No. 35111-1-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
May 30, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Mason County, No. 05-1-00475-4, James B. Sawyer II, J., entered June 26, 2006.
HOUGHTON, C.J.
Patricia Glaser-Gibson appeals her conviction and sentence on four forgery counts. She argues that the trial court violated her right to confront adverse witnesses by excluding evidence. She also contends that the statutes under which she was convicted and the charging document are ambiguous and unenforceable. We affirm.
FACTS
This case revolves around the will of David Barnett,[1] who died on January 21, 2005. Sometime in the middle of February, his brother Phil received a copy of a will. Phil immediately realized the signature was not his brother’s and reported it to the police.
Shelton Police Department Detective Harry Heldreth investigated the report. Because Glaser-Gibson’s signature and notary stamp appeared on the will, Heldreth contacted her for more details. Glaser-Gibson told Heldreth that she acknowledged David’s signature, as well as the signatures of two witnesses, on January 10, 2005.
But as the investigation continued, Heldreth began to suspect Glaser-Gibson was not being truthful. Gerald Thomas, a long-time friend of the Barnett family, reported that he had seen David’s sister Nancy filling out a will shortly after David’s death. April Bunting and Steve Stryker, who signed the will as witnesses, confessed to Heldreth that they signed the will after David’s death. Ultimately, Nancy admitted that she prepared the will after David was already dead. She claimed that Glaser-Gibson signed David’s name to the will and then notarized it.
The State charged Glaser-Gibson with four counts of forgery, alleging alternatively that she acted as a principal or an accomplice in executing the false will. The first three counts concerned the false notarizations, while the fourth count alleged that she “did possess, utter, offer, dispose of, or put off as true a written instrument which she knew to be forged.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 104-06.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. When Nancy testified, Glaser-Gibson sought to introduce certified copies of the information to which she pleaded guilty and her statement on plea of guilty. The trial court found the documents not relevant, offered only to mislead the jury, and refused to admit them.
The jury convicted Glaser-Gibson on all counts. She appeals.
ANALYSIS Confrontation Clause
Glaser-Gibson first contends that the trial court deprived her of her right to confront Nancy when it refused to admit documentation of her forgery conviction. Glaser-Gibson argues that because the information and statement on plea of guilty establish February 22, 2005, as the date on which Nancy committed forgery and because the falsified will was filed on February 15, 2005, Nancy could not have committed the crime to which she pleaded guilty. Accordingly, Glaser-Gibson argues that the documents were relevant because they were inconsistent with Nancy’s testimony at trial.
We review the exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 618, 132 P.3d 80 cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 559 (2006). A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004).
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983). But there is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. State v. Jones, 117 Wn. App. 221, 233, 70 P.3d 171 (2003). Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a fact that is consequential in light of the other facts and the substantive law. ER 401; State v. Baldwin, 111 Wn. App. 631, 638-39, 45 P.3d 1093 (2002) aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 448, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).
Here, the proffered documentation was not relevant to any disputed issue in Glaser-Gibson’s case. She argued to the trial court that it was relevant to impeach Nancy’s credibility. But the documents do not tend to prove or disprove any tendency to lie on Nancy’s part and are not relevant for that purpose.
Moreover, Glaser-Gibson did not question Nancy about the circumstances of her guilty plea, despite the trial court’s ruling that she could do so. Because she was free to confront Nancy about her guilty plea, and there is no indication the documentation was necessary for effective cross-examination, the trial court’s ruling did not violate her Sixth Amendment rights.
In any event, the possibility that the documents would mislead the jury outweighed their tenuous relevance. When evidence is only minimally relevant, the trial court may exclude it if the need to limit its prejudicial effects outweighs its probative value. ER 403; Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 16. The State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the February 22 date on the documents was merely a scrivener’s error. Introducing the documents would have served only to mislead the jury by placing undue emphasis on the possible date of the forgery, which was not a consequential fact in the case. This argument fails.
Ambiguity
Glaser-Gibson further argues that the second amended information is inadequate because it alleged she was either a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the forgery, and because the meaning of “put off” is ambiguous.
A charging information is sufficient if it states the essential elements of the crimes so that the accused may understand the charges and defend against them. State v. Goodman, 108 Wn. App. 355, 359, 30 P.3d 516 (2001). A person commits the crime of forgery either by personally performing the prohibited acts or by acting as an accomplice. RCW 9A.60.020; RCW 9A.08.020(2)(c).
It is well established that when there are alternative ways of committing a crime, the State may charge both alternatives in the same count. State v. Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 800, 802 P.2d 116 (1990). Here, the State could charge Glaser-Gibson alternatively as a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the forgeries and her argument lacks merit.
The argument that the information is ambiguous also lacks merit. The forgery charges alleged that Glaser-Gibson “did possess, utter, offer, dispose of, or put off as true a written instrument which she knew to be forged.” CP at 106. “Put off” means “to sell or pass fraudulently.” Webster’s Third New Intern’L Dictionary 1850 (2002). The information put Glaser-Gibson on notice that the State charged her with fraudulently passing David’s will as genuine and was legally sufficient.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Quinn-Brintnall, J. and Penoyar, J. concur.