STATE v. MILLER, 30731-6-II (Wash.App. 10-12-2004)

No. 30731-6-IIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: October 12, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County. Docket No: 03-8-00528-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/23/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Diane M Woolard.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Anne Mowry Cruser, Attorney at Law, PO Box 1670, Kalama, WA 98625.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Julie Christine Carmena, Attorney at Law, 1200 Franklin St, PO Box 5000, Vancouver, WA 98666-5000.

HOUGHTON, J.

Joshua Blake Miller appeals his adjudication of second degree malicious mischief, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the property damage exceeded $250. We affirm.

Facts
On June 4, 2003, the State charged Miller, a juvenile, with second degree malicious mischief for damaging William Schult’s vehicle.[1]

At the hearing, Schult testified that approximately one week after someone had damaged his son’s car, he came home to find that someone had thrown rocks at and damaged his vehicle. He testified that the rocks had dented, scratched, or otherwise damaged the vehicle’s hood, windshield, right front fender, roof, door, and side mirror.

Schult further testified that he had been a journeyman mechanic from 1960 to 1988, and a master diesel truck mechanic from 1980 to 1996. Additionally, he acted as `either shop foreman or service manager’ for 22 years and, as part of that job, was frequently responsible for writing out `wreck estimates.’ Report of Proceedings (RP) at 45-46.

When the State asked Schult to estimate the amount of damage to his vehicle, defense counsel objected based on lack of foundation. The court requested additional foundation, and Schult testified that as a service manager he was responsible for warranty work, customer relations, and `wreck estimates.’ RP at 46-47. These estimates included calculating the cost of bodywork needed to repair damaged vehicles. He then estimated that there was approximately $600 to $700 worth of damage to his vehicle if he did not include the damage to the windshield, which appeared minimal, or preexisting paint problems. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.[2]

Miller testified and denied throwing rocks at Schult’s vehicle. Apparently crediting a statement Miller had previously given the police and other testimony establishing that Miller threw rocks at Schult’s vehicle over Miller’s testimony, the court found Miller guilty of second degree malicious mischief. Miller appeals.

Analysis
Challenging the trial court’s finding of fact 63 and conclusion of law,[3] [4] Miller argues that the evidence of value was insufficient to support the guilty finding because Schult did not present any written estimates of the amount of the damages and his estimate was too speculative.

The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628
(1980). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted against the defendant. State v. Anderson, 72 Wn. App. 453, 458, 864 P.2d 1001, review denied, 124 Wn.2d 1013 (1994).

For purposes of a malicious mischief charge, the measure of damages includes diminution in value or the costs of repairs required to restore the damaged property to its former condition. State v. Gilbert, 79 Wn. App. 383, 385, 902 P.2d 182 (1995); State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn. App. 325, 328-29, 730 P.2d 716 (1986), review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1002 (1987). In order to establish that Miller committed second degree malicious mischief, the State had to prove that the damage to Schult’s property exceeded $250. RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a).

Although the State can certainly present specific evidence of damages or cost of repair and may support this evidence with written estimates, Miller cites no cases requiring detailed evidence of repair costs or written estimates. Further, Schult’s testimony here was sufficient to establish the cost of repairs. He testified that the alleged damage was not present before the vehicle was pelted with rocks; described the type of damage that occurred; excluded relatively minor or preexisting damages; and testified, based on his extensive first hand experience with the automobile repair industry, that the damage caused by the rocks would cost at least $600 to repair. Additionally, Miller did not present any evidence contradicting Schult’s estimate. This evidence is sufficient to establish that the damage exceeded $250.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

BRIDGEWATER, J. and QUINN-BRINTNALL, C.J., concur.