act of 1961, and by maintaining its own municipal court, Enumclaw had manifested its election to continue its existing municipal court. Enumclaw v. Hunt, 35 Wn. App. at 473.

B Court Improvement Act
The appellants Naillon, Twigg and Kerrigan contend, finally, that even if the City of Aberdeen manifested its election to continue its municipal court by continuing to

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operate it or by adopting the resolution that became effective May 20, 1970, the Aberdeen Municipal Court, nevertheless, ceased to exist on July 1, 1984. They contend that the Court Improvement Act of 1984 served to repeal Aberdeen’s authority to operate its municipal court at least from July 1, 1984, to January 1, 1985. RCW 3.50.060.[6] As a consequence, they contend the city court had no jurisdiction over the appellants Kerrigan, Naillon, and Twigg during the 6-month hiatus from July 1, 1984, to January 1, 1985. We believe that it is unnecessary to set forth in detail the argument of the appellants on this point because, even if their contention is correct that the municipal court of Aberdeen was in a state of suspension for a period of 6 months in late 1984, the same legislation specifically provided that the municipal court would have continuing jurisdiction over cases pending before the effective date of the act (July 1, 1984). (See notes following RCW 3.50.005.) The savings clause, section 128 of Laws of 1984, ch. 258, reads as follows:

The enactment of sections 101 through 139 of this act shall not affect any case, proceeding, appeal, or other matter pending in any court operating under Title 35 or 35A RCW on the effective date of this act. The enactment of sections 101 through 139 of this act shall not have the effect of terminating or in any way modifying any right or liability, civil or criminal, which may be in existence on the effective date of this act.

In light of this saving provision, it is clear that the Aberdeen Municipal Court had jurisdiction to resolve cases pending on July 1, 1984, against Naillon, Twigg, and Kerrigan.

We affirm the orders of the Grays Harbor Superior Court affirming Feldt’s and Kerrigan’s convictions, as well as its

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order denying Naillon’s and Twigg’s applications for a writ of prohibition.

REED, C.J., and WORSWICK, J., concur.

Review denied by Supreme Court May 31, 1988.