No. 55507-3-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
May 1, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-1-07143-3, Julie Spector, J., entered December 21, 2004.
Affirmed in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Koch Pllc, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122-2842.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Deborah A. Dwyer, King Co Pros Ofc/Appellate Unit, 516 3rd Ave Ste W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2362.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
PER CURIAM.
Estefano Agustiniano-Saguilan pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree assault-domestic violence and entered an Alford[1] plea to one count of misdemeanor harassment-domestic violence. As a condition of suspending his sentence on the harassment, the court ordered Agustiniano-Saguilan to have no contact with his children for two years. The court also entered an order prohibiting contact with the children under RCW 10.99.050. Agustiniano-Saguilan argues that the trial court exceeded its sentencing authority in issuing the order. We affirm the no-contact order. However, we remand so that the trial court can correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment and sentence.
FACTS
The substantive facts are taken from the certification for probable cause. Agustiniano-Saguilan authorized the court to review the certification to find a factual basis to accept his guilty plea. Agustiniano-Saguilan and his wife Carolina Leon have two children, E.I.A. and R.M.A. The couple began discussing divorce in 2004 after eight years of marriage. On October 7, 2004, Agustiniano-Saguilan called Leon and Leon agreed to speak with him in person. When he arrived he did not speak with Leon but instead dragged her through the house by her hair, caused her to tumble down a flight of stairs, and beat her with a studded belt. He threatened Leon that if she “did not allow him to have the children he would come take the children from her, . . . kill them and then kill himself.” Agustiniano-Saguilan left. Leon called 911. A sheriff’s deputy arrived and saw large welts on Leon’s back from the beating. The deputy could not locate Agustiniano-Saguilan.
Early the next morning, Agustiniano-Saguilan returned. He told Leon that he would kill himself if she took the children. Leon called 911 again and Agustiniano-Saguilan was arrested. Leon said that “she believed without a doubt that the Defendant will carry out his threats, and feared for her safety and the safety of her children.” Leon reported that Agustiniano-Saguilan carried around a bag of knives for his employment as a chef, and that he had recently spoken of acquiring a firearm.
The State charged Agustiniano-Saguilan with misdemeanor harassment — domestic violence and third-degree assault — domestic violence. The charging language for the misdemeanor harassment stated that Agustiniano-Saguilan “knowingly did threaten to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to Carolina Leon, E.I.A[.], and R.M.A[.], and the words or conduct did place Carolina Leon in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out.”
Agustiniano-Saguilan pleaded guilty to third-degree assault-domestic violence and made an Alford plea to misdemeanor harassment-domestic violence. As part of his plea agreement on the misdemeanor, Agustiniano-Saguilan agreed to have no contact with the crime victims, identified as Leon, E.I.A., and R.M.A. During the presentation of the plea agreement to the court, Agustiniano-Saguilan requested that he be allowed some contact with his children. The State informed the court that they were named as victims, and the court noted that there may therefore be an order entered relating to contact with the children. Although Agustiniano-Saguilan asked that he be allowed to continue contact with the children, he did not seek to revoke his plea agreement. The court found that Agustiniano-Saguilan’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
At sentencing, the State recommended that for the harassment charge, the court should prohibit Agustiniano-Saguilan from contacting the “two minors who are victims of that complaint.” A victim advocate representing Leon told the court that Leon had continuing concern for her own safety and the safety of her children. Leon supported the State’s recommendation of no-contact but was willing to support modification of the order in the future if Agustiniano-Saguilan completed some treatment. Agustiniano-Saguilan opposed the no-contact order.
The court expressed “grave concerns” for the children’s safety. The court ordered Agustiniano-Saguilan not to contact the children for two years as a condition of his suspended sentence for harassment. The court also issued a no-contact order under RCW 10.99.050. The court expressly allowed Leon to initiate modification proceedings or recall of the no-contact order protecting the children if Agustiniano-Saguilan completed treatment. Agustiniano-Saguilan timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
A trial court granting probation may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence and direct the suspension to continue “upon such conditions and for such time as it shall designate, not exceeding the maximum term of sentence or two years, whichever is longer.” RCW 9.95.210. Crime-related conditions of probation are subjective determinations traditionally “left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” State v. Parramore, 53 Wn. App. 527, 530, 768 P.2d 530 (1989) (quoting David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington, sec. 4.5 (1985)). Traditionally, no causal link must be established between the condition imposed and the crime committed as long as the condition relates to the circumstances of the crime. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). A court may impose probationary conditions that tend to prevent the future commission of a crime. State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687 (1999). Agustiniano-Saguilan threatened to kill Leon and the children. A victim advocate told the court on behalf of Leon that Leon had continuing concerns for her safety and the safety of the children. The trial court expressed “grave concerns” for the children’s safety. The court suspended Agustiniano-Saguilan’s sentence on the condition that he have no contact with the children for two years. Because Agustiniano-Saguilan’s threat was against Leon and the children, the condition related to the circumstances of the crime. The trial court was acting within its authority under Williams and RCW 9.95.210 and did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition.
Furthermore, Agustiniano-Saguilan specifically agreed that the children were crime victims as part of his Alford plea to the misdemeanor harassment-domestic violence. Although he asked the court not to restrict his contact with his children when entering his plea and at sentencing, he did not seek to revoke the plea agreement. Thus, under the facts of this case, the trial court’s no-contact order entered under RCW 10.99.050
is valid.
The parties agree that Agustiniano-Saguilan’s judgment and sentence incorrectly refers to “HARASSMENT-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a)(I)(b).” The correct statutory reference for misdemeanor harassment as reflected in the charging documents is RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (b). We remand to the trial court to correct this scrivener’s error. See State v. Moten, 95 Wn. App. 927, 929, 935, 976 P.2d 1286 (1999).
We note that the record contains a variety of similar but different spellings of appellant’s name. Throughout this opinion we use the spelling that was used on the judgment and sentence.
(1970).