No. 51066-5-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: June 30, 2003 DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Skagit County Docket No: 01-8-00601-5 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 09/03/2002
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Koch Pllc, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Christopher Gibson, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Erik Pedersen, Attorney at Law, Skagit Co Prosc Atty Ofc, 605 So. 3rd St, Mount Vernon, WA 98273-3867.
Skagit Count Prosecuting Atty, Attorney at Law, 605 So. Third St, Courthouse Annex, Mount Vernon, WA 98273.
GROSSE, J.
When S.R. was thirteen years old, he brutally murdered his eight year old sister. The juvenile court followed the State’s recommendation and imposed a manifest injustice disposition confining S.R. until his twenty-first birthday. S.R. appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to consider his mental illness in crafting a disposition. This argument is not well taken. After hearing the testimony of experts from both the State and the defense, the court appropriately determined that S.R.’s mental illness, and his high risk to reoffend without long-term treatment, required that S.R. be confined for a long and definite period.
The juvenile court put it well, telling S.R.:
You cannot impress your way out of this, you cannot perform your way out of this. You cannot pretend your way out of this. This is until age 21, and it’s until age 21 so that you have no reason to try to put on a front to get out of there early, because it isn’t going to happen. So you might as well let down those barriers as soon as you walk through the door, you might as well tell them what’s going on inside as soon as you walk through the door, because you’re going to be there until age 21, and that’s going to give you the best chance possible of dealing with this problem.
We affirm.
FACTS
On November 14, 2001, S.R. was taking care of his eight year old sister Samantha. He was chatting on the Internet and doing homework when he began having suicidal thoughts. But because he was too afraid to kill himself, he decided to kill his sister instead. He got a small serrated knife from the kitchen drawer and, thinking that it would be easier to clean up blood on tile, asked Samantha to come into the bathroom. Samantha unsuspectingly followed S.R. into the bathroom, where he attempted to slit her throat while she looked at him in amazement. The knife was too dull, and Samantha was able to run out of the bathroom. S.R. picked up a bigger knife from the kitchen, chased after Samantha, and stabbed her in the back while she tried to run out the door. Samantha looked into S.R.’s eyes and said “Call mom.” S.R. said, “Sorry,” stabbed Samantha several more times, and watched her die. He carefully cleaned up and put Samantha’s body in the freezer. He then made two phone calls: the first was to a female classmate to tell her that he “liked her.” The second was to 911.
Police arrived and questioned S.R., who confessed to the crime. He told police he knew what he did was wrong. He did not tell police he was hearing voices, and did not exhibit signs of mental illness. Nor had S.R. exhibited any overt signs of mental illness prior to the murder. After he was arrested and taken to jail, S.R. began claiming that he was “hearing voices.” But his reports of auditory hallucinations were inconsistent.
The State charged S.R. as a juvenile with first degree murder, a charge to which S.R. entered an Alford[1] plea of guilty. At S.R.’s dispositional hearing, the State asked that the court impose a manifest injustice disposition and order that S.R. be confined until his twenty-first birthday, while the defense asked that the court impose a standard range disposition.
The State presented testimony from Dr. Eric Johnson, who testified that he did not believe S.R.’s self-reports of auditory hallucinations, and that S.R.’s answers did not fit the profile of an adolescent who had a psychotic disturbance. He observed that there was no evidence that S.R. suffered from a psychotic condition, or any serious mental or emotional problems, prior to the murder. And there was no evidence during or after the murder of S.R. exhibiting behavior typical of a psychotic episode, as was evidenced by the fact that S.R. cleaned up the crime scene and called a friend before calling the police, and was coherent and articulate when speaking to the police. According to Dr. Johnson, S.R. suffered from obsessive-compulsive disorder but was able to control his behavior, and knew what he did was wrong. Dr. Johnson also testified that S.R. had essentially admitted that he was unwilling to tell the whole truth about what he had done and why because he was afraid of how people would perceive him, and because it would not be good for his case. He then asked Dr. Johnson what could be done to have his charges reduced or to have the judge show leniency. Dr. Johnson was concerned that if S.R. were given a sentence that depended in length on his behavior, S.R. would have incentive not to be open in therapy and would in turn not benefit from treatment, thereby increasing the odds that he would commit future similar acts of violence. Dr. Johnson testified: “A short sentence and a short course of treatment would give him a better chance of maintaining the impressions that he’s very good at maintaining, it would give him the illusion that he can be in control of all this, and that he does not have to let out the whole story.”
The defense presented testimony from Dr. Kenneth Muscatel, who stated that he agreed with most of Dr. Johnson’s testimony. However, Dr. Muscatel concluded that it was likely that S.R. suffered from a psychotic disorder, and did hear voices. Dr. Muscatel conceded, however, that S.R.’s alleged symptoms were “unusual” and that “this is not your typical framework for psychotic.” Dr. Muscatel also agreed that S.R. was in need of long-term intensive care.
The juvenile court found that a standard range disposition would result in a manifest injustice, and therefore ordered that S.R. be confined until his twenty-first birthday. The court relied on several factors in imposing the disposition, including victim vulnerability, and the fact that treatment until age twenty-one was necessary for the safety of the community. The court explained that while the experts could not agree on a diagnosis, they did agree that S.R. was in need of a long period of intensive treatment. In the court’s judgment, this disposition gave S.R. the best chance of getting the treatment he needed. The court agreed with Dr. Johnson’s analysis, and felt that it was appropriate to order a length of confinement that S.R. could not alter by his behavior. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court may impose a disposition outside the standard range if it determines that a disposition within the standard range would “effectuate a manifest injustice.”[2] A “manifest injustice” includes a disposition that would impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act.[3] These purposes include protection of the citizenry and the provision of necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders.[4] S.R. does not challenge the trial court’s findings as to the victim’s vulnerability, or his need for treatment and danger to the community. Rather, he contends that the trial court failed to appropriately take his mental condition into account.
S.R.’s mental illness and need for long-term treatment clearly factored heavily in the court’s determination that a manifest injustice disposition was appropriate. And we reject S.R.’s claim that the trial court improperly relied upon a statutory mitigating factor to impose an aggravated manifest injustice disposition. A mental condition that significantly reduces an offender’s culpability is a statutory mitigating factor.[5] But this does not mean that an offender’s mental illness and corresponding need for treatment may not under certain circumstances constitute grounds for a manifest injustice disposition above the standard range. The need for long-term treatment for an offender who presents a high risk of reoffense has long been recognized as an appropriate basis for imposing a manifest injustice disposition.[6]
In sum, the trial court carefully considered the testimony regarding S.R.’s mental illness, and appropriately determined that a disposition within the standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice given S.R.’s mental illness and need for treatment. We therefore affirm.
COLEMAN and AGID, JJ., concur.
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