STATE v. CHRISTENSON, 25931-1-II (Wash.App. 10-12-2001)

Nos. 25931-1-II, 25935-4-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: October 12, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.

Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County, No. 99-1-02858-1, Hon. Nile E. Aubrey, April 21, 2000, Judgment or order under review.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Linda J. King, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 881008, Steilacoom, WA 98388-1008.

Rebecca W. Bouchey, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 64095, University Pl, WA 98464.

Stephanie C. Cunningham, Attorney At Law, Pmb 304 2522 N.PROCTOR St, Tacoma, WA 98406-5338.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Kathleen Proctor, Pierce County Deputy Pros Atty, Co City Bldg, 930 Tacoma Ave So Rm 946, Tacoma, WA 98402-2177.

KAREN G. SEINFELD, J.

Jeremy Christenson appeals a conviction of first degree felony murder and John Wesley Horn appeals a conviction of first degree premeditated murder. Both convictions relate to the stabbing and strangulation death of Bernard Lane. Both appellants claim that the trial court, in their consolidated trial, should have suppressed evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop in Oregon. They also raise sufficiency, evidentiary, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error claims. In addition, Horn argues that the trial court violated his right of confrontation when it admitted Christenson’s incriminating statement to the police into evidence. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.

FACTS
On June 23, 1999, Christenson, Horn, and Coley Howard were working for the same temporary labor service in Tacoma. They decided to pool their money for a motel room and spent the next three evenings at the motel smoking crack cocaine that they obtained from people they met at the motel or that Christenson and Horn met while bar hopping. After work on June 26, Howard returned to the motel while Christenson and Horn again went bar hopping. According to Horn, he and Christenson ran into Lane, the murder victim, who offered to sell them some crack cocaine, and the three of them then returned to the motel room where Horn, Christenson, and Howard pooled their money to buy $60 worth of crack from Lane. Howard’s testimony differed. He said that Lane was not among the people who returned to the room with Christenson and Horn and that he provided $40 to buy the drugs to mollify the prospective drug sellers. The drug sellers eventually left.

According to Howard, after the drugs were consumed, Horn said that he was going to go out and `jack [rob] some crackhead’ so he could finish getting high. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 482. Horn wrapped a dollar bill around some newspaper to make it look like he had more money. Christenson and Horn then left the room, telling Howard to stay behind.

Horn testified that he, Christenson, and Howard decided to try to make a deal for some more drugs although they did not have any money left. Horn testified that he responded facetiously to Howard’s queries about how they were going to get drugs without money by stating: `What do you want me to do, jack a drug dealer?’ RP at 868. Christenson and Horn left the room and met up with Lane, who said he would make some telephone calls to get some drugs.

Christenson and Horn returned to the motel room with Lane, who had a large Bowie knife that he showed to the other three. Howard said that at some point Horn asked him to get a soda and, as he prepared to leave the room, he heard Horn say quietly to Christenson: `Are you ready to do this?’ RP at 490.

Horn’s description of events differed. He testified that Howard got up and said he was going out for a soda. After Howard left, Lane pulled out his knife, got up out of his chair, and said, `give me your f-ing money. I’m going to kill you.’ RP at 875. He then stabbed Horn in the arm. Horn said that he and Lane fought for the knife and that Christenson tried to help Horn by grabbing Lane’s throat and punching him in the face. Horn grabbed the knife and started stabbing Lane when Lane lunged at him; he continued to stab Lane until Lane stopped struggling. When Horn finally stopped stabbing Lane, the knife was in Lane’s chest but Lane was still alive.

In his redacted statements, Christenson said that he went out that night to get someone to `jack’ and bring back to the room and that Howard was not in the room when Lane was killed. Christenson denied stabbing anyone but admitted that he had strangled and hit Lane and then put a knife in Lane’s hand to make it look like self-defense. Christenson also acknowledged that he was trying to get Lane to let go of the knife during the fight.

According to Howard, when he returned to the room, Lane was lying on the floor making loud wheezing noises with a knife protruding from the right side of his face. When someone came to the door and asked if everything was all right, Horn sent the person away. Howard, fearful that the sounds would attract someone to the room, asked someone to do something. Someone then went over to Lane but Howard did not see what that person did.

Howard then saw Lane kneeling, facing toward the window, and Horn punching Lane on the top of the head. After a second person came to the door, Howard put a pillow over Lane’s face to muffle the wheezing noises.

At that point, he noticed that the knife was now in Lane’s chest. According to Horn, Howard stuffed a paper in Lane’s mouth, put a pillow over Lane’s face, and continued to strangle Lane with his other hand for about two and a half minutes.

At about 11 p.m. that evening, Horn, Christenson, and Howard left for Oregon. The next morning, a motel maid found Lane with a knife sticking out of his chest, a piece of paper stuffed in his mouth, and a pillow over his face. On July 3, Oregon State Police Troopers arrested the three men on material witness warrants during a traffic stop near Bend, Oregon. The State then charged them as accomplices with first degree premeditated murder with a deadly weapon enhancement and, in the alternative, with first degree felony murder based on robbery, also with a deadly weapon enhancement. Howard agreed to testify at trial in exchange for a reduced charge of rendering criminal assistance in the first degree, to which he pleaded guilty.

The jury convicted Horn of first degree premeditated murder while armed with a deadly weapon. The jury found Christenson guilty of the first degree felony murder alternative but acquitted him on the deadly weapon enhancement.

I. Joint assignments of error A. Motion to Suppress — Oregon Stop
Christenson and Horn argue that their seizure near Bend, Oregon, was unlawful under both Oregon and Washington law and, thus, based on the `silver platter’ doctrine, the trial court should have suppressed the resulting evidence. Alternatively, they ask this court to abandon the silver platter doctrine and find that the seizure was unlawful under Washington law.

Neither appellant raised this issue below by moving to suppress the challenged evidence; thus, they may not raise it on appeal unless it involves `manifest error affecting a constitutional right.’ RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). To establish `manifest error,’ there must be actual prejudice. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333-34 (no relief where undeveloped record did not indicate whether trial court would have granted motion to suppress because this showing was necessary to establish actual prejudice); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App. 307, 311, 966 P.2d 915 (1998) (record must be sufficiently developed to establish whether suppression motion clearly would have been granted).

The record indicates that on July 3, 1999, an Oregon trooper saw a Toyota truck towing a black Dodge van. The truck was traveling at 25 to 30 mph in an area where the traffic flow was 60 mph; the towed vehicle had no hazard lights; and there were only two people in the truck’s cab, which had three seat belts, while there were three people in the truck’s bed.

The trooper stopped the truck because the vehicle’s slow speed and lack of hazard lights created a hazard and because under Oregon law, passengers must use all available seat belts before they are exempt from the seat belt law. He discovered that neither the driver nor any of the vehicle’s occupants had a valid driver’s license.

The trooper first asked everyone for their names and birth dates to investigate the seat belt violation. The three passengers in the truck’s bed identified themselves as James Maxwell, Jr., Eric Ray Marcus, and Joshua J. Swanson and said they did not have any identification because they had been robbed in Seattle. They claimed that they had been issued either an identification or driver’s license from the states that they claimed to be from but when the trooper performed a check on their stated names and birth dates, he found no matching records.

At this point, the trooper asked everyone to stay put and he called for backup. He testified that he had safety concerns because he was dealing with five people and because the person later identified as Horn failed to follow his repeated requests not to come close. Once backup arrived, the first trooper took Howard aside. After the trooper told Howard that he did not believe him, Howard provided his true name. A subsequent records check revealed a material witness warrant out of Tacoma. The same process occurred with Christenson and Horn. All three men were ultimately arrested on the Washington warrants.

The discussion with Christenson lasted approximately six minutes but Horn did not reveal his true identity for about 40 minutes. According to the trooper, Horn was `calm’ and `[h]e didn’t appear hardly nervous. The only sign of nervousness that I noted was his jaw was kind of working a lot, the muscles in his jaw were tense. Otherwise, he was able to look me right in the eyes as I talked with him. Didn’t seem real uptight.’ RP at 222. The entire stop lasted about 1 hour and 45 minutes.

The so-called `silver platter’ doctrine, which allows a court to admit evidence lawfully obtained by officials from other jurisdictions, initially applied to the exchange of evidence between federal and state officials.

The Washington Court of Appeals described it as `the principle that evidence independently and lawfully obtained by federal officers acting pursuant to federal law is admissible in Washington state criminal proceedings, even when evidence obtained in a similar manner by state officers would violate state constitutional strictures.’ State v. Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. 119, 120, 796 P.2d 728 (1990).

The Washington Supreme Court recently broadened the principle’s application to the exchange of evidence between two states. See State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). The Brown court held that the silver platter doctrine applies if (1) the evidence was lawfully obtained in the foreign jurisdiction, and (2) the officers of the foreign jurisdiction were not acting as agents or with the cooperation or assistance of the officers of the forum state. 132 Wn.2d at 587-88; see also Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. at 125.

1. Oregon Law — Traffic Stop

Christenson and Horn claim that the Oregon troopers exceeded their statutory authority to make a stop for a traffic violation. Based on this claim, they argue that the evidence was not admissible under the silver platter doctrine. Under Oregon law, it is a traffic violation for occupants of a vehicle not to wear seat belts and they are not exempt from the law until all available seat belts are in use. Or. Rev. Stat. §811.210(1)(c) (2001); Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.215(5) (1999). An officer `[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification and issuance of citation.’ Or. Rev. Stat. § 810.410(3)(b) (1999).[1] But `an officer who stops a person for a traffic infraction may investigate only that infraction, unless the state can point to some basis other than the traffic infraction to broaden the scope of the investigation.’ State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or. 206, 895 P.2d 306, 309
(1995). See also State v. Aguilar, 139 Or. App. 175, 912 P.2d 379, 382
(1996) (`[W]e conclude that reasonable suspicion that a defendant has committed illegal acts, other than a traffic infraction, is the proper standard for permitting an officer to broaden the scope of an investigation during the course of a traffic stop.’).

Here, after stopping the Toyota truck for a possible seat belt violation and for the lack of hazard lights, the trooper discovered that the driver did not have a valid license. Thus, he had to find someone else who could lawfully drive the truck. When the passenger in the cab did not have a driver’s license, the trooper asked the other three passengers for their names and birth dates. A records check revealed no records for people with those names.

These facts supported a reasonable suspicion to broaden the scope of the stop. Further, the trooper had safety concerns based on the number of people involved in the stop and Horn’s behavior. See, e.g., State v. Senn, 145 Or. App. 538, 930 P.2d 874, 876 (1996) (`An officer safety inquiry or frisk in the course of a traffic stop does not violate ORS 810.410(3)(b), so long as that inquiry or frisk is justified by reasonable suspicion[.]’). Based on the minimal record before us, Christenson and Horn have not established that their seizure was unlawful under Oregon law.[2]

2. Cooperation or Assistance of Washington Officers

Horn and Christenson also argue that the silver platter doctrine does not apply because the Oregon troopers were acting as `agents’ of Washington State or with the `cooperation or assistance’ of Washington State’s officers. See State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692, 699, 879 P.2d 984 (1994); Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. at 125. But the minimal record before us does not support this argument.

There is no evidence of any prior official contact between Oregon and Washington officers concerning the appellants, much less any evidence of antecedent planning, joint operations, or other cooperative investigation. Cf. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 700-01 (Washington officers cooperated with Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents by accompanying agents to defendant’s property, taking aerial photographs at DEA’s request and turning photographs over to DEA, taking part in execution of search warrant, gathering evidence, and prosecuting suspects).

The record shows only that someone contacted Tacoma officers and apprised them that the appellants were in custody in Oregon. Moreover, there is no indication that Oregon officers were involved in the interviews of the three men conducted by Tacoma officers who traveled to Oregon. See, e.g., Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 588-90 (no agency or cooperation where Palm Springs police notified King County police that defendant had confessed to a killing in Seattle area and King County police asked Palm Springs police to interview defendant; King County police did not tell Palm Springs police what to ask or how to conduct interview); Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. at 121, 125-26 (no agency or other cooperation where Bellingham police officer relayed information to DEA that defendant would be trafficking cocaine through Seattle-Tacoma airport; no evidence that Bellingham officer requested subsequent vehicle search by DEA or knew search would occur). Nor have Christenson and Horn shown that excluding the evidence would further any legitimate state interest. Deterrence of police misconduct is not a concern here because no Washington officer violated state law or violated privacy interests protected by Washington law. See Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 590; Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. at 126.

Consequently, because the appellants have not shown that their seizure was unlawful under Oregon law or that Oregon troopers were acting with the cooperation or assistance of Washington officers, the challenged evidence fit within the silver platter doctrine.

3. Continued Viability of the Silver Platter Doctrine

Alternatively, Christenson and Horn ask this court to abandon the silver platter doctrine. But they offer no compelling reason for doing so other than claiming that this is the current `trend’ in other jurisdictions and is recommended by legal commentators.

The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged and applied the doctrine as recently as 1997, and we recently recognized the doctrine’s continued existence, referencing it by analogy. See Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 585-91; State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. 370, 379-80, 20 P.3d 430, review denied, ___ P.3d ___ (2001). We noted that the `doctrine is based upon the idea that because state constitutions have inherent jurisdictional limits, it would disserve the principles of federalism and comity to subject foreign law enforcement officers to state constitutions.’ Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. at 380. Thus, the silver platter doctrine remains viable in Washington.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel — Motion to Suppress
Christenson and Horn assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on their attorneys’ failure to move to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly unlawful seizure in Oregon.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent the unprofessional errors. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). See also State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (claim fails if either prong is not met). There is a strong presumption that counsel provided effective representation; legitimate trial tactics will not constitute deficient performance. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335; State v. Garrett, 124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P.2d 185 (1994).

The failure to file a motion to suppress is not per se deficient representation. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336-37. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that if counsel had made the motion, the court `probably’ would have granted it. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 337 n. 4; State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App. 307, 319, 966 P.2d 915 (1998). Given the above discussion, Christenson and Horn cannot show that the court probably would have granted their motion to suppress. Thus, their ineffective assistance claims fail.

C. Photographic and Video Evidence
Christenson and Horn next challenge the trial court’s admission of crime scene and autopsy photographs and a videotape of the crime scene.

They assert that the evidence was cumulative and unduly prejudicial.

Accurate photographic depictions are admissible, even if gruesome, if their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect. State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789, 806, 659 P.2d 488 (1983). The State may introduce photographs to prove every element of the crime and to rebut all defenses but it must exercise restraint in offering inflammatory or unnecessary evidence. State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 609, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995); Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 807. As with other evidentiary decisions, the trial court has substantial discretion in admitting photographic evidence and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 806.

The State offered 117 crime scene and autopsy photographs and a videotape of the crime scene. Horn and Christenson initially objected to 25 of the photographs but later withdrew three of their objections. The trial court sustained six of the objections (including trimming one photo in response to an objection) and admitted only 16 pictures over defense objections. The trial court also overruled the defendants’ objection to the crime scene videotape finding that it, unlike the photographs, provided an overall perspective of the scene.

Christenson and Horn assert generally that the information provided by the photographs was cumulative because it came in through testimony and other evidence. But the availability of other evidence alone does not support exclusion of photographic evidence. State v. Stackhouse, 90 Wn. App. 344, 358, 957 P.2d 218 (1998). We find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its substantial discretion. See State v. Daniels, 56 Wn. App. 646, 649, 784 P.2d 579 (1990) (`Unless it is clear from the record that the primary reason to admit gruesome photographs is to inflame the jury’s passion, appellate courts will uphold the decision of the trial court.’).

II. Appellant Horn’s assignments of error A. Confrontation Clause
Horn asserts that the State did not properly redact the incriminating statement of his nontestifying codefendant, Christenson, and, thus, it was error to admit the statement at their joint trial.

Although courts generally presume juries will follow their instructions, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the admission of the incriminating statements of a nontestifying codefendant at their joint trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, notwithstanding any limiting instruction. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). See also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 690, 879 P.2d 971 (1994). As the Bruton court stated:

there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.

391 U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted).

The Bruton holding is a `narrow exception’ to the presumption that jurors follow their instructions. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Thus, `the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence’ does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211. But redactions that merely leave a blank space, the word `deleted,’ or other similar obvious indications of alteration to remove the defendant’s name, do violate Bruton. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998).

Here, Christenson’s statement to the police incriminated himself and Horn. Although the trial court had expressed reservations about admitting the statement in a joint trial, it ultimately allowed the State to use the redacted statement but left the door open for motions should a Confrontation Clause issue arise.

At trial, the State’s last witness was a Tacoma detective who testified about Christenson’s statement, in part, as follows:

Q Did Mr. [Christenson] say if he stabbed a man?
A He said he did not stab anyone.
Q Did he indicate if Coley Howard was in the room when the black man was killed?
A Yeah. He said Coley was not in the room.
Q Did Mr. [Christenson] say if he had done anything to that black man?
A Yes, he did. He said he had strangled him, hit him a few times, and placed a knife in the man’s hand when he left.
Q Did he say why he had put the knife in the man’s hand?
A To make it look like a self-defense, a fight, or a fair fight.

RP at 759-60. In cross-examination, Horn elicited more of Christenson’s statement describing a struggle between Lane and another person. Christenson did not testify.[3]

Horn testified that he stabbed Lane, arguing that he did it in self-defense. In closing argument, Horn used Christenson’s statement to support his assertion that there was a struggle with Lane but he discounted Christenson’s claim that Christenson placed a knife in Lane’s hand to make it look like self-defense.

Horn asserts that Christenson’s statement violated his right of confrontation by referring to him inferentially. He contends that because Christenson said he did not stab anyone and Howard was not in the room, Horn was the only other defendant on trial who could have stabbed Lane.

The State responds that as Christenson’s statement only incriminated Horn when linked with other evidence admitted at trial and there was no obvious indication of alteration, the statement was properly redacted.

The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between statements that explicitly implicate the defendant and those that are inferentially incriminating:

In Bruton, the codefendant’s confession `expressly implicat[ed]’ the defendant as his accomplice. Thus, at the time that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt that it would prove `powerfully incriminating.’ By contrast, in this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant’s own testimony).

Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208 (citations omitted).

Here, Christenson’s redacted statement is incriminating only if it is linked to other evidence admitted at trial, including that there were three people involved in Lane’s death and that Lane was stabbed and strangled to death in a motel room. Thus, Bruton’s concern about the power on a jury of statements expressly implicating a defendant is not applicable. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208; Cotten, 75 Wn. App. at 691. Further, even assuming a Bruton violation, any error was harmless. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208
(1973) (Bruton errors subject to harmless error analysis); State v. Vannoy, 25 Wn. App. 464, 474-75, 610 P.2d 380 (1980) (Bruton error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Christenson’s statement is cumulative of other evidence at trial, including Horn’s own testimony. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162
(1987) (defendant’s own confession may be considered in determining if Confrontation Clause violation was harmless). Horn testified that he was in the motel room and that he stabbed Lane but he asserted that he did so in self-defense.

In addition, the evidence of Horn’s guilt is overwhelming. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284
(1969) (Bruton error harmless where evidence cumulative and overwhelming). Howard heard Horn say he was going out to `jack some crackhead’ and then Horn returned to the motel room with Lane. Howard heard Horn ask Christenson if he was `ready to do this’ before Horn asked Howard to go get him a soda. A witness in the next room heard banging and wheezing noises, and someone saying, `please don’t kill me.’ RP at 695. Howard returned to the room and saw Lane on the floor. When someone came to the room to check on the occupants, Horn told the person that everything was all right. Lane suffered more than 25 stab wounds to his face, head, chest, and back, including defensive wounds. Finally, Horn’s fingerprints were on the knife found imbedded in Lane’s chest. Consequently, we find no Bruton violation but conclude that any possible violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel — Motion for Mistrial
Horn also contends that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a mistrial after the admission of Christenson’s statement when Christenson did not testify. But because Horn cannot establish that there was a Bruton violation, he cannot show that a motion for a mistrial would have been successful.

Further, as the presumption runs in favor of effective representation, Horn has not shown that his counsel’s decision not to move for a mistrial was devoid of any legitimate defense purpose. See State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Horn’s counsel used Christenson’s statement on several occasions in closing argument to bolster Horn’s self-defense argument and, thereby, create reasonable doubt. For these reasons, Horn’s ineffective assistance claim must fail. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1994).

C. Sufficiency of Evidence — Premeditation
Horn also contends that there was insufficient evidence that he premeditated the crime. He argues that he told Christenson not to bring a knife, that the incident lasted only a couple of minutes, and that he and Lane struggled for control of the knife.

In a sufficiency challenge, we must take the evidence in the light most favorable to the State in determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 338, 851 P.2d 654 (1993).

We consider circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable and leave credibility determinations for the trier of fact. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990); State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).

Premeditation is `more than a moment in point of time’ and it involves `the deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life.’ RCW 9A.32.020(1); State v. Robtoy, 98 Wn.2d 30, 43, 653 P.2d 284 (1982). Further, premeditation requires “the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.” State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 597-98, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995) (quoting State v. Ollens, 107 Wn.2d 848, 850, 733 P.2d 984 (1987)).

The State may establish premeditation using circumstantial evidence if the inferences the jury draws are reasonable and there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 643, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). A wide range of facts may support an inference of premeditation but motive, procurement of a weapon, stealth, and the method of the crime are particularly relevant. State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 831-32, 975 P.2d 967 (1999); Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d at 644.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence of premeditation. Evidence that Lane suffered more than 25 stab wounds, including several to his back, suggests that he was struck from behind. The medical examiner characterized the wounds to Lane’s arms and hands as defensive wounds. In addition to the stab wounds, there was also evidence of strangulation.

There is also sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s rejection of Horn’s self-defense argument. Lane sustained several deep wounds to his face, forehead, head, and back; the only wound that Horn sustained was not consistent with a stab wound; a witness heard someone asking for help and stating, `please don’t kill me,’ RP at 695; when someone inquired if everyone was all right, Horn sent the person away; Horn left the room with the intent of finding someone to rob, and Howard saw Horn going through Lane’s fanny pack and pockets, suggesting a motive for the killing. See Ollens, 107 Wn.2d at 853 (sufficient evidence of premeditation where defendant stabbed victim numerous times and then slashed the victim’s throat, the defendant procured a knife, the evidence suggested the defendant struck the victim from behind, and the defendant had a motive to kill in order to effectuate the robbery).

D. Cumulative Error
Finally, Horn argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial and therefore requires reversal. See State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772, 789, 684 P.2d 668 (1984). But he has failed to establish any error sufficient to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a new trial under this doctrine.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

WE CONCUR: HOUGHTON, J., HUNT, A.C.J.