No. 61501-7-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
March 2, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 07-8-01499-3, Larry E. McKeeman, J., entered March 13, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
PER CURIAM.
The accomplice liability statute requires knowledge of “the” specific crime charged and not merely any foreseeable crime committed as a result of the complicity.[1] Because the State proved that K.P. provided aid to others knowing they intended to use force to remove property from the person of another, we affirm the juvenile court order adjudicating her guilty of first degree robbery on a theory of accomplice liability.
Acquaintances K.P. and K.E. spent time together one afternoon in March 2007. While at a party where a group of juveniles were drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, K.E. confided to K.P. that he had $80 and a quantity of wine with him that day.
K.P. and a friend arranged for a ride to another party. To K.E.’s surprise, he was not offered a ride to the next party, being told that there was not enough room for him in the vehicle. K.P. and her friend left K.E. near K.P.’s residence.
K.P. then received a phone call from K.L., a friend who had been present at the first gathering. During the call, K.P. told K.L. that K.E. had money and alcohol on his person. K.L. asked for K.P.’s permission to “jump” K.E. K.P. granted her permission and gave K.E.’s cellular telephone number to K.L.
K.L. then called K.E. and arranged for them to meet up. After walking with K.E. for a period, K.L. and his group of juvenile males turned on K.E., hitting him with their fists and a skateboard and eventually knocking him unconscious. When K.E. regained consciousness, his money, alcohol, backpack, and cell phone had been taken from him.
The State charged K.P. with first degree robbery. After a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated her guilty as charged.
K.P. appeals.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
K.P. argues that there was insufficient evidence to find her guilty of first degree robbery as an accomplice because she did not contemplate that the robbery would involve infliction of injury. We disagree.
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewed in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.[2]
A person is guilty of robbery when she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will by the use, or threatened use, of force.[3] If the person inflicts bodily injury in the commission of the crime, she is guilty of robbery in the first degree.[4]
RCW 9A.08.020 provides that a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:
(a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he
(i) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it. . . .[5]
The accomplice liability statute requires knowledge of “the” specific crime charged and not merely any foreseeable crime committed as a result of the complicity.[6] While an accomplice must have known about the specific crime the principal was going to commit, the defendant “need not have specific knowledge of every element of the crime committed by the principal, provided he has general knowledge of that specific crime.”[7]
In State v. Davis, [8] an accomplice, acting as a lookout to a robbery, contested his first degree robbery conviction on the basis that he did not know that the principle was armed with a deadly weapon. Being armed with a deadly weapon, much like inflicting bodily injury, elevates a robbery in the second degree to robbery in the first degree.[9] The court recognized that it had to determine “whether the accomplice liability statute predicates criminal liability on general knowledge of a crime or specific knowledge of the elements of [a crime], i.e. possession of a gun.”[10] The court ultimately held that specific knowledge of the elements of the participant’s crime was not necessary, stating, “[a]s to the substantive crime, the law has long recognized that an accomplice, having agreed to participate in a criminal act, runs the risk of having the primary actor exceed the scope of the preplanned illegality.”[11]
Later cases affirm this principle, but also make clear that an accomplice must, at least, have had knowledge of the particular overall crime intended, not just knowledge that generalized criminal activity would ensue.[12]
While knowledge of the specific crime charged is required, there is no requirement of such specificity that one have knowledge of the particular degree of the crime. In In re the Pers. Restraint of Sarausad II, [13] the court concluded:
[T]he law of accomplice liability in Washington requires the State to prove that an accused who is charged as an accomplice with murder in the first degree, second degree or manslaughter knew generally that he was facilitating a homicide, but need not have known that the principal had the kind of culpability required for any particular degree of murder. Likewise, an accused who is charged with assault in the first or second degree as an accomplice must have known generally that he was facilitating an assault, even if only a simple, misdemeanor-level assault, and need not have known that the principal was going to use deadly force or that the principal was armed.[14]
For the same reasons, the required “specific” crime underlying robbery in the first degree is robbery. The supreme court came to this conclusion in In re Domingo, [15] where, looking back to Davis, it stated, “Davis was validly convicted as an accomplice to first degree robbery even if he did not know the principal was armed because the State proved he had general knowledge that he was aiding in the crime of robbery.”[16]
Here, evidence showed that K.P. gave K.L. information that aided him in the planning and commission of first degree robbery. It was clear to K.P. from K.L.’s words that he intended to take money and property from K.E. by force, including physical assault. K.P. therefore provided aid to others knowing they intended to use force to remove property from the person of another — knowing they intended to commit, at least, robbery in the second degree.[17] Even if K.P. may not have known that the force used against the victim would be so severely executed as to render him unconscious, she had the general knowledge that she was aiding in the crime of robbery. This is sufficient to sustain her conviction for first degree robbery.
We affirm the order of disposition. For the Court:
(2001) (citing State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000)).
does not impose strict liability on accomplices for any and all crimes but merely reaffirms our longstanding rule that an accomplice need not have specific knowledge of every element of the crime committed by the principal, provided he has general knowledge of that specific crime.”).