No. 46886-3-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: May 7, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 99-1-10097-9, Hon. Anthony P. Wartnik, June 21, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Associates Pllc, 810 Third Avenue, 320 Central Building, Seattle, WA 98104.
Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman Assoc. Pllc, 810 3rd Ave Ste 320, Seattle, WA 98104.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/Appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Steven W. Fogg, Off of Prosecuting Aty, 516 Third Ave, Seattle, WA 98104.
PER CURIAM.
Ieshea Brown appeals the imposition of moral reconation therapy (MRT) as a condition of her community placement sentence, arguing that the record does not sufficiently show that MRT is a crime-related treatment. But the relative incompleteness of the record directly resulted from Brown’s failure to object to MRT before the trial court. A defendant may not create a barren record by failing to object to a condition of community placement, and then complain that the record is insufficient to determine whether the condition is appropriate. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
According to the charging papers, on July 7, 1999, at about 3:00 a.m., Brown and her sister, co-defendant Annette San Cartier, approached a young woman, Jennifer Beckham, who was drinking a bottle of beer as she waited for a bus. Brown and her sister confronted Beckham about “working the area, in terms of prostitution.”
After words were exchanged, San Cartier and Brown began to assault Beckham. During the fight, San Cartier took the beer bottle out of Beckham’s hand and struck Beckham on the head with it, inflicting a gash. After assaulting Beckham, Brown and San Cartier relieved Beckham of her purse and rummaged through it. Both sisters then fled the area.
The Seattle police conducted an investigation of the assault and robbery. In a tape-recorded statement, Brown admitted striking Beckham with a beer bottle and rummaging through her purse. In return for Brown’s Alford[1] plea, the State filed an amended information reducing the charge to second degree assault with a deadly weapon enhancement.
Prior to sentencing, the Department of Corrections (DOC) interviewed Brown and prepared a presentence report. According to the report, Brown told DOC that she had dropped out of school after completing the eighth grade. She said that “she does have prosocial associates and friends, but due to her line of work [in the escort service industry], associates more with her friends and acquaintances that have problems with alcohol, drugs, and law enforcement.” Brown also stated a desire for rehabilitation, stating that she:
hopes to take advantage of any rehabilitation services that will be available through the prison system so that upon her release from confinement, she will be able to rejoin society in a more prosocial endeavor.
Noting Brown’s “risk areas” of employment and companions, DOC recommended “Moral Reconation[2] Therapy” (MRT). DOC described MRT as a “cognitive behavior program designed to help offenders analyze their lives, set and achieve goals, and make decision[s] at a higher level of moral reasoning.”
After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 15 months incarceration. The judge also adopted without discussion DOC’s proposed conditions of community placement, which included the MRT program. Brown voiced no objection to MRT at the sentencing hearing. Brown appeals.
ANALYSIS
Brown argues that the trial court erred in imposing MRT as a condition of community placement. She argues that the State did not show that MRT is sufficiently related to the crime for which she was convicted.
Under RCW 9.94A.120(9)(a), an offender ordered to serve a prison term after being convicted of second degree assault must serve a one-year term of community placement. As part of the defendant’s term of community placement, the court may require the offender to “participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services.” RCW 9.94A.120(9)(c)(iii). A condition is crime-related if it directly relates to the circumstances of the crime, although no causal link need be established between the condition imposed and the crime committed. RCW 9.94A.030(11); State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992).
Here, Brown did not object below to the trial court’s imposition of MRT as a community placement condition. A defendant does not waive her right to review the legality of a community placement condition by her failure to object below. State v. Armstrong, 91 Wn. App. 635, 638, 959 P.2d 1128 (1998). The Armstrong court cautioned, however, that aggrieved defendants are “well advised” to raise their concerns about community placement conditions before the sentencing court. 91 Wn. App. at 638.
In support of its warning, the Armstrong court explained that raising an objection below allows the trial court and the State to make a complete record in support of the condition. 91 Wn. App. at 638. The right to have review of a sentence to correct errors of law does not carry with it a right to a remand for fuller development of pertinent facts. Armstrong, 91 Wn. App. at 638-39. Citing the bareness of the record relied upon by the defendant (who did not object below to the community placement condition he appealed), the Armstrong court refused to overturn the trial court’s conclusion that its conditions were related to the circumstances of the crime. 91 Wn. App. at 639.
Brown’s failure to object below separates her from the defendant in State v. Vasquez, 95 Wn. App. 12, 972 P.2d 109 (1998), virtually the only case on which she relies. The defendant in that case argued before the trial court that there was not a sufficient nexus between his crime and MRT. The State, however, did not respond to the argument at the trial court level. Vasquez, 95 Wn. App. at 16. On appeal, the court struck MRT from the defendant’s sentence, holding that it did not have sufficient evidence before it to determine whether MRT was crime-related treatment. Vasquez, 95 Wn. App. at 17.
Here, by contrast, by failing to object to the imposition of MRT at the trial court level, Brown foreclosed the opportunity to create a more complete record. Brown now uses the relatively incomplete record as a weapon, complaining that “[t]here is nothing in the record to link the MRT program to Brown’s alleged offense, or how it might prevent her from committing similar offenses in the future.”
Armstrong clearly prohibits this tactic: a defendant may not create a barren record by failing to object to a condition of community placement, and then complain that the record is insufficient to determine whether the condition is appropriate. By failing to object below, Brown denied the trial court an opportunity to make a more complete record justifying its decision to impose MRT. We therefore affirm.
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