No. 50615-3-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: September 22, 2003. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-8-01723-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/11/2002.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Thomas Michael Kummerow, WA Appellate Project, Cobb Bldg, 1305 4th Ave Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101-2402.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Tami A. Perdue, City of Kent Law Department, 220 4th Ave S, Kent, WA 98032-5838.
PER CURIAM.
Corey Dillworth challenges the restitution order that followed his juvenile adjudication for third degree assault, contending the State failed to establish a causal relationship between his crime and payments by the victim’s employer for the victim’s medical care and time off work.[1] But considered together, the itemized description of the care provided, the victim’s sworn statement, and a report from the victim’s employer sufficiently demonstrates that the payments would not have been needed but for the commission of the crime. We affirm. Corey Dillworth pleaded guilty in juvenile court to third degree assault for punching Metro bus driver Mohsen Teheri. At sentencing, the court imposed restitution in an amount to be determined at a hearing.
At the hearing, the State presented a signed statement under penalty of perjury by Teheri, a facsimile cover sheet provided by Colleen Boyd, a King County claims officer, and an itemized list of expenditures by King County Safety and Claims management for medical costs and time off work. Defense counsel objected to part of the claim, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish a causal connection between the crime and some of the damages. The court disagreed and ordered the full requested amount of restitution. Appellate review of an order of restitution under the Juvenile Justice Act is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the restitution.[2] There must be a causal connection between the crime and the victim’s loss.[3] The requisite connection exists when `but for’ the offense committed, the loss would not have occurred.[4]
Once the fact of damage is established, the precise amount does not have to be shown with mathematical certainty.[5] `Evidence of damage is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’[6]
Dillworth concedes that the order was proper as to $120 for out of pocket losses and medical expenses for CAT scans, x-rays and emergency room treatment.[7] He argues that the statement of expenditures is insufficient to support the restitution order as to claims for dental and optical work and lost wages. But Dillworth overlooks the information from the detail provided in the statement of charges and the statements by Ms. Boyd and Mr. Teheri, all included in the State’s exhibit 1.
The list of medical services details the type of service provided, the date provided, and the doctor or caregiver involved. The date of the assault was April 8. Dental services began on April 10, with a series of items listed including charges for an `oral eval,’ `Root canal therapy 2 canals,’ and two sets of `core build-up.’ On April 18, there are two more charges for `Crown porcelain w/noble met.’ Ms. Boyd wrote, as to the dental work, `the dental report indicated sign{s} of trauma to several teeth, also consistent with the reported assault, requiring emergency repair.’ Given the dates and details, this provided sufficient evidence for the court to draw a rational inference that the assault damaged Mr. Teheri’s teeth sufficiently to require root canals and crowns. As to the optical charges, on May 13, Mr. Teheri received a new patient eye exam. Ms. Boyd wrote `{t}he report from the optical clinic indicates findings of corneal abrasion as well as {a} wound to the forehead, providing suitable documentation that the visit was a direct result of the injury and not a routine optical exam.’ The court did not abuse its discretion in finding the requisite causal connection as to this item either.
Finally, as for the time off work, Mr. Teheri missed all work from April 9 through July 2. King County Safety and Claims found a net total of $10,253.45 as the loss, and Mr. Teheri, in his sworn statement, estimated the lost wages at $14,000. Dillworth argues that the injury to Mr. Teheri was merely superficial and cannot support this high level of time off work. But the reference in the record to the word `superficial’ is a description of the medical work that was done in response to the surface wound, not a minimization of the overall seriousness of the assault. Trial counsel acknowledged to the court that Mr. Teheri had to receive twelve stitches to close the wound on his head and agreed that x-rays and CAT scans were appropriate because Mr. Teheri had apparently lost consciousness from the blow. Mr. Teheri received repeated x-rays and CAT scans, with the final set of tests occurring June 14. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the lower amount provided by the Safety and Claims office.
The cases Dillworth cites are distinguishable. In State v. Bunner,[8]
a DSHS medical recovery report was insufficient because it did not indicate why services were provided.[9] Despite having `no idea’ of how the report established a causal relationship, the trial court relied on it to impose restitution.[10] Relying on Bunner, the court in State v. Hahn[11] reversed where the State again relied solely on a DSHS report of payments that did not link the charges to any particular symptoms or treatments. Here, the information about the injury and treatment supports a finding of a causal relationship. There was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
SCHINDLER and GROSSE, JJ., concur.
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