STATE v. CROWL, 29921-6-II (Wash.App. 11-25-2003)

No. 29921-6-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three.
Filed: November 25, 2003. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of Cowlitz County. Docket No: 02-1-01240-7. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/17/2003.

Counsel for Appellant(s), John A. Hays, Attorney at Law, 1402 Broadway St, Longview, WA 98632-3714.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael H Evans, Attorney at Law, 312 SW 1st Ave, Kelso, WA 98626-1739.

QUINN-BRINTNALL, A.C.J

Following a bench trial, the court convicted Ralph Chester Crowl of three counts of luring in violation of RCW 9A.40.090. Crowl contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS Luring
In September 2002, four boys under the age of 16[1] were walking home from school on a warm, sunny day. As the boys walked alone along Bloyd Street in the direction of their respective homes, Crowl stopped, backed up, and turned around, driving towards the boys. Crowl approached the boys, slowed his vehicle, and completely stopped within two to three arms length of the boys.

The boys testified that Crowl asked, `Do you want a ride?’ 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 42. One of the boys did not clearly understand what Crowl said and asked, `What?’ 1 RP at 42. Crowl again asked, `Hey, kids, do you want a ride?’ and moved his hand in a beckoning motion. 1 RP at 43. Frightened, the boys ran toward their homes.

A neighbor had been watching as Crowl approached the boys. She saw the boys take a step toward the vehicle as if trying to hear something Crowl said. After the boys ran, the neighbor hurriedly went and spoke with them. The boys told her that Crowl had asked them if they wanted a ride.

At the time of the incident, Crowl was working as a landscaper on Bloyd Street. Crowl admitted to making contact with the boys. Crowl had never previously met the boys or had contact with their parents.

Procedure
Crowl was charged with three counts of luring[2] in violation of RCW 9A.40.090, a Class C felony. Crowl waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found Crowl guilty as charged and sentenced him to serve one year in jail for each count, to run concurrently.[3]

ANALYSIS Standard of Review
Crowl contends that the State did not present substantial evidence to convict him of the three counts of luring. In an appeal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we inquire `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. Myles, 127 Wn.2d 807, 816, 903 P.2d 979
(1995) (quoting State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 338, 851 P.2d 654 (1993)). We draw all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor and against the defendant. Joy, 121 Wn.2d at 338-39. We need not be convinced of the truth of the charge, but we must be convinced that on the evidence in the record any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 63 Wn. App. 703, 708, 821 P.2d 543, review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1028
(1992). For purposes of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant admits the truth of the State’s evidence. Jones, 63 Wn. App. at 707-708.

Luring
Crowl contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish the elements of luring because (1) his acts did not amount to `enticement’ and (2) he did not act with the requisite mens rea for the crime. A person commits the crime of luring if the person: (1)(a) Orders, lures, or attempts to lure a minor . . . into a motor vehicle; (b) Does not have the consent of the minor’s parent or guardian . . .; and (c) Is unknown to the child. RCW 9A.40.090. The term `minor’ refers to a person under the age of 16. 9A.40.090(3)(a). It is an affirmative defense to luring, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, and the defendant did not have any intent to harm the health, safety, or welfare of the minor. 9A.40.090(2).

Neither RCW 9A.40.090, nor chapter 9A.40 RCW, explicitly define the terms `lure’ or `luring,’ but Washington case law has determined that a commonly understood use of the word is to `entice.’ State v. Dana, 84 Wn. App. 166, 172, 926 P.2d 344 (1996), review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1021 (1997). `Moreover, the connotation of the word `lure’ amplifies that meaning by implying that one who lures another leads that person into a course of action that is wrong or foolish under the circumstances.’ Dana, 84 Wn. App. at 172. Luring is not an invitation alone; enticement, by words or conduct, must accompany the invitation. Dana, 84 Wn. App. at 176. In Dana, Division One of this court found the statute sufficiently definite to inform a reasonable person of what conduct it proscribes. 84 Wn. App. at 172.

Crowl contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that his actions amounted to `enticement’ and argues that his actions amount to only a propositional statement. Crowl distinguishes Dana by noting that Dana propositioned two minors to get into his car while exposing his genitals. Such blatant sexual conduct is, however, not an element of luring. Crowl turned his vehicle around, drove towards a group of boys he had never met before, stopped his vehicle within two to three arms length of the boys, and twice asked `Do you want a ride?’ while moving his hand in a beckoning motion. The evidence established that Crowl attempted to entice a minor who did not know him to enter his vehicle, without the consent of that minor’s parent. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Crowl’s words and conduct constituted enticement and proved the elements of luring. Accordingly, we affirm Crowl’s conviction.

Crowl also asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he acted with any `evil intent.’ Crowl believes that the legislature used the term `lure’ in order to establish a mens rea element necessary for a conviction of luring. But the intent of the perpetrator is not an element of luring. RCW 9A.40.090; Dana, 84 Wn. App. at 177. See also 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 19.02.01, at 71 (Suppl. 1998). The legislature defined elements of luring in plain and unambiguous language. RCW 9A.40.090. Crowl requests that we establish an additional `intent’ element for the crime of luring. This, however, we will not do. See State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wn.2d 724, 734, 991 P.2d 80
(2000) (It is the function of the legislature, not the court, to define the elements of a specific crime.).

Accordingly, we affirm Crowl’s conviction.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

HOUGHTON, J. and BRIDGEWATER, J., concur.