STATE OF WASHINGTON, on behalf of JANAKI SWANSON, and JULIAN SWANSON, children, Petitioner v. JEFFREY TODD SWANSON, Appellant, and LYNANN SWANSON, Respondent.

No. 48566-1-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: February 11, 2002. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 95-3-07285-6 Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 04/24/2001.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Jeffrey T. Swanson (Appearing Pro Se), 934 Third Avenue North, Kent, WA 98032.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Megan Goodrick, 900 4th Ave Ste 900, Seattle, WA 98164.

Lynann Swanson (Appearing Pro Se), 7712 Teanaway Road, Cle Elum, WA 98922.

Rian K. Ebesugawa, King Co Pros Aty-Ofc Fam, 900 4th Ave Ste 900, Seattle, WA 98164-1002.

PER CURIAM.

In this support modification proceeding, the trial court granted appellant Jeffrey Swanson’s request for a deviation in the standard support obligation based on Jeffrey’s son from another relationship. But the court denied an additional deviation for Jeffrey’s stepdaughter.

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second deviation, we affirm the decision.

FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts are undisputed.[1]
The State of Washington filed this support modification proceeding in November 2000 on behalf of the two minor children of Jeffrey Swanson and Lynann Swanson. The State alleged that Jeffrey’s income had increased and requested that his current monthly support obligation, which had been set in September 1997 at $904, be raised to $1,041.

In response to the petition, Jeffrey maintained, among other things, that Lynann was voluntarily unemployed while she attended school and requested that the court impute to her a net monthly income of $4,166.67. He also requested that the trial court use the `Whole Family Method’ to calculate a downward deviation based on support obligations for his son from another marriage and for the daughter of his current spouse.

The trial court determined that Jeffrey had a net monthly income of $4,110 and imputed a net monthly income of $1,957 to Lynann. Based on the parties’ combined net monthly income and the child support schedule, the trial court calculated Jeffrey’s proportional monthly support obligation to be $921. The court agreed to use the Whole Family Method and grant Jeffrey a one-child deviation for his son from another marriage, but refused to grant an additional deviation for his stepdaughter. In its oral ruling, the court observed that Jeffrey had voluntarily assumed the additional burden of a stepchild. The court also found that there was no evidence verifying the income of Jeffrey’s new spouse. The court then ordered Jeffrey to pay a total of $768 per month in child support.

ANALYSIS
The trial court’s decision modifying a child support order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[2] The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s refusal to grant an additional deviation for Jeffrey’s stepdaughter, who was living in his new household. Once the trial court has determined the parents’ incomes and the presumptive support obligation, the court has discretion to deviate from the standard calculation based on the nonexclusive list of factors in RCW 26.19.075, including `when either or both of the parents before the court have children from other relationships to whom the parent owes a duty of support.’[3] Deviation from the standard support schedule is appropriate when it would be inequitable not to do so.[4]

Generally, the trial court is required to enter findings of fact specifying the reasons for any deviation or the denial of a request for deviation.[5] The trial court in this case failed to enter written findings to support its decision. But the absence of specific findings of fact does not necessarily require remand if the oral decision reveals the basis for the trial court’s resolution of the issue.[6] The trial court’s decision in this case was based on affidavits, and no court reporter was present for argument or the court’s oral decision. Jeffrey has prepared an undisputed narrative report of proceedings that includes the court’s oral decision. The narrative report of proceedings establishes that the trial court’s denial of the additional deviation was based, at least in part, on the lack of evidence verifying his new spouse’s income. Moreover, the crux of Jeffrey’s argument on appeal is that the trial court misapplied the Whole Family Method of calculation as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, the record is sufficient to permit review of the issues that Jeffrey has raised on appeal, and no useful purpose would be served by a remand for entry of written findings.

Jeffrey contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant an additional deviation from the standard support obligation for the stepdaughter living in his current household. Essentially, he argues that after having agreed to use the Whole Family Method to grant a deviation for his son from another relationship, the trial court was required, as a matter of law, to follow all of the guidelines established by the Support Enforcement Division (SED) of the Department of Social and Health Services when calculating the deviation: `Once [the trial court] determined that the Whole Family Method was appropriate to be used in this case, she bound herself to correctly counting the number of children that Mr. Swanson was obligated to support in applying it.’[7] Because the SED guidelines for the Whole Family Method include stepchildren that are living in the relevant parent’s household, Jeffrey reasons that the trial court was required to grant a deviation for his stepdaughter.

This court recently addressed the Whole Family Method for calculating deviations in In re Marriage of Bell:

Appendix 9 to Kimberley’s brief indicates that the Support Enforcement Division (SED) of the Department of Social and Health Services uses the Whole Family Method to determine the proper amount of deviation from the standard calculation in all cases that involve a parent who owes support obligations to children in more than one household. The Whole Family Method is apparently based only on the total number of children to whom the parent owes support. It involves an initial determination of the health care, day care, and special child rearing expenses for each child for whom support is being determined in a given case, and then mandates a deviation based on the number of other children to whom the parent already owes support.[8] Although the Whole Family Method is a reasonable approach and courts may use the Whole Family Method for guidance, `courts are not bound to use one formula in calculating deviations.’[9] Rather, the Legislature has directed that courts exercise discretion, within certain statutorily specified limits, when considering an appropriate deviation.[10] Consequently, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by refusing to use the Whole Family Method, either in whole or in part.

The narrative report of proceedings indicates that the trial court denied the additional deviation at least in part because Jeffrey failed to submit evidence verifying the income of his new spouse. When determining the child support obligation and whether to deviate from the standard calculation, the trial court considers the income and resources of each party’s household, including the income of new spouses.[11] RCW 26.19.071(2) requires that current pay stubs and the two previous years’ tax returns `be provided to verify income and deductions.’

In his financial worksheet, prepared in November 2000, Jeffrey indicated that his new spouse had a monthly income of $1,000. But the record contains only two W-2 forms showing that she had a gross income in 1999 of about $6,700. Jeffrey submitted no current pay stubs or any other verification for his wife’s current income. Because Jeffrey failed to submit the necessary verification of income required to support his request for an additional deviation, we cannot say that the trial court exercised its discretion in an untenable or manifestly unreasonable way by denying the request.

Jeffrey also contends that the trial court erred by failing to calculate the presumptive child support obligation. But where, as here, the parties have a combined net monthly income of more than $5,000, but less than $7,000, the economic table is advisory, not presumptive.[12]
Jeffrey appears to allege that the trial court was required to undertake some additional calculation before applying any deviation. But he does not identify what the presumptive amount should have been or cite any relevant authority to support his arguments.

Affirmed.

[1] The proceedings below were not recorded, and Jeffrey has submitted a Narrative Report of Proceedings. The State does not challenge the accuracy of the narrative report.
[2] In re Marriage of Blickenstaff, 71 Wn. App. 489, 498, 859 P.2d 646 (1993).
[3] RCW 26.19.075(1)(e); see generally In re Marriage of Bell, 101 Wn. App. 366, 371-72, 4 P.3d 849 (2000).
[4] In re Marriage of Pollard, 99 Wn. App. 48, 55, 991 P.2d 1201
(2000).
[5] RCW 26.19.075(2), (3); see In re Marriage of Bell, 101 Wn. App. at 375.
[6] In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 777, 791 P.2d 519
(1990).
[7] Appellant’s Brief, at 10.
[8] (Footnote omitted.) In re Marriage of Bell, 101 Wn. App. at 374-75.
[9] In re Marriage of Bell, 101 Wn. App. at 375.
[10] In re Marriage of Bell, 101 Wn. App. at 376.
[11] RCW 26.19.071(1), 26.19.075(2), see Brandi v. Talley, 98 Wn. App. 521, 524, 991 P.2d 94 (1999).
[12] RCW 26.19.020