STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JULIE DIANE HALL, Appellant.

No. 53778-4-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: April 18, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 03-1-00766-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/09/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Ronald X Castleberry.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.

Cheryl D. Aza, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701, Seattle, WA 98101-3635.

Julie Diane Hall (info Only) (Appearing Pro Se), 12402 8th Dr SE, Everett, WA 98208.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Charles Franklin Blackman, c/o Snohomish County Pros, 3000 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4061.

PER CURIAM.

Julie Hall appeals her conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. The initial search of Hall’s bag was a valid Terry[1] search for officer safety and supported the denial of Hall’s motion to suppress. The stipulated evidence adequately supported the finding of guilt; and the findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient to allow adequate review. We affirm Hall’s conviction.

FACTS
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 20, 2003, Lynnwood police officers James Hoffman and Brian Jorgensen were dispatched to the Meadowdale Apartments in Lynnwood in response to a 911 call. The call was made by an individual who identified himself and said he had seen two people drive into the apartment parking lot in a small brown car without its lights on, park in the back of the lot, and check cars in the lot in a suspicious way.

Upon their arrival, Officers Hoffman and Jorgensen spoke with Officer Byrd, who was already on the scene talking with a suspect. Officer Byrd directed the officers to a car that matched the description given in the dispatch. A woman later identified as Julie Hall was in the car. There was a cylindrical object on Hall’s lap, and her hands were not visible. The officers asked Hall to show her hands, and she eventually complied. Hall handed the cylindrical object, a flashlight, to Officer Hoffman. The officers asked Hall for identification, and she reached into a bag or purse at her feet. Hall reached around in the bag with her left hand while attempting to shield the view into the bag with her right, and appeared increasingly agitated. The officers became concerned for their safety and asked Hall to remove her hands from the bag. Hall did not comply. After the officers repeated their requests that Hall show her hands several times and she failed to comply, Officer Hoffman reached through the open car window and grabbed Hall’s hand. Hall pulled away, and Officer Jorgensen opened the car door. The officers pepper sprayed Hall, took her from the car, put her on the ground, and handcuffed her.

Officer Hoffman looked in the bag and saw drug paraphernalia. He arrested Hall for possession of drug paraphernalia and obstructing a law enforcement officer. The officers then searched the bag incident to arrest and found $7,000 and two large bags of white powder that was later determined to be methamphetamine.

Hall was charged under RCW 69.50.401(a) with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. After a hearing pursuant to CrR 3.5 and 3.6, the trial court denied Hall’s motion to suppress all evidence gathered after she was seized. Hall agreed to a trial on stipulated facts, including all evidence in the affidavits of probable cause and the reports, statements, lab tests, photos, diagrams, and other documents presented with the stipulation.[2] The trial court found Hall guilty as charged and imposed a standard range sentence. Hall appeals.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Hall contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found in her bag because the search was neither incident to arrest nor a valid component of an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.[3] In a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law regarding the validity of a search de novo.[4]

As the State argues, there were two searches in this case: in the first, Officer Hoffman looked into Hall’s bag after she had been removed from the car and handcuffed; in the second, the officers searched Hall’s bag after arresting her for obstructing a law enforcement officer and possession of drug paraphernalia. The State agrees with Hall that the first search was not incident to any arrest; rather, it argues that this search was never meant to be more than a search for weapons based on fear for the officers’ safety. We agree.

By definition, a Terry stop is “a brief, warrantless investigative stop or seizure.”[5] Although an individual’s freedom may be curtailed in order to effectuate the investigation, the purpose of the stop is to allow police to determine whether criminal activity is actually occurring. “In the context of an admittedly valid stop, any reasonable basis supporting an inference that the investigatee . . . is armed will justify a protective search for weapons.”[6] If police find no such activity, the assumption is that the individual will be free to leave. Because a Terry stop is by nature transitory, the scope of the search for weapons must be sufficient to assure the officers’ safety,[7] while at the same time being limited to its protective purpose.[8] A search for weapons prompted by concern for officer safety may extend to the area within the suspect’s immediate control[9] so that, if he is ultimately released, he cannot at that point obtain and use a weapon.

In this case, the trial court found that the officers had an articulable suspicion that Hall was involved in vehicle prowling as the result of the 911 call from an identified citizen. When Hall began reaching around in her bag while trying to screen it from the officers’ view, and then failed to respond to their requests to show her hands, the officers had a valid concern for their safety. In her Statement of Additional Grounds for Review, Hall argues that she was confused about what the officers wanted her to do and that she was unable to get out of the car because she was still in her seatbelt. Hall did not testify, and the issue is whether the officers had any reasonable basis to believe she was armed. Given her behavior and what they knew at the time, we conclude that the officers’ actions were justified under Terry.

We acknowledge that Hall argues she was seized before the officers physically grabbed her hands. We conclude that the seizure occurred when the officers commanded Hall to remove her hands from the bag, and that the search was valid because of the concern for safety. This concern allowed the officers to limit Hall’s freedom of movement for a period long enough to perform a limited search of the bag. After the officers removed Hall from the car and handcuffed her, Officer Hoffman looked into the bag; this was a valid, limited search incident to a Terry stop.

Upon looking into the bag, Officer Hoffman saw a drug pipe. He immediately recognized that it was a drug pipe, stopped the search, and arrested Hall for possession of drug paraphernalia, a crime under the Snohomish County Code,[10] and for obstructing a law enforcement officer. Once Hall was under arrest, the subsequent full search of the bag was incident to arrest.

The trial court did not err in denying Hall’s motion to suppress the evidence found in her bag.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Hall contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of guilt because there was no evidence that the substance found in her bag was ever sent to the Washington State Crime Lab for testing to determine whether it was methamphetamine. On appeal, the evidence is sufficient if, viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.[11]

Although she argues that the State failed to present evidence that the white powder found in her bag was tested by the State Crime Lab, Hall stipulated to all the facts set out in the affidavit for probable cause. This affidavit states: “The Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory has confirmed the white powder is 40.9 grams of methamphetamine.”[12] This stipulated fact sufficiently establishes that the substance in Hall’s bag was methamphetamine. The State sufficiently proved the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS FOR REVIEW
Hall contends the findings of fact are insufficiently specific to allow for appellate review. Hall cites State v. Barber,[13] where the trial court’s findings regarding a Terry investigative stop failed to include the specific facts relied on as the basis of the stop. But in this case, the findings set out the specific facts the officers knew when they arrived on the scene, and the events that occurred after their arrival that led to Hall’s seizure and arrest. These facts explain and support the conclusions of law, and the court’s conclusions that “the initial conversation was a simple community contact” and that the contact “did not go beyond this until the request for identification was made” are clear enough to allow review.[14]

Affirmed.

SCHINDLER and BECKER, JJ.

[1] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968).
[2] Clerk’s Papers at 70.
[3] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.
[4] State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).
[5] State v. Marcum, 116 Wn. App. 526, 531, 66 P.3d 690 (2003), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (emphasis added).
[6] State v. Wilkinson, 56 Wn. App. 812, 818, 785 P.2d 1139
(1990).
[7] State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
[8] State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d 919 (1993).
[9] State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d at 12.
[10] Snohomish County Code 10.48.020.
[11] State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (citations omitted).
[12] Clerk’s Papers at 157.
[13] State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992).
[14] Clerk’s Papers at 55.