No. 25638-3-III.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three.
May 22, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 04-1-00343-2, Kathleen M. O’Connor, J., entered September 29, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Schultheis, C.J., and Sweeney, J.
BROWN, J.
Shawn Cranford appeals his firearm convictions, contending the State failed to prove, and the court failed to find, the guns possessed met the statutory “firearm” definition. We disagree, and affirm.
FACTS
In 2006, the State charged Mr. Cranford in part with possession of a stolen firearm and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The State separately listed two stolen handguns, a .357 Rossi and a .38 Smith Wesson. According to Sheriff’s Deputies Tammy Spitzer and William McCrillis, the .38 was loaded with five rounds and the .357 was unloaded and stored with six rounds of ammunition. Firearms examiner Stanley McGee determined the .38 fired normally; he did not test the .357. The court in a bench trial found Mr. Cranford constructively possessed the stolen firearms beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of operability. Mr. Cranford appeals.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether, considering operability and the statutory firearm definition, the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged.
We review a trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence State v. Schwab, 141 Wn. App. 85, 91, 167 P.3d 1225 (2007). We review de novo a trial court’s conclusions of law. Id. The court’s findings of fact must support its conclusions of law. State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852, 858, 177 P.3d 139 (2008).
The State must prove the crime elements beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 801, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). A person is guilty of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm “if the person . . . has in his or her possession . . . any firearm after having previously been convicted . . . of any serious offense.” RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). A person “is guilty of possessing a stolen firearm if he or she possesses . . . a stolen firearm.” RCW 9A.56.310(1). “Firearm” is defined as “a weapon or device from which a projectile or projectiles may be fired by an explosive such as gunpowder.” RCW 9.41.010(1), .040(1)(a); RCW 9A.56.310(5). The term “may be fired” includes unloaded, malfunctioning, and disassembled guns “that can be rendered operational with reasonable effort and within a reasonable time period.” State v. Padilla, 95 Wn. App. 531, 535-36, 978 P.2d 1113 (1999); State v. Wade, Page 3 133 Wn. App. 855, 873, 138 P.3d 168 (2006), review denied, 160 Wn.2d 1002 (2007); State v. Berrier, 110 Wn. App. 639, 645, 41 P.3d 1198 (2002); State v. Faust, 93 Wn. App. 373, 381, 967 P.2d 1284 (1998).
Here, the deputies found a loaded gun and an unloaded gun with ammunition; neither were disassembled or had missing parts, thus, rendering them permanently inoperable. Even if both guns failed to properly fire upon testing, malfunctioning or temporarily inoperable guns are still “firearms” under RCW 9.41.010(1). Padilla, 95 Wn. App. at 535-36; Wade, 133 Wn. App. at 873; Faust, 93 Wn. App. at 381. The record supports the court’s findings of fact and its findings of fact support its conclusions of law.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Schultheis, C.J., Sweeney, J., Concur.