No. 21927-5-IIIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three. Panel Seven.
Filed: October 14, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No: 02-1-02011-0. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/28/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Tari S. Eitzen.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Cynthia Ann Jordan, Attorney at Law, 921 W Broadway Ave Ste 201, Spokane, WA 99201-2119.
Debra Renee Monroe (Appearing Pro Se), #730919, Pine Lodge-Alpine 15, P.O. Box 300, Medical Lake, WA 99022.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kevin Michael Korsmo, Attorney at Law, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-2043.
KURTZ, J.
Debra Renee Monroe was charged with second degree theft and second degree possession of stolen property. She qualified for the drug court program and signed the standard agreement, acknowledging the conditions of the program and waiving the right to a trial in the event that she was terminated from the program. When Ms. Monroe failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, the court terminated her from the drug court program and found her guilty of the two charges. On appeal, Ms. Monroe contends her due process rights were violated because the court terminated her from the drug court program based on knowledge concerning a new drug charge pending against her. She asserts that her termination from the drug court program was improper absent proof of a conviction on the new charge. We affirm Ms. Monroe’s sentences.
FACTS
Debra Monroe was charged with second degree theft. After she was released from custody, she was evaluated for the drug court program and found to be eligible. Meanwhile, the information was amended to add the charge of second degree possession of stolen property. Ms. Monroe then signed the standard drug court agreement, acknowledging the conditions of the program and waiving her right to trial on both charges if she violated the terms of the program. One of the conditions of the program was that Ms. Monroe was required to appear for all court dates.
When Ms. Monroe failed to appear for a court date on December 16, 2002, a warrant was issued for her arrest. Ms. Monroe and her attorney appeared in court on February 28, 2003. The trial court determined that Ms. Monroe had previously stipulated to the admission and accuracy of the facts related to the charges and that she had waived her right to trial in the event she was terminated from the drug court program. The court found sufficient cause and concluded that Ms. Monroe was guilty of second degree theft and second degree possession of stolen property.
Defense counsel recommended a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) sentence. The prosecutor indicated that while Ms. Monroe had been unsuccessful in the drug court program, the State had no objection to a DOSA sentence. Ms. Monroe asked for DOSA, informing the court that she had `turned [her] life over to the Lord.’ Report of Proceedings at 6. The court imposed a DOSA sentence of 10 months in custody and 10 months of DOSA treatment.
Ms. Monroe appeals. ANALYSIS
Ms. Monroe’s argument on appeal is based on her assumption that she was dismissed from the drug court program because she was charged with a new crime. There is nothing in the record to support this assumption except statements in Ms. Monroe’s pro se notice of appeal.
Contrary to Ms. Monroe’s assertions, the bench warrant here was issued when Ms. Monroe failed to appear for a drug court session on December 16, 2002. Ms. Monroe’s failure to appear at a scheduled court hearing was the only violation of the drug court agreement mentioned by the court when Ms. Monroe was terminated from the program. The record does not support Ms. Monroe’s argument that her new charge was the reason for her discharge. Moreover, even if we assume that Ms. Monroe’s assertion was supported by the record, her argument would still fail. When Ms. Monroe entered the drug court program, she agreed that she would attend all court proceedings, appear in court `regardless of [her] compliance with the treatment program,’ and participate in the recovery program `to the satisfaction of the Court.’ Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 67-68. Ms. Monroe also acknowledged that `any failure of the treatment program,’ including missing treatment and the commission of a new crime, might result in termination from the program.
CP at 68. Hence, the fact that she was charged with a new crime could have been considered as a basis for discharge from the program — but it did not form the basis in this case.
We affirm Ms. Monroe’s sentences.
The majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KATO, C.J. and SCHULTHEIS, J., Concur.