No. 47126-1-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: October 15, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 001030408, Hon. Joan E. Dubuque, July 31, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Associates Pllc, 810 Third Avenue, 320 Central Building, Seattle, WA 98104.
Eric Broman, Nielsen Broman Assoc. Pllc, 810 3rd Ave Ste 320, Seattle, WA 98104.
John E. Bell, 800 Bellevue Way N.E. Ste 3, Bellevue, WA 98004.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Page B. Ulrey, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104.
PER CURIAM.
Tyler Brown appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following a conviction for felony violation of a no-contact order. Brown’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that there is no basis for a good faith argument on review. Pursuant to State v. Theobald[1] and Anders v. California,[2] the motion to withdraw must:
[1] be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
[2] A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and
[3] time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses;
[4] the court — not counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.[3]
This procedure has been followed. Brown’s counsel on appeal filed a brief with the motion to withdraw. Brown was served with a copy of the brief and informed of a criminal appellant’s right to file a pro se supplemental brief. Appellant did not file a supplemental brief.
The facts are accurately set forth in counsel’s brief in support of the motion to withdraw. The court has reviewed the briefs filed in this court and has independently reviewed the entire record. The court specifically considered the following potential issues raised by counsel for the appellant:
1. Does the citation of the incorrect statute in the information require reversal of the conviction?
2. Is reversal required because the State failed to prove that Brown’s two predicate convictions were constitutionally valid?
3. Did Brown’s conviction violate due process because the State failed to provide notice that his third conviction for violating a no-contact order would be a felony?
These potential issues are wholly frivolous.
Upon independent review, the court has discovered a discrepancy in Brown’s judgment and sentence. Although found guilty of violating a post-sentence no contact order as prohibited by RCW 10.99.050(2)(c), Brown’s judgment and sentence indicates he was convicted under RCW 10.99.040(4)(c), the pretrial no-contact order statute. This is technically incorrect, but it is only a scrivener’s error.
Since in all other respects the potential issues in this case are frivolous, counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the appeal is dismissed. The trial court is, however, directed to enter an order within sixty days of the filing of this opinion amending Brown’s sentencing record to reflect that he was convicted under RCW 10.99.050(2)(c).