No. 24920-1-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: February 2, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County, No. 97-1-01116-9, Hon. Marywave Van Deren, July 2, 1999, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Linda J. King, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 881008, Steilacoom, WA 98388-1088.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Barbara L. Corey-Boulet, Pierce County Deputy Pros. Atty., County City Bldg., 930 Tacoma Ave. S., Tacoma, WA 98402-2177.
J. DEAN MORGAN, P.J.
Raallan Garred appeals a denial to set aside his conviction for first degree child rape and third degree child molestation.
We affirm.
Facts
On March 18, 1997, the State charged Garred with one count of first degree child rape and two counts of first degree child molestation. The State agreed to amend the information to one count of first degree child rape (Count I) and one count of third degree child molestation (Count II).
In exchange, Garred agreed to enter Alford-Newton guilty pleas to both counts.[1] Garred’s attorney read the plea agreement to him[2] and discussed with him the constitutional rights he was waiving. Then, on April 15, 1997, Garred pleaded guilty to each count.
A sentencing hearing was convened on June 2, 1997. Garred and the State both agreed to an offender score of 7 for Count I and 5 for Count II, resulting in a standard range of 159-210 months on Count I and 17 to 22 months on Count II. The State and Garred agreed to a sentence recommendation of 205 months for Count I, and to no recommendation on Count
II.
Defense counsel did not argue the `washout’ of a prior attempted burglary conviction because of Garred’s agreement with the State on the offender scores and sentencing recommendation. The trial court sentenced Garred to 210 months on Count I and 22 months on Count II, to be served concurrently.
Garred later filed a personal restraint petition with this court. He argued in part that the trial court had improperly calculated his offender score. On September 24, 1998, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. On June 16, 1999, Garred filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court declined, and Garred filed this appeal.
Analysis
Garred appeals the denial of his pro se motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that the law upon which he was convicted is unlawful, therefore the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Garred’s attorney concedes the invalidity of this argument and does not include it in her brief. We reach the same conclusion by independent review. We hold that the argument is meritless.
Although Garred’s pro se motion to dismiss raised only the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Garred’s counsel now attempts to raise the issue of whether his sentence was based on an improperly calculated offender score. However, we decline to consider this issue. The Supreme Court held in State v. Brand[3] that `a court may not consider a CrR 7.8(b) motion if the movant has previously brought a collateral attack on similar grounds.’[4] Brand applies here because Garred made the same claim in his earlier PRP, and he has not shown good cause to address the issue again.[5]
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
WE CONCUR: HOUGHTON, J., BRIDGEWATER, J.
(1970); State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976).