STATE v. BAKER, 146 Wn. App. 1067 (2008)

No. 36472-7-II.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
September 30, 2008.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Jefferson County, No. 02-1-00116-1, Theodore F. Spearman, J., entered May 22, 2007.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HOUGHTON, P.J.

Douglas Baker challenges the trial court denial of his motion to vacate his comprehensive plea agreement. Pro se, he raises additional arguments in a statement of additional grounds.[1]
We affirm.

FACTS
On November 7, 2003 the State charged Baker in Jefferson County with one count of manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver marijuana; one count of conspiracy to manufacture marijuana; and one count of first degree defrauding a public utility. At the same time, the State charged him in Clallam County with first degree defrauding a public utility, marijuana manufacture, 14 counts of cocaine delivery, and 14 counts of money laundering.

Baker appealed his convictions. We reversed his Clallam County convictions and remanded for dismissal of the charges with prejudice. State v. Baker, noted at 128 Wn. App. 1068
(2005).

On January 16, 2004, Baker pleaded guilty to defrauding a public utility in Jefferson County. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed the remaining Jefferson County charges and ordered him to pay $1,479.80 restitution. He entered into a comprehensive plea agreement that combined the Jefferson County case with forfeiture proceedings initiated by Clallam County regarding property owned by the Bakers. The trial court accepted the plea and signed a judgment and sentence.

On January 13, 2005, Baker moved pro se in Jefferson County to vacate the judgment and withdraw his guilty plea. He asserted “extreme extraordinary medical, intimidations and coercion to force this breached plea agreement.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 35. He asserted that he and “his beloved wife were attacked by United States Federal terrorist[s] and the State of Washington terrorists,” that he was subject to cruel and unusual punishment, and that State officials committed treason. CP at 37. But he did not raise the issue of State breaching the comprehensive plea agreement.

The Jefferson County Superior Court denied Baker’s motion. It found that he failed to reach a sufficient threshold showing of grounds for consideration of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On August 2, 2006, Baker moved to withdraw guilty plea and vacate the judgment. He asserted that he signed the plea agreement under duress and deception and, additionally, that the State failed to meet its obligations under the agreement. More specifically, he argued that Jefferson County did not (1) give 15 percent of the sale of Baker’s properties to his wife; (2) give her 30 days’ notice from the date of the closing of the sale of the home to collect her possessions and vacate the home; and (3) return specific items, including a digital camera. Baker argued that contract law governing plea agreements entitles him to withdraw his plea or request specific performance. Alternatively, he argued that the trial court must allow him to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. The State responded claiming a time bar.

The trial court denied Baker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment, stating that it declined to interfere with the prior ruling that it was “the law of the case, and it precludes this Court from going beyond it.” Report of Proceedings (May 21, 2007) (RP) at 56.

The trial court also stated that even if it were to hypothetically go beyond the previous ruling, it would still find the motion time barred. The trial court explained that the “many of the breaches that allegedly occur[ed] were known . . . prior to . . . January 13, 2005.” RP at 55-56. The trial court emphasized that there may be some type of relief still available to Baker for the alleged breaches, but the sole issue it had to decide was whether to vacate the plea.

Baker appeals.

ANALYSIS Standard of review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. S.M., 100 Wn. App. 401, 409, 996 P.2d 1111 (2000). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on untenable or unreasonable grounds. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). The trial court must “allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” CrR 4.2(f). Under CrR 4.2, manifest injustice means an obvious injustice. State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42, 820 P.2d 505 (1991).

Equitable tolling
Baker first contends that in certain cases the one year statutory limit on collateral attacks could be subject to equitable tolling.[2] He asserts that justice requires equitable tolling here because the State failed to comply with the comprehensive plea agreement as of August 2006.

Baker sets forth four ways in which the State failed to comply with the agreement: (1) selling his family’s property for less than fair market value, (2) failing to give his wife 30 days after the sale to enter the property and collect her possessions, (3) failing to return a digital camera, and (4) withholding money owed to the Bakers from the sale. At the hearing on the motion, Baker argued that he had no other remedy available to him. He argued that contract law should apply and it entitled him to the benefit of his bargain.

Equitable tolling allows a court to proceed with an action when justice requires it, even though a statutory time period has elapsed. State v. Duvall, 86 Wn. App. 871, 874, 940 P.2d 671 (1997). In certain circumstances, RCW 10.73.090 may be subject to equitable tolling. State v. Littlefair, 112 Wn. App. 749, 757-58, 51 P.3d 116 (2002). But in criminal cases, the courts apply the doctrine “sparingly, when the plaintiff exercises diligence, and there is evidence of bad faith, deception or false assurances by the defendant.” In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 150 Wn.2d 583, 593, 80 P.3d 587 (2003).

We decline to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling here because Baker fails to assert that the State violated any particular right which, if ignored, would cause a manifest injustice. Additionally, Baker knew about the State’s asserted breach six months after the final judgment, giving him six months to make a timely appeal under RCW 10.73.090.

Baker’s counsel testified at the hearing that his wife attempted to collect her property on June 18, 2004, the day of the sale, and she “was told no, you can’t have it.” RP at 45. Baker had the opportunity to raise the issue of a breached plea agreement six months after the final judgment and he failed to do so.

At the hearing, the State explained that the clerk of court was holding the property which Baker claimed the State was holding in violation of the plea agreement. The State said that “the only thing that stands in the way of that property being released to the rightful owners, who are the Bakers, is an application by them to the court.” RP at 47. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to vacate Baker’s guilty plea.

Statement of Additional Grounds
In his first additional ground, Baker challenges in personam jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. The Washington Constitution grants the authority for counties to establish a superior court and anticipates the jurisdiction of those courts to hear all felony criminal cases. Const. art. IV, § 5, 6. Baker’s argument fails.

Baker next argues that the State has not met its burden of establishing the corpus delicti of the crime in this case. Under the rule of corpus delicti, a trial court may not admit extrajudicial incriminating statements by the accused unless the State presents independent evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime to corroborate the statements. State v. Brockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 328, 150 P.3d 59 (2006). But Baker offers nothing to show that his conviction was supported by his own confession or admissions to the police, and we are not obligated to search the record in support of the claims made in a statement of additional grounds for review. RAP 10.10(c).

Baker also offers no substantiation for his third additional ground claiming bad faith against the State, or his fourth additional ground claiming that the State violated the rule against double jeopardy. Although he cites various legal rules in both claims, he does not explain how the facts constitute a violation of those rules. These unsubstantiated claims therefore fail.

Baker’s final additional ground reiterates his charge of bad faith. Under RAP 10.10(c), we must be able to determine the nature and occurrence of the alleged errors in order to consider them as grounds for review. Because we discern no distinct additional alleged error, we do not consider it further.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

BRIDGEWATER, J. and ARMSTRONG, J., concur.