No. 52782-7-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: December 22, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Lewis County. Docket No: 02-1-00627-7. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 11/08/2002.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Douglas Charles Blankenship (Appearing Pro Se), 615 Yew St, Centralia, WA 98531.
Peter B. Tiller, Attorney at Law, Rock Pine, PO Box 58, Centralia, WA 98531-0058.
Counsel for Respondent(s), J. Andrew Toynbee, Attorney at Law, M/S Pr001, 360 NW North St, Chehalis, WA 98532-1925.
Per Curiam.
A jury found Douglas Blankenship guilty of one count of tampering with a witness. Because the evidence was sufficient to support Blankenship’s conviction, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give Blankenship’s proposed instruction defining the term `induce,’ we affirm.[1]
Douglas Blankenship was charged with one count of tampering with a witness (domestic violence) and one count of fourth degree assault (domestic violence). At trial, Centralia Police Officer James Shannon testified that he was dispatched to investigate a possible domestic dispute on August 3, 2002. Upon arriving at the residence, Officer Shannon noticed that a pane of glass in the front door was broken and that most of the glass was lying inside.
When no one responded to his knocking, Officer Shannon went around the house and knocked on the back door. Through the glass, he saw a man and a woman, later identified as Douglas Blankenship and Shilo Mitchell, walk away from the door. Mitchell eventually returned and opened the door, and Officer Shannon noted what appeared to be a scratch on her neck. Mitchell told the officer that she and Blankenship had been fighting.
Officer Shannon returned to the front of the house, where Blankenship was talking to another officer. Officer Shannon noticed that Blankenship had a cut knuckle that was bleeding and began asking questions. Blankenship, who was holding an infant, started backing into the house. Officer Shannon followed Blankenship inside, where he saw a smashed fan and broken picture on the floor. At this point, Officer Shannon advised Blankenship that he was under arrest for assault.
At first, Blankenship refused to put down the child and began arguing loudly with Officer Shannon. Blankenship then called to Mitchell and handed her the child. According to Officer Shannon, Blankenship repeatedly yelled at Mitchell `Don’t say anything. Don’t you tell them anything’ as he was being removed from the house. In response, Mitchell moved back, looked away, and `appeared frightened.’ Both Officer Shannon and Officer Gary Byrnes testified that Blankenship did not mention anything about an attorney until he was outside of the house.
According to Officer Shannon, Mitchell was cooperative in answering questions when he spoke with her at the back door. After the officers arrested Blankenship, Mitchell refused to answer any further questions and ordered the officers out of the house.
Mitchell testified that she had been living with Blankenship since March 2000 and that the couple had two children. At the time of the arrest, Blankenship had moved out for several days and was living with a friend, but the two were in the process of moving together to a different house. Mitchell acknowledged that she and Blankenship had been arguing before the police arrived. During the argument, Mitchell had been talking to a friend on the telephone. After Blankenship began yelling at the friend, the friend apparently called 9-1-1.
Mitchell denied that Blankenship had hit or scratched her. She explained that the glass in the front door had broken when the door slammed. According to Mitchell, after handing her the child, Blankenship had said, `Babe, don’t say anything. I’m gonna get an attorney.’ Mitchell maintained that she did not feel threatened or intimidated by Blankenship’s comments.
The jury found Blankenship guilty of tampering with a witness. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the assault count, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that charge.
Blankenship first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with a witness. As set forth in the jury instructions, the State in this case was required to prove, among other things, (1) that Blankenship had reason to believe that Mitchell would be called as a witness in an official proceeding or that she had information relevant to a criminal investigation; and (2) that he attempted to induce her to withhold relevant information from a law enforcement agency. See RCW 9A.72.120. Proof of an attempt to induce a witness to withhold information does not depend solely on the literal meaning of the words used. `The State is entitled to rely on the inferential meaning of the words and the context in which they were used.’ State v. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d 77, 83, 785 P.2d 1134 (1990).
The State’s witnesses testified that after Blankenship was arrested for assault, he repeatedly yelled at Mitchell to not `say anything’ to the officers. In response, Mitchell appeared frightened and backed away. Immediately after Blankenship’s arrest, Mitchell, who earlier had cooperated with the officers, refused to answer any further questions and ordered the officers out of the house.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the foregoing evidence, including Mitchell’s response to Blankenship’s statements, was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Blankenship had attempted to induce Mitchell to withhold relevant information from the criminal investigation. Contrary to Blankenship’s suggestion, the State was not required to establish that his statements actually caused Mitchell to withhold information. See State v. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 84 (‘One can be guilty of an attempt to induce a witness regardless of the effect upon the witness’).
Blankenship next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give his proposed instruction defining the term `induce’ and by denying his CrR 7.5 motion for a new trial based on the same omission. Under RCW 9A.72.120, the State was required to prove that Blankenship attempted `to induce’ Mitchell to withhold relevant information from the police investigation. Blankenship’s proposed instruction provided: `Induce’ means to influence by threat or by offer of consideration.
Clerk’s Papers, at 74.
Generally, the trial court in a criminal case must define technical words and expressions used in jury instructions, but need not define words that are of ordinary understanding or self-explanatory. State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 611-12, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). Blankenship cites no authority suggesting that the term `induce’ as used in RCW 9A.72.120 has a technical meaning that differs from its ordinary meaning. Nor has he cited any authority supporting the specific definition contained in his proposed instruction or indicated how the absence of the instruction prejudiced his ability to argue his theory of the case to the jury.
Blankenship’s reliance on State v. Rempel is misplaced for several reasons. He asserts that the analysis in Rempel `hinges upon the literal meaning of the words and whether said words `contain an express threat’ or promise of reward.’ Brief of Appellant, at 13. But in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s conviction, including the defendant’s request to the victim of an attempted rape to `drop the charges,’ the Rempel court expressly noted that an attempt to induce a witness to withhold testimony does not `depend only upon the literal meaning of the words used’ and that the State is entitled to rely on the `inferential meaning’ of words and the context in which they are used. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d at 83-84. The Rempel court’s analysis contains no discussion of jury instructions and provides no support for the specific definition set forth in Blankenship’s proposed instruction.
Moreover, the version of the witness tampering statute at issue in Rempel did not include RCW 9A.72.120(c), which was added in 1994 and prohibits attempting to induce a person to withhold relevant information from a criminal investigation. Consequently, the Rempel court’s analysis of the defendant’s request to `drop the charges’ is of only limited assistance in determining whether Blankenship attempted to induce Mitchell to withhold relevant information from the police investigation.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Blankenship’s proposed instruction and in denying his motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.