No. 19919-3-III.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three. Panel Nine.
Filed: March 14, 2002. UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County, No. 001021641, Hon. Ellen K. Clark, January 25, 2001, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Susan M. Gasch, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 30339, Spokane, WA 99223-3005.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kevin M. Korsmo, Spokane County Prosecutor’s Office, W. 1100 Mallon, Spokane, WA 99260.
Andrew J. Metts III, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-0270.
SWEENEY, J.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Our inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we can conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Here, stolen credit cards were found in the car under the seat where Richard McBride was sitting. A pawn shop receipt bearing his name was found with the stolen credit cards. And the driver of the car saw Mr. McBride remove credit cards from his coat before police stopped the car. This was sufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession of stolen property. We affirm.
FACTS
Richard McBride assigns error to only one of the trial court’s factual findings. The unchallenged factual findings are, of course, verities on appeal. State v. Schmeck, 98 Wn. App. 647, 650-51, 990 P.2d 472 (1999).
The following factual recitation is from the trial court’s unchallenged factual findings. Mr. McBride was the front-seat passenger in a car pulled over by police. Both officers involved in the incident saw Mr. McBride moving around and leaning forward. One officer observed him moving things around on the floor of the car, until the officer asked him to stop.
The vehicle was searched and four credit cards were found under the front passenger seat. The owners of the credit cards did not give Mr. McBride permission to have or use the cards. The driver of the car saw Mr. McBride pull credit cards out of his coat and stuff them in and under the seat. Additionally, a pawn shop receipt in Mr. McBride’s name was located under the front passenger seat. Mr. McBride’s brother was in the back seat of the car. But he did not see or hear what occurred in the front seat because he was more concerned with running from the police. Mr. McBride was charged with four counts of second degree possession of stolen property. He waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The judge found Mr. McBride guilty as charged.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Mr. McBride contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed the stolen credit cards. He claims that the State presented no credible evidence that he placed the stolen credit cards under the seat. Mr. McBride further argues that finding his pawn shop receipt under the seat was insufficient to show possession of the stolen credit cards.
The standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we can conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201; State v. Potts, 93 Wn. App. 82, 86, 969 P.2d 494 (1998); State v. Bridge, 91 Wn. App. 98, 100, 955 P.2d 418 (1998). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201; State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415, 824 P.2d 533 (1992). We give deference to the trier of fact. It is the trier of fact who resolves conflicting testimony, evaluates the credibility of witnesses, and generally weighs the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Prestegard, 108 Wn. App. 14, 23, 28 P.3d 817 (2001); Walton, 64 Wn. App. at 415-16.
“A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if . . . [h]e or she possesses a stolen access device[.]” RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c). A credit card is an access device. RCW 9A.56.010(1). Possession may be either actual or constructive. State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 783, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997). “Actual possession means that the goods are in the personal custody of the person charged with possession; whereas, constructive possession means that the goods are not in actual, physical possession, but that the person charged with possession has dominion and control over the goods.” State v. Staley, 123 Wn.2d 794, 798, 872 P.2d 502 (1994) (quoting State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969)).
Dominion and control over the premises where the contraband is found creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant had dominion and control over the contraband located within. State v. Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 523, 13 P.3d 234 (2000); State v. Tadeo-Mares, 86 Wn. App. 813, 817, 939 P.2d 220 (1997). A vehicle constitutes premises for purposes of constructive possession. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 654, 826 P.2d 698 (1992).
Whether the defendant had dominion and control, and thus constructive possession, is determined by reviewing the totality of the circumstances State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977); Turner, 103 Wn. App. at 521.
One factor showing constructive possession is the ability to reduce the object to actual possession. Turner, 103 Wn. App. at 521; Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. at 783; State v. Hagen, 55 Wn. App. 494, 499, 781 P.2d 892 (1989). Proximity to the contraband is also examined, but mere proximity is not sufficient to establish constructive possession Id. at 498-99. No one factor is dispositive; the court must examine the totality of the circumstances. Turner, 103 Wn. App. at 521.
Here, the trial court found that Mr. McBride had dominion and control over the area where the stolen credit cards were found. The court’s finding is substantially supported. An officer stated that Mr. McBride was leaning forward and moving things around on the floor of the car. Thus, he had the ability to take actual possession of the credit cards Turner, 103 Wn. App. at 521. Additionally, a pawn shop receipt in Mr. McBride’s name was located under the front passenger seat. Sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding of constructive possession. See Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. at 783 (defendant constructively possessed gun located under the seat of the car he was driving).
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. McBride had actual possession of the cards as well. The driver of the car saw Mr. McBride remove credit cards from his coat and stuff them in and under the seat. It was the fact finder’s prerogative to accept the driver’s testimony. Prestegard, 108 Wn. App. at 23; Walton, 64 Wn. App. at 415-16.
In sum, there is sufficient evidence to support Mr. McBride’s convictions for second degree possession of stolen property. We affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KURTZ, C.J. and KATO, J., concur.