No. 27141-9-IIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: March 18, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County Docket No: 92-3-00648-5 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 03/08/2001
Counsel for Appellant(s), Steven Nash Bogdon (Appearing Pro Se), Attorney at Law, 105 W Evergreen Blvd, P.O. Box 1148, Vancouver, WA 98666-1148.
Aaron Hugh Caplan (Appearing Pro Se), Attorney at Law, Aclu of Washington, 705 2nd Ave Ste 300, Seattle, WA 98104-1799.
Shawn S. Suggs (Appearing Pro Se), 1119 — 22nd Avenue, Longview, WA 98632.
Counsel for Respondent(s), John A. Hays, Attorney at Law, 1402 Broadway St, Longview, WA 98632-3714.
QUINN-BRINTNALL, A.C.J.
On January 5, 2001, the Cowlitz County Superior Court granted Andrew Hamilton an anti-harassment protection order against his former wife, Shawn Suggs. On that same day, the trial court found Suggs in contempt of court for violating a prior protection (`no investigation’) order. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Suggs appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) issued an anti-harassment protection order against her, and (2) punished her for violating the `no investigation’ order. We affirm the anti-harassment order but vacate the order finding Suggs in contempt because the court imposed a criminal sanction for the violation of a civil order.
FACTS
Andrew Hamilton[1] and Shawn Suggs separated in 1992, and divorced in 1994. They have one son and one daughter. Throughout the past several years, Suggs and Hamilton have had frequent disagreements regarding their parenting plan and often resorted to court proceedings for resolution.
Hamilton’s Anti-harassment Order
On December 27, 1999, Hamilton petitioned the Cowlitz County Superior Court for a statutory anti-harassment protection order against Suggs.[2]
Hamilton’s declaration in support of the order alleged several specific instances where Suggs’ behavior was intended to threaten his employment, harm his reputation, embarrass him, and cause him emotional distress. Specifically, Hamilton alleged that: Suggs’ husband contacted the Cowlitz County Sheriff and informed him that Suggs was concerned Hamilton would attempt to harm Suggs at the upcoming contempt hearing because of his past behavior and because Hamilton carries a gun.
Suggs’ husband contacted the Cowlitz County Prosecutor and expressed the same concerns about the upcoming contempt hearing.
Suggs contacted the Kelso City Manager to advise him Hamilton was `breaking the law.’ In turn, the Kelso City Manager contacted the Kelso Chief of Police, Hamilton’s boss, and repeated Suggs’ allegations. Suggs contacted a battered woman’s shelter and advised its manager she needed protection from Hamilton.
A nameless caller, later identified as Suggs, contacted the Kelso Finance Department to inquire about the propriety of a police officer also having a license for an independent private investigation business.
Suggs contacted the Longview Police Department Domestic Violence Unit to report that Hamilton was harassing her.
Suggs sent a letter to the editor of the Longview Daily News, implying her personal experience with domestic violence.
Suggs complained to the Division of Child Support that Hamilton was in arrears in child support payments.[3]
The `No Investigation’ Order Judge Warme heard preliminary oral argument on Hamilton’s anti-harassment petition on January 7, 2000. At argument, Hamilton contended that Suggs was continuing to display `inappropriate and annoying and harassing behavior’ toward him through her inquiries of third parties. Report of Proceedings (RP) (1/7/00) at 8.
Judge Warme orally ruled, `I want everybody to stop investigating, stop giving information or gathering information, except as to subpoena witnesses. People want to subpoena witnesses for the hearing we are going to have, you can subpoena witnesses.’ RP (1/7/00) at 54. Judge Warme cautioned, `Ms. Suggs has the right to interview witnesses. You’re not going to like the witnesses she interviews, and you are not going to like the way she conducts her interviews.’ RP (1/7/00) at 55.
On January 14, 2000, Judge Warme entered a temporary order of protection pending a hearing. In the order, Judge Warme arranged to have a visiting superior court judge hear Hamilton’s petition for an anti-harassment protection order and Suggs’ petition for a protection order.[4] In the interim, Judge Warme reminded the parties to stop `any investigations of the other party,’ but he provided that the parties and counsel could `interview witnesses in preparation for litigation’ on the pending orders. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 64.
On May 17, 2000, Hamilton moved the court for an order shortening time and terminating the restraining order granted on October 14, 1999. Judge Draper granted the motion to shorten time and set a telephonic hearing for May 18.
Following that hearing, Judge Draper entered a written order on May 22, 2000, that purported to supersede Judge Warme’s October 14, 1999 order as follows:
The parties should not speak or communicate with one another other than e-mail, or come closer than 20 feet, and shall not engage in any conduct which is intended to annoy the other party.
[Hamilton] may pick up the parties’ children for visits at [Suggs’] residence curbside.3. Further, the court orders the parties to become involved in mediation. Said mediation shall commence not later than June 2, 2000. The parties shall cooperate with Cowlitz County Superior Court Administrator, Nancy Williamson, in determining an appropriate mediator.
CP at 87.
On November 1, 2000, Hamilton filed a motion for an order of contempt against Suggs. He alleged that Suggs violated the January 14, 2000 order prohibiting the parties from investigating each other. Specifically, he alleges that Suggs contacted the Kelso School District Superintendent and Director of Student Services to request an investigation of her suspicion that Hamilton had illegally obtained a telephone line in their son’s name, and that she contacted the Kelso Chief of Police to complain that he was not being cooperative in their mediation.
A hearing on the alleged violations was set for November 9, 2000. Suggs was served with all pertinent motion papers on November 2, and on November 8, 2000, Suggs moved the court for sanctions against Hamilton and for a continuance of the November 9 hearing.
Judge Warme heard argument on Hamilton’s motion for contempt on November 9, 2000, as originally noted. Suggs argued that Judge Warme had initially ordered the parties not to investigate each other, but she argued that the order allegedly violated was superceded by the order Judge Draper entered on May 22, 2000. Suggs contended that she could not be held in contempt for violating the January 14 order because the May 22 order superceded it. Judge Warme granted Suggs’ request for a continuance and set over further argument for November 22, 2000, so that Suggs could be prepared to explain how the May 22 order superceded the January 14 order.
On November 22, 2000, Judge Warme ruled from the bench, `I don’t find anything, any documentation that supports [Suggs’] assertion that the prior order had been superseded [sic]. I think the prior order is still in effect.’ RP (11/22/00) at 5. But, when Judge Warme learned that Judge Draper had earlier referred the matter to mediation, he referred the matter back to Judge Draper.[5] On November 29, 2000, the parties filed a mediated settlement agreement with the court, dated November 18, 2000.
On January 5, 2001, Judge Draper heard argument on both parties’ motions. Judge Draper ruled from the bench regarding the motion for contempt:
I do find Ms. Suggs in contempt for violation of Judge Warme’s order and my order. My order, even though it superceded some of the restraints, said also parties shall not engage in any conduct which is intended to annoy the other party. . . . I find no justification for [Suggs] proceeding the way she did unless it was intended to annoy.
It’s clear Mr. Hamilton was annoyed.
RP (1/5/01) at 46. The record indicates that the acts Judge Draper considered contemptuous were Suggs’ requests, made under the Public Disclosure Act, for public records from the Kelso School District and Kelso Sheriff’s Department.
In ruling that Hamilton was entitled to an order of protection from unlawful harassment, Judge Draper stated:
This pattern couldn’t be much more clear. It is intended to harass, annoy, vex, disrupt, and otherwise harm Mr. Hamilton. Ms. Suggs more than once says, Someone told me this was the way to go. That doesn’t diminish the effect it has on the recipient of this kind of conduct.
RP (1/5/01) at 52. Judge Draper awarded $2,000 in attorney fees to Hamilton. Judge Draper then imposed six months in jail suspended on condition of no further contempt.
On March 6, 2001, Suggs filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Draper’s most recent order, arguing that her inquiries had been made in good faith and that the government’s restriction of her actions was unconstitutional.
On March 8, 2001, Judge Draper issued an order of contempt against Suggs.[6] The trial court found that Suggs had violated the orders of January 14, 2000 and May 22, 2000, by continuing to investigate Hamilton with the intent to annoy him. Judge Draper found Suggs in civil contempt,[7] sentenced her to six months in the Cowlitz County jail, but allowed her to purge the confinement if she refrained from engaging in further contemptuous acts for one year. Judge Draper also entered a judgment against Suggs for $2,000 in accordance with the underlying protective order.
On April 9, 2001, Suggs appealed the contempt and anti-harassment protection orders to this court. We address three issues: (1) Where the respondent has no direct contact with the petitioner is an anti-harassment order proper? (2) Did the trial court err in finding Suggs in contempt for violating the `no investigation’ order? And (3) was the trial court’s contempt penalty civil or criminal?
ANALYSIS
Anti-harassment Protection Order
The first issue Suggs raises is whether the trial court erred by entering a permanent statutory anti-harassment protection order against her.
We review legal issues de novo. But we review factual issues under the substantial evidence test. Substantial evidence is `evidence which Qwould convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the declared premise.” Freeburg v. City of Seattle, 71 Wn. App. 367, 371, 859 P.2d 610
(1993) (quoting Nord v. Shoreline Sav. Ass’n, 116 Wn.2d 477, 486, 805 P.2d 800 (1991).
The anti-harassment statute defines unlawful harassment as `knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.’ Former RCW 10.14.020(1) (1999) (emphasis added). See also RCW 10.14.030(3). Here, the record contains unchallenged facts that show the trial court did not abuse its statutory `broad discretion’ by entering the permanent anti-harassment order of protection against Suggs.[8] RCW 10.14.080(6).
A petition for relief from unlawful harassment shall allege the existence of harassment and shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is sought. RCW 10.14.040(1). Unlawful harassment consists of (1) a knowing and willful, (2) course of conduct, (3) directed at a specific person, (4) which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to a person, and (5) serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. Former RCW 10.14.020(1); Shinaberger ex rel. Campbell v. LaPine, 109 Wn. App. 304, 307-08, 34 P.3d 1253 (2001); see also Burchell v. Thibault, 74 Wn. App. 517, 521, 874 P.2d 196 (1994).
In issuing the anti-harassment order, Judge Draper ruled: Based upon the petition, testimony and case record, the court finds that [Suggs] has engaged in conduct over a period of years which was intended to annoy, harass, vex or otherwise harm [Hamilton] and was not acting pursuant to any statutory authority[.]
CP at 415. See RCW 10.14.030(3).
Suggs sets forth several arguments explaining why the trial court should not have entered a permanent anti-harassment protection order. Suggs first argues that Hamilton’s allegations of defamation are insufficient as a matter of law to support an anti-harassment order under RCW 10.14 because her behavior did not rise to the level of stalking, threatening, and harassing conduct required by the statute and that her conduct consisted of speaking to persons other than Hamilton.
The statute does not require a finding of stalking or threatening to meet the statutory requirements for unlawful harassment. Suggs’ behavior fits within the acts prohibited by the statute. All of Suggs’ inquiries and complaints were directed at Hamilton, albeit through third parties, and appear to be intended to endanger his job and his reputation. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Suggs did not knowingly lodge any accusations about Hamilton. All of her actions were directed toward Hamilton. Rather than merely collecting information for the underlying legal proceedings as she contends, the record indicates that Suggs intentionally made unfounded accusations about Hamilton designed to create a hostile work/living environment and serving no legal purpose.
Suggs next argues that treating defamation as harassment operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because the injunction restrains her from making valid and substantiated allegations about Hamilton to third parties. But not all prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, and libelous speech is not constitutionally protected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (certain classes of speech, including lewd and obscene speech, profane speech, libelous speech, and `fighting words’ are not constitutionally protected); see, e.g., State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 39 n. 1, 9 P.3d 858
(2000) (because libelous speech is not constitutionally protected, it may be the basis for an anti-harassment order), review denied sub nom., Calof v. Casebeer, 143 Wn.2d 1014 (2001). Most of Suggs’ prior allegations have been conclusively shown to be untrue. For example, Suggs concedes that Hamilton probably did not molest their daughter; and contrary to Suggs’ allegation that Hamilton stole her cellular telephone, Hamilton discovered who stole Suggs’ cellular telephone and returned it to her. Suggs next argues that Hamilton’s allegations were not proved by a preponderance of the evidence. It is true that the anti-harassment order is silent as to any burden of persuasion. But the absence of a formal statement of the appropriate standard is not reversible error. The record is replete with evidence of Suggs’ harassing conduct and had the court formally restated the burden of proof it would not have affected the outcome of the case. State v. Gonzales, 90 Wn. App. 852, 855, 954 P.2d 360, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1024 (1998).
Suggs contends that the factors enumerated in RCW 10.14.030 render Hamilton’s allegations unfounded. The trial court’s findings indicate that it considered the statutory factors. The record established that Suggs’ behavior was designed to alarm, annoy, or harass Hamilton and supports the anti-harassment protection order. RCW 10.14.030(3).
Suggs also argues that Hamilton did not suffer substantial emotional distress. The record contains numerous examples of Suggs contacting Hamilton’s superiors in Kelso and Longview, as well as the Cowlitz County sheriff, and the City manager. Any reasonable person would feel that his job may be significantly jeopardized as a result of these allegations. Any reasonable person would suffer substantial emotional distress in this case. Former RCW 10.14.020(1).
Suggs also argues that the permanent order should not have been entered, citing RCW 10.14.080(4), which states that, generally, anti-harassment orders `shall be effective for not more than one year.’ But, the statute allows for extended orders in circumstances where the unlawful harassment is likely to resume when the order expires. Judge Draper specifically held that Suggs was likely to resume unlawful harassment of Hamilton when the order expired and the record supports his finding. Thus, the court had authority to `enter a permanent antiharassment protection order.’ RCW 10.14.080(4).
Finding of Contempt
We next address whether the trial court erred by finding Suggs in contempt of court for violating the `no investigation’ order. We review the issuance of a contempt order for abuse of discretion. State v. Caffrey, 70 Wn.2d 120, 122, 422 P.2d 307 (1966). The contempt order and the issues related to it are technically moot because it expired by its own terms on March 8, 2002, and we can no longer provide Suggs effective relief. In re Truancy of Perkins, 93 Wn. App. 590, 593, 969 P.2d 1101, review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1003 (1999). Although this court is not required to address a moot issue, because the area of civil and criminal contempt continues to be in a state of flux in Washington, we address the contempt finding and the penalty imposed in this case. State v. Cox, 109 Wn. App. 937, 940-41, 38 P.3d 371 (2002), citing Fusato v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Ass’n, 93 Wn. App. 762, 766, 970 P.2d 774
(1999) (public interest exception to general rule that appellate court does not address moot issue applies when merits of controversy are unsettled and continuing question of public importance exists); see, e.g., In re Commitment of McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 838, 676 P.2d 444
(1984).
Initially, we note that to the extent that the court’s `no investigation’ orders infringed on Suggs’ use of the Public Disclosure Act to obtain public documents from the Kelso School District and Kelso Sheriff’s Department, our Supreme Court has now held that a trial court may not prohibit a party from obtaining information through the Public Disclosure Act. O’Connor v. Dep’t of Soc. Health Servs., 143 Wn.2d 895, 25 P.3d 426 (2001). Suggs cannot be lawfully restrained from exercising her right to obtain public information by using the Public Disclosure Act and her use of the Act is not contemptuous.
Moreover, chapter 7.21 RCW is referred to as the `general contempt statute.’ See, e.g., In re Detention of N.M., 102 Wn. App. 537, 540, 7 P.3d 878 (2000); In re Detention of M.B., 101 Wn. App. 425, 440, 3 P.3d 780 (2000); In re Detention of Rebecca K., 101 Wn. App. 309, 317, 2 P.3d 501 (2000).
RCW 7.21.010(1) defines the acts constituting contempt: “Contempt of court’ means intentional: . . . (b) [d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court[.]’ RCW 7.21.030-.050 provide general guidelines for civil (remedial), criminal (punitive), and summary contempt of court, respectively.
There is a well-recognized distinction between criminal and civil contempt proceedings and any judgment rendered thereon. While criminal contempt looks to punishment, civil contempt looks to coercion to compel compliance with an order or judgment requiring performance of some act by the contemnor. In re Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Parent, 112 Wn. 620, 626, 192 P. 947 (1920). The civil contempt power given a court is intended to operate to coerce a party to comply with an order or judgment. A civil contempt sanction will stand as long as it serves coercive, not punitive, purposes. Criminal contempt is punitive. With few exceptions (e.g., civil commitment, compelling testimony) confinement is punitive. A prosecutor must file a complaint or an information to seek a punitive sanction. RCW 7.21.040(2)(a). In criminal contempt cases, the contemnor is afforded `those due process rights extended to other criminal defendants.’ Smith v. Whatcom County Dist. Court, 147 Wn.2d 98, 105, 52 P.3d 485 (2002) (quoting In re Personal Restraint of King, 110 Wn.2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988)).
An order of remedial civil contempt must contain a purge clause under which a contemnor has the ability to avoid a finding of contempt and/or incarceration for non-compliance. Rebecca K., 101 Wn. App. at 314.
Although the court’s March 8, 2001 contempt order included what purported to be a purge clause, the court actually imposed a set term of confinement and then suspended its imposition on conditions that could not be immediately satisfied. Such a penalty is punitive, not coercive, because it does not allow for the purging of the contempt upon compliance with the order, only the avoidance of the punishment. Compare the court’s suspended jail time here with the coercive jail time imposed in other cases. See, e.g., RCW 44.16.1509[9] (failure to appear before legislative committee when attendance is compelled is civil contempt); Penfield Co. of California v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S.Ct. 918, 91 L.Ed. 1117 (1947) (individual may be held in prison while in contempt of order requiring production of documents); Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wn. App. 688, 959 P.2d 687 (1998) (delinquent parent can be detained until he or she pays past due child support), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1017 (1999).
Whether a penalty for contempt is punitive or coercive is not controlled by the presence of purging-type language in the order. The penalty is coercive if and only if the contemnor has the present capacity to purge the contempt and avoid the penalty. Here, the penalty was imposed and suspended on condition that Suggs refrain from engaging in any further `investigations or contemptuous actions’ for one year. CP at 412. Suggs could avoid incarceration by complying with the court’s order, but she had no ability to purge her contempt. Thus, the court’s contempt penalty was punitive and not coercive and was, therefore, not a sanction lawfully available to the trial court in a civil contempt action. Statutory Attorney Fees under Former RCW 4.24.510 (1999)
Suggs argues that she should be granted attorney fees under former RCW 4.24.510. This court reviews the reasonableness of the award or denial of attorney fees under the abuse of discretion standard. A trial court abuses its discretion only when the exercise of its discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons. Boeing Co. v. Heidy, 147 Wn.2d 78, 90, 51 P.3d 793 (2002) (citing Brand v. Dep’t of Labor Indus., 139 Wn.2d 659, 665, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999)).
Suggs characterizes Hamilton’s motion for contempt as a `SLAPP’ suit (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) and claims that she is entitled to immunity under former RCW 4.24.510.
Former RCW 4.24.510, often called the `SLAPP statute,’ provides:
A person who in good faith communicates a complaint or information to any agency of federal, state, or local government, or to any self-regulatory organization that regulates persons involved in the securities or futures business and that has been delegated authority by a federal, state, or local government agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune from civil liability for claims based upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency or organization. A person prevailing upon the defense provided for in this section shall be entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in establishing the defense.
(Emphasis added.) But a claim of immunity under former RCW 4.24.510 is an affirmative defense that may not be raised for the first time on appeal[10] Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 99 Wn. App. 338, 351, 992 P.2d 545 (2000), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 143 Wn.2d 687
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1103, judgment reversed in part, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); see also Port of Longview v. Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd., 96 Wn. App. 431, 435-36, 979 P.2d 917 (1999) (defendant pleaded affirmative defense of immunity under RCW 4.24.510). In issuing the anti-harassment order, the trial court made a specific finding that the court finds that [Suggs] has engaged in conduct over a period of years which was intended to annoy, harass, vex or otherwise harm [Hamilton] and was not acting pursuant to any statutory authority[.]
CP at 415.
Substantial evidence supports the specific finding that Suggs’ behavior was intended to annoy, harass, vex, or otherwise harm Hamilton. Former RCW 4.24.510 does not apply here, and Suggs is not entitled to her attorney fees. But the trial court erred when it found Suggs in contempt for using the Public Disclosure Act and exceeded its authority by imposing a contempt penalty that was punitive and not coercive.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. QUINN-BRINTNALL, A.C.J. We concur:
ARMSTRONG and HOUGHTON, JJ., concur.
(3) Either party may request a domestic violence protection order under chapter 26.50 RCW or an antiharassment protection order under chapter 10.14 RCW on a temporary basis. The court may grant any of the relief provided in RCW 26.50.060 except relief pertaining to residential provisions for the children which provisions shall be provided for under this chapter, and any of the relief provided in RCW 10.14.080. Ex parte orders issued under this subsection shall be effective for a fixed period not to exceed fourteen days, or upon court order, not to exceed twenty-four days if necessary to ensure that all temporary motions in the case can be heard at the same time.
(4) In issuing the order, the court shall consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800.
(5) The court may issue a temporary restraining order without requiring notice to the other party only if it finds on the basis of the moving affidavit or other evidence that irreparable injury could result if an order is not issued until the time for responding has elapsed. Former RCW 10.14.020 (1999) provides:
Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.
(1) `Unlawful harassment’ means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course of conduct is caused by a person over age eighteen that would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child.
(2) `Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. `Course of conduct’ includes, in addition to any other form of communication, contact, or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.’
The court denied Suggs’ petition, ruling, `This matter has been previously litigated and then dismissed. The petition does not allege any new even[ts] occurring since the dismissal.’ CP at 62.
I don’t know what [Judge Draper’s] thoughts were about it, I don’t know what his intentions were about it, but it strikes me that that was certainly not my intention in referring the matter to a visiting judge, that it would go to mediation. There are significant issues here where a judge needs to be involved, needs to be directly involved. This is not a mediation issue. . . . My order has not been superseded [sic] by anything that Judge Draper did, but I really think Judge Draper needs to do this. RP (11/22/00) at 17-18.
The court, in granting an ex parte temporary antiharassment protection order or a civil antiharassment protection order, shall have broad discretion to grant such relief as the court deems proper, including an order:
(a) Restraining the respondent from making any attempts to contact the petitioner;
(b) Restraining the respondent from making any attempts to keep the petitioner under surveillance;
(c) Requiring the respondent to stay a stated distance from the petitioner’s residence and workplace; and
(d) Considering the provisions of RCW 9.41.800
[requiring the surrender of weapons].
RCW 10.14.080(6) (Emphasis added). See also, State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 39-40, 9 P.3d 858 (2000), review denied sub nom., Calof v. Casebeer, 143 Wn.2d 1014 (2001).
RCW 10.14.080(4) provides:
An order issued under this chapter shall be effective for not more than one year unless the court finds that the respondent is likely to resume unlawful harassment of the petitioner when the order expires. If so, the court may enter an order for a fixed time exceeding one year or may enter a permanent antiharassment protection order. Suggs did not contact Hamilton; Suggs’ course of conduct must, therefore, satisfy the statutory definition of a course of conduct that is unlawfully harassing, as defined in former RCW 10.14.020.
RCW 10.14.030 provides:
In determining whether the course of conduct serves any legitimate or lawful purpose, the court should consider whether:
(1) Any current contact between the parties was initiated by the respondent only or was initiated by both parties;
(2) The respondent has been given clear notice that all further contact with the petitioner is unwanted;
(3) The respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner;
(4) The respondent is acting pursuant to any statutory authority, including but not limited to acts which are reasonably necessary to:
(a) Protect property or liberty interests;
(b) Enforce the law; or
(c) Meet specific statutory duties or requirements;
(5) The respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living environment for the petitioner;
(6) Contact by the respondent with the petitioner or the petitioner’s family has been limited in any manner by any previous court order. (Emphasis added.)