THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. LUDVIG PEDERSON HAMMOCK, Appellant.

No. 25764-9-III.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three.
February 26, 2008.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 06-1-03088-6, Harold D. Clarke III, J., entered December 15, 2006.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Sweeney, C.J., and Schultheis, J.

BROWN, J.

Ludvig Hammock appeals his first degree malicious mischief conviction, contending no evidence supports his conviction because the damaged car had a value far less than the damage repair estimate of $1,594.35. We affirm.

FACTS
The State charged Mr. Hammock with first degree malicious mischief based on these facts that are recounted most favorably to the State under our standard of review. According to the trial testimony, in August 2006, Mr. Hammock took a used stove to sell to Croteau’s Appliance in Spokane. Mr. Hammock negotiated with store manager, Ronald Aldrich. About 15 to 20 minutes after completing their business, Mr. Aldrich noticed a commotion in front of the store. Mr. Hammock was chasing a man around two parked cars. Later, Mr. Aldrich saw Mr. Hammock chasing a man around his own car and then climb onto it. He saw Mr. Hammock leap to the hood, then the top, and then slide off the rear trunk. He saw Mr. Hammock grab at the side-view mirror while chasing the man. Store owner, Don Udseth, saw Mr. Hammock on top of the rear of Mr. Aldrich’s car. When Mr. Hammock refused to stop, Mr. Aldrich called the police.

Mr. Aldrich took his car to J A Body shop to get a damage repair estimate. Mr. Aldrich pointed out dents, scratches, and drag marks on the hood, top and rear deck of the car and a cracked side-mirror he related to this incident. J A manager Wayne Shelton testified he estimated the repair damages at $1,594.35, giving the details of how he reached his damage estimate.

Mr. Aldrich testified he purchased the damaged 1982 Pontiac 6000 LE for $250 and testified that it ran well after some engine repairs and was in good body condition, except for a missing grill. Mr. Aldrich traded the car prior to trial. The trade-in value was $300. Due to his high deductible, Mr. Aldrich did not file an insurance claim.

The court instructed the jury on the crime of first degree malicious mischief, defining “physical damage” as “in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any diminution in the value of any property or the reasonable value of necessary repairs to any property which was damaged as a consequence of an act.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 133. The defense mainly consisted of urging it was impossible to do so much damage to such a low priced car. The jury found Mr. Hammock guilty. Mr. Hammock appealed.

The State has abandoned its appeal of the trial court’s decision to deny restitution.

ANALYSIS
The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Mr. Hammock’s first degree malicious mischief conviction. Mr. Hammock contends the State failed to prove damages exceeding $1,500 to Mr. Aldrich’s car.

We review an evidence sufficiency challenge in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We accept the State’s evidence as true and view all reasonable inferences for the State Id. Circumstantial evidence is as reliable as direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the trier of fact in matters of witness credibility and evidence weight. State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992). We will affirm if the trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.

A person is guilty of first degree malicious mischief if the person “knowingly and maliciously” “[c]auses physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.” RCW 9A.48.070(1)(a). The unchallenged jury instructions define the term “physical damage” as “in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any diminution in the value of any property or the reasonable value of necessary repairs to any property which was damaged as a consequence of an act.” CP at 133. This instruction conforms to State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn. App. 325, 328-29, 730 P.2d 716 (1986).

Mr. Hammock does not dispute the accuracy of the $1,594.35 damage repair estimate, but argues it is not possible to inflict that damage to such a low priced vehicle. He is wrong. The vehicle purchase price and trade-in value are irrelevant since the court properly instructed the jury under Ratliff
that it could convict based on the value of repairs. Accordingly, because the evidence viewed most favorably for the State shows the damage was caused by Mr. Hammock, was malicious and exceeded $1,500, sufficient evidence supports Mr. Hammock’s conviction.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

Sweeney, C.J., Schultheis, J., concur.