STATE v. SINGH, 51264-1-I (Wash.App. 6-14-2004)

No. 51264-1-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: June 14, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 01-1-10489-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 10/15/2002. Judge signing: Hon. George T Mattson.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Eugene Edward Piculell, Law Office of Gene E. Piculell, 10900 NE 8th St. Ste 1115, Bellevue, WA 98004-4456.

Bhupinder Singh (Appearing Pro Se), C/O Gurmail Singh, 24620 Russell Rd, L-105, Kent, WA 98032.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Catherine Marie McDowall, King County Prosecutor’s Office, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.

PER CURIAM

Bhupinder Singh (“Bhupinder”)[1] appeals his conviction of assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the second of three statements he made to a police officer just prior to his arrest. Because Bhupinder fails to show that his second, exculpatory statement explains his first and third statements, places them in context, corrects misleading testimony, or is necessary to insure fairness, we affirm.

On December 13, 2001, Bhupinder Singh attended services at a Sikh temple in Renton. After the post-service meal, Bhupinder left the temple. He then called the victim, Gurnek Singh (“Gurnek”), out of the temple and stabbed him. After police responded, Bhupinder turned himself in and made a series of three statements to an officer. The trial court admitted the first statement, in which Bhupinder identified himself to the officer as the stabber. The court also admitted the third statement, in which Bhupinder identified the knife as the one he had used to stab the victim. The court excluded the second statement, in which Bhupinder stated to the officer that three men were attacking him when he stabbed the victim.

A jury convicted Bhupinder as charged, and he appeals.

THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS
Bhupinder argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his second statement to police, violating the “rule of completeness.” We disagree.

The “rule of completeness” allows the admission of statements that are needed to clarify or explain other statements that are admitted.[2]
This court has adopted a test stated in U.S. v. Velasco[3] to determine whether the offered statements: (1) Explain the admitted evidence, (2) Place the admitted portions in context, (3) Avoid misleading the trier of fact, and (4) Insure fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.[4]
The offered statements must be relevant, and we will not disturb the evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.[5]

While Bhupinder argues that his statement “meets every part of the [four-part] test,” he is mistaken.

With regards to the first part of the test, Bhupinder makes two arguments. First, he claims that his second statement regarding self-defense was admissible because it explained, modified and rebutted his first statement (admission of stabbing) and his third statement (identification of the knife). Second, he argues that his self-defense statement explains, modifies, or rebuts the State’s evidence that Bhupinder had no marks on his face or body. Neither argument is persuasive.

Bhupinder’s first and third statements were neither vague nor confusing such that additional explanation was required. Moreover, his account of self-defense would neither explain nor modify his other statements identifying himself as the stabber and identifying the knife as his weapon. With regards to the second and third parts of the test, his account of self-defense does not place his first and third statements into context. Nor do his first and third statements mislead the trier of fact such that the self-defense statement is necessary.

Finally, the interests of fairness do not require consideration of Bhupinder’s self-exculpatory statement. He was free to testify and present his theory of self-defense. Nothing more is required on these facts. Bhupinder relies heavily on State v. Alvarado[6] to support the admission of the excluded statements. His reliance is misplaced.

Alvarado addressed ER 803(a)(5), the admissibility of a statement when the declarant is unavailable. Here, the exclusion of a statement under ER 106 is at issue. These issues are not the same.

Bhupinder also argues that the trial court based its decision to exclude his second statement on untenable grounds. He claims that the trial court excluded the statement based on a mistaken belief that the rule of completeness does not apply to statements that are separated in time or made to different people. This claim is not supported by the record. The record reflects that the court based its decision on a distinction between pre- and post-Miranda statements. In using the phrase “distinct and separate statements,” the trial court concluded that: (1) a Miranda warning separated Bhupinder’s first statement from his second and third statements, and (2) that Bhupinder’s second statement, which described three men attacking him, did not add context to his third statement, which identified the knife as the weapon used. The record reflects that the court isolated Bhupinder’s first statement from his second and third statements based on the giving of Miranda, not on the issue of time.

In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the exculpatory statement.

We affirm the judgment and sentence.

ELLINGTON and COLEMAN, JJ.