No. 21318-8-IIIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three. Panel Nine.
Filed: September 4, 2003 DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County Docket No: 02-1-00334-7 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 07/30/2002
Counsel for Appellant(s), David N. Gasch, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 30339, Spokane, WA 99223-3005.
Sharyl Rose Rustad (Appearing Pro Se), P.O. Box 3164, Deer Park, WA 99006.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kevin Michael Korsmo, Spokane County Prosecutors Office, Ms:st 1116 West Broadway Ave, Spokane, WA 99260.
Andrew J. III Metts, Spokane County Pros Offc, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-0270.
SWEENEY, J.
A police officer may effect a custodial arrest for no valid operator’s license only if there are other reasonable grounds to arrest. State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 877, 863 P.2d 75 (1993). Here, the court found the following grounds sufficient to support a custodial arrest: (1) Sharyl Rose Rustad had no picture identification of any kind; (2) she gave two different names, neither of which came back as registered with the Department of Licensing; and (3) the pickup she was driving was not registered to her. These are sufficient `other reasonable grounds’ to support a custodial arrest. And we affirm the trial judge’s decision to that effect.
FACTS
Sharyl Rustad’s vehicle was stopped by Spokane County Deputy Sheriff Shannon McCrillis for a cracked windshield, no gas cap, and impeding traffic by driving 42 mph in a 55 mph zone. She identified herself as Sharyl R. Amaya. She said she had no driver’s license or picture identification of any sort. The deputy ran a driver’s check through the Department of Licensing (DOL). There was no record of her name on file. Ms. Rustad then told the deputy that she had her driver’s license under the name of Sharyl R. Rustad. A second DOL check again showed no record of that name. Ms. Rustad told the deputy that she was recently arrested for third degree driving with a suspended licensed. The pickup Ms. Rustad was driving was not registered to her.
The deputy arrested Ms. Rustad. When she stepped from the pickup and placed her hands behind her back, white powder sprinkled down from her sweatshirt. When the deputy pulled on the bottom of Ms. Rustad’s sweatshirt, a bag of methamphetamine fell out.
The State charged Ms. Rustad with possession of a controlled substance. Ms. Rustad moved to suppress the drug evidence. The court denied the motion. It found Ms. Rustad guilty after a stipulated facts trial.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Rustad assigns error to the court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Standard of Review. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999). Ms. Rustad does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact. They are, therefore, verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Traffic Stop. The initial stop here was proper. Ms. Rustad was driving with a cracked windshield, without a gas cap, and she was impeding traffic by driving 13 mph under the speed limit.[1]
Custodial Arrest. In State v. Hehman, our Supreme Court declared, as a matter of public policy, that `custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant signs the promise to appear.’ State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978). Further, although `a custodial arrest is not proper for a minor traffic violation[,] . . . we do not imply that a law enforcement officer must disregard custodial arrest if he has other reasonable grounds apart from the minor traffic violation itself. In those situations, the general rules of arrest control.’ Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
In 1979 the Legislature codified Hehman by decriminalizing most traffic offenses, and amending the arrest statutes.[2] Hehman and its codification limit custodial arrests for minor traffic infractions. State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 690, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). Police may now arrest a driver for a traffic violation punishable as a misdemeanor or fine. RCW 46.64.015. But the detention arising from such an arrest may not be for a period of time longer than is reasonably necessary to issue and serve a citation and notice, with certain statutory exceptions not pertinent here.
In Terrazas, we held that custodial arrests for traffic violations were limited to specific circumstances, including `other reasonable grounds’ in addition to a minor traffic violation. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. at 877.
There, police suspected the driver was under the influence after seeing the car cross the divider line. They stopped the car. Id. at 874. The driver told the officer that he did not have a driver’s license. The officer then asked the driver to step out of his car and walked him over near his patrol car. The officer asked the driver his name and date of birth. He suspected the driver had given a false name and patted the driver down for weapons or a wallet with identification. He found neither. The officer concluded that the driver was not under the influence. But he nonetheless arrested him for driving without a license and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Id.
The officer `did not ask any questions regarding [the driver’s] residence, his ties to the community, or his reason for being in that particular location. . . . The trooper did not offer the driver the opportunity to sign a citation to appear in court, because he suspected the driver was using a false name.’ Id. at 874-75. Nor did the officer ask dispatch to run a computer check on the name the driver gave.
The driver in Terrazas gave the officer a false name. Id. at 875. We held that even though the driver was unable to verify his identity `mere suspicion that [the driver] had . . . given a false name is insufficient as other grounds to justify a custodial arrest.’ Id. at 878. The officer did not attempt to verify the information given by the driver or attempt to establish ownership of the car before arresting him. Id. Here, the officer did check both names given by Ms. Rustad.
And the trial court concluded that:
The fact that the defendant gave two names to the deputy, neither of which checked out with the DOL, the truck was not registered to her and she had no picture identification or driver’s license on her possession, was enough, given the totality of circumstances know [sic] to the deputy at the time of the arrest, that it was reasonable to assume the defendant would not respond to a citation if one was issued. The deputy properly exercised his discretion to make a custodial arrest of the defendant.
Clerk’s Papers at 26. That conclusion is amply supported by the court’s findings of fact. And that conclusion supports the `other reasonable grounds’ requirement for arrest here.
We affirm the decision of the trial judge denying Ms. Rustad’s motion to suppress.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KATO, A.C.J. and KURTZ, J., concur.
(2002) (holding traffic stop was not unlawful where the vehicle had a severely cracked windshield and there was no indication the stop was pretextual); State v. Feller, 60 Wn. App. 678, 682, 806 P.2d 776
(1991) (noting that officer lawfully stopped a vehicle with a cracked windshield and no gas cap and whose driver failed to signal a lane change); RCW 46.61.425 (providing that the operation of a vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic unless it is necessary for safe operation is a violation of the rules of the road).
(1992); RCW 46.63.010, .020 (decriminalization and exceptions); RCW 46.64.015 (arrest for traffic violations); RCW 10.31.100 (warrantless arrest).