No. 26102-6-III.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three.
May 1, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 07-1-00138-1, Craig J. Matheson and Cameron Mitchell, JJ., entered May 3 and 25, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Kulik, A.C.J., and Thompson, J. Pro Tem.
BROWN, J.
Jewel E. Johnson appeals her possession of methamphetamine conviction, contending the trial court erred in denying her CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the evidence found inside her purse. She argues the stop leading to her arrest and search violated the pretext principles of State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). We disagree, and affirm.
FACTS
The trial court’s CrR 3.6 findings are unchallenged. Thus, they are verities on appeal. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489
(2003).
While on regular patrol, Police Officer Hyrum Stohel testified he saw a minivan stopped at a red light. Officer Stohel pulled up behind the minivan to wait for the light. The minivan began to turn right without signaling. Halfway into the turn, the driver turned on the right-turn signal. As the minivan turned, Officer Stohel saw a large crack in the vehicle’s windshield. He decided to stop the driver, but before he could activate his emergency lights, the driver pulled into a driveway and stopped. The officer contacted the driver, who was identified as Ms. Johnson. He had no previous knowledge of Ms. Johnson’s identity or criminal history prior to contacting her.
Officer Stohel told Ms. Johnson why he stopped her and asked for her driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance. Ms. Johnson produced an expired driver’s license, but told the officer she had a valid one. The officer called dispatch to verify Ms. Johnson’s driver’s license status, learning her license was suspended in the third degree. Officer Stohel arrested Ms. Johnson. In a search incident to arrest, the officer found a crystalline substance, which later tested positive as methamphetamine, inside a wallet in Ms. Johnson’s purse located on the seat of the minivan.
The State charged Ms. Johnson with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. She requested CrR 3.6 suppression of the methamphetamine, arguing Officer Stohel’s stop was an unlawful, pretextual stop under Ladson. The court disagreed, concluding Officer Stohel had probable cause to contact Ms. Johnson based on her failure to use her turn signal. Following a stipulated-facts trial, the court found Ms. Johnson guilty as charged. She appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the court erred in denying Ms. Johnson’s CrR 3.6 evidence suppression motion and concluding her stop did not violat Ladson pretext principles.
On a motion to suppress where the findings of fact are unchallenged, we review de novo whether the findings support the trial court’s legal conclusions. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004).
A traffic stop is a “seizure” for purposes of our constitutional analysis. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350. Therefore, it is subject to the reasonableness criteria of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Traffic stops are constitutional if the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has violated the traffic code. Probable cause exists if the officer’s knowledge of the facts and circumstances are “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed.” Clement v. Dep’t of Licensing, 109 Wn. App. 371, 375, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001).
A pretextual traffic stop occurs when police pull over a citizen with the aim of conducting an investigation that is unrelated to driving, rather than stopping the individual with the goal of enforcing the traffic code. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349. Pretextual stops “generally take the form of police stopping a driver for a minor traffic offense to investigate more serious violations — violations for which the officer does not have probable cause” to investigate. State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 94-95, 69 P.3d 367 (2003). Pretextual stops are not permitted under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 353. When determining if a stop is pretextual, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including both the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior and the subjective intent of the officer. Id. at 358-59. If the stop is pretextual, all evidence flowing from the stop must be suppressed. Id. at 359 (citing State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)).
RCW 46.61.305(2) requires a driver to signal his or her intent to turn left or right not less than 100 feet before turning. Officer Stohel observed Ms. Johnson begin a right turn without signaling. At that point, he had probable cause to stop her, regardless of when Officer Stohel turned on his emergency lights. Emergency light use is generally considered in deciding whether a seizure occurred. See State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 716, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (use of emergency lights — one circumstance to be considered in reviewing whether request for identification was a seizure) (citing People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 71
(Colo. 1998)).
After a traffic stop, an officer is permitted to detain a person to, among other things, “check the status of the person’s license.” RCW 46.61.021(2). Officer Stohel properly requested Ms. Johnson’s driver’s license after stopping her for failing to signal. Because Ms. Johnson could not produce a valid driver’s license, Officer Stohel properly contacted dispatch. Upon learning her license was suspended in the third degree, he arrested her. The search incident to arrest led to the methamphetamine.
Because the stop was lawful, the later obtained evidence flowing from the stop was admissible. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Ms. Johnson’s CrR 3.6 motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Kulik, A.C.J.
Thompson, J. Pro Tem.