No. 28033-7-IIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: October 18, 2002 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County, No. 011009025, Hon. James Edgar F. Warme, November 8, 2001, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), John A. Hays, Attorney At Law, 1402 Broadway, Suite 103, Longview, WA 98632.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Heiko P. Coppola, Deputy Pros Atty, Cowlitz Co Pros Aty Offc, 312 S.W. First Ave, Kelso, WA 98626.
BRIDGEWATER, J.
Kimberly Kay Heinzman appeals her conviction of manufacture of marijuana. She claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence discovered in her home because the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish the citizen informant’s basis of knowledge. We conclude that the affidavit clearly established the informant’s basis of knowledge. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 10, 2001, the State charged Heinzman with one count of manufacturing marijuana. Following her arraignment, Heinzman moved to suppress the evidence seized in a search of the home she shared with her boyfriend.
She asserted that the affidavit the police provided in support of the warrant request was insufficient because it failed to establish the citizen informant’s basis of knowledge. The affidavit contained the following information related to the citizen informant:
On 09/05/01, Longview Police Officer Chris Trevino contacted affiant. Officer Trevino told me that he had a female by the name of Melissa Christine Hinton . . . inside the Police Department that was a victim of an assault. Officer Trevino stated that HINTON’s soon to be ex-husband and his mother had assaulted her and took her child. Officer Trevino related that while HINTON was inside the Police Department she told him about an indoor marijuana grow. Officer Trevino asked if I could speak with her.
On 09/05/01, Det. Cruser and I spoke with HINTON . . . . HINTON told me that two days ago, on 09/03/01, she was at 165 Niblett Way in Longview. HINTON stated that her soon to be ex-mother in law’s boyfriend, Jim Rasmussen lives at this residence. While there HINTON stated that she observed 10 growing marijuana plants in the spare bedroom closet. Hinton stated that these plants were in the `budding’ stage and that they were approximately three feet in height. HINTON also stated that she observed three hooded lights over these plants in the closet as well as watering devices. HINTON stated that earlier on during the growing cycle of these plants, she observed them up in the attic of this residence. HINTON stated that the access for the attic is in the attached garage/laundry room area. HINTON also stated that she heard Rasmussen talk about having 30 “clones” in the attic. . . .
HINTON is familiar with growing and processed marijuana. HINTON advised that she has used marijuana in the past and has been around three different marijuana grows in the past. HINTON stated that her brother used to grow and sell marijuana extensively, and that she was around a lot of marijuana, both growing and processed while living in the Spokane area near her brother. HINTON is not receiving any compensation for providing this information.
Clerk’s Papers at 14-15.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Heinzman guilty after a bench trial on stipulated facts. Heinzman appeals.
ANALYSIS
To determine whether an informant’s tip establishes probable cause for a search warrant, we apply the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli[1] test. The Aguilar-Spinelli test is appropriate to evaluate information received by an identified citizen informant named in the affidavit in support of the request for a warrant. State v. Wible, Wn. App., 51 P.3d 830, 835 (2002) (citing State v. Northness, 20 Wn. App. 551, 582 P.2d 546 (1978)). The first prong of this test requires that the affidavit provide the judge issuing the search warrant with sufficient facts to determine whether the informant has a basis for the allegations. The second prong requires that the affidavit provide sufficient facts for the judge to determine the informant’s veracity or reliability. When the informant is an ordinary citizen rather than a criminal or professional informant “and his identity is revealed to the issuing magistrate, intrinsic indicia of the informant’s reliability may be found in his detailed description of the underlying circumstances of the crime observed or about which he had knowledge.” Northness, 20 Wn. App. at 557.
We review a trial court’s Aguilar-Spinelli determinations based on “the credibility and reliability of confidential informants or anonymous tips” for abuse of discretion. In re Detention of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 800, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (clarifying the standard of review and holding that de novo standard applies to court’s legal determination that probable cause exists and abuse of discretion standard applies to factual determination of whether it should consider a confidential or anonymous informant’s information). An application for a search warrant should be judged in the light of common sense with doubts resolved in favor of the warrant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 904, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977); see also State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 875-76, 991 P.2d 668 (2000) (unidentified citizen informant).
To establish a basis for an allegation that someone is committing a crime involving a controlled substance, the affidavit must contain more than the identified informant’s personal belief that what she observed was a controlled substance; it must also establish that she had the skill, training, or experience necessary to identify the controlled substance in question. State v. Matlock, 27 Wn. App. 152, 155-56, 616 P.2d 684 (1980); cf. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. at 875. The affidavit here satisfies this requirement.
Here, Hinton stated that (1) she had used marijuana in the past; (2) she had been around three other grow operations; (3) her brother had frequently grown and sold marijuana when she lived near him in Spokane; and (4) she had frequently been around both growing and processed marijuana. A court could reasonably infer from this information that Hinton had the experience necessary to allow her to recognize growing marijuana and marijuana grow operations. Further, Hinton’s description of the 10 plants, the lighting system, and the watering devices, all located in a relatively hidden location and her observation of the starter plants in the attic would allow an ordinary, prudent person with Hinton’s background to infer that she had observed criminal activity in the house.
Heinzman argues that the affidavit here is similar to those in State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695, 812 P.2d 114 (1991), and Matlock, which were deemed insufficient to support the search warrant request. We disagree.
First, we note that Ibarra is inapposite here because it concerned an informant whose name was known to the police officer affiant but not to the judge reviewing the warrant request. Here, Hinton’s name, as well as her relationship with the affected parties, was set out in the affidavit in support of the warrant request for the judge to review. Cases addressing anonymous or known but unnamed informants do not control our analysis here.
Further, in Ibarra, the affidavit stated that the informant knew what cocaine was, that he recognized the tools used to ingest cocaine, that he knew what cocaine packaged for sale looked like, and that he saw what he believed to be cocaine in the defendant’s house. 61 Wn. App. at 697. But the affidavit did not supply information concerning how the informant obtained this knowledge. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 702. Similarly, in Matlock, the affidavit merely stated the reporting officer/eyewitness’s conclusion that the plants he observed in the defendant’s window “appeared to be Marijuana, a Controlled Substance,” 27 Wn. App. at 154, but it lacked any facts establishing that the officer had the skill, training, or experience necessary to identify marijuana plants. 27 Wn. App. 155-56. Unlike the affidavits in these cases, the affidavit here detailed Hinton’s personal experience with processed and growing marijuana and her previous exposure to marijuana grow operations.
Nor do we find persuasive Heinzman’s contention that the affidavit was insufficient because it “contains no claim from the affiant officer that (1) the informant made a detailed statement of what he or she saw, and (2) that from the officer’s training and experience, he could conclude that the informant was describing a marijuana grow.” Br. of Appellant at 11. The affidavit clearly provided a detailed statement of what Hinton observed in the house. Further, the affidavit provided sufficient information from which the court issuing the warrant could conclude that Hinton had a basis for recognizing the plants and concluding that they were part of a marijuana grow operation.
Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude from the representations in Hinton’s statements that there was a probability of criminal activity; a statement that the officer providing the affidavit came to the same conclusion was not required. See Wible, 51 P.3d at 834, (affidavit relying on citizen informant sufficient if it sets forth first-hand factual information so that the magistrate could determine that the informant had a basis for the allegation). Thus, we hold that the affidavit satisfied the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and the trial court did not err when it denied Heinzman’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BRIDGEWATER and HUNT, JJ., concur.