No. 30630-1-IIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: August 24, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County. Docket No: 03-2-02351-9. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/13/2003. Judge signing: Hon. John F Nichols.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Ernest M Edsel, Attorney at Law, PO Box 733, Vancouver, WA 98666.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Denise Joan Lukins, Attorney at Law, PO Box 1148, Vancouver, WA 98666-1148.
MORGAN, A.C.J.
In this unlawful detainer action, tenant Ernest Edsel appeals a judgment that awarded reasonable attorney fees to landlord Carla Siemer. We affirm.
On September 25, 2002, Siemer and Edsel executed two contracts pertaining to a house in Vancouver. One said Edsel would be a month-to-month tenant. The other said his lease would expire on October 1, 2003. Neither contained an attorney fee provision.
On April 10, 2003, Siemer executed a 20-day notice terminating Edsel’s tenancy. On May 5, 2003, she sued him for unlawful detainer and asked for reasonable attorney fees.[1] Edsel, who is a lawyer appearing on his own behalf,[2] answered that he was entitled to possession until October 1, that the house was not habitable, and that Siemer should not receive costs or attorney fees.
After a hearing, the trial court found that the one-year-lease agreement was not valid.[3] On June 13, 2003, the trial court entered judgment against Edsel for $712.92 in overdue rent and $1,015 in costs and reasonable attorney fees.
Edsel now appeals, stating two assignments of error and seven issues. In his assignments of error, he states that the trial court erred by entering final judgment against him and by ordering him to pay $850 of Siemer’s attorney fees. In his statement of issues, he asks whether RCW 59.18 violates the interstate commerce clause `by forcing all landlords and tenants to pay attorney’s fees’ regardless of whether their contracts so require; whether RCW 59.18 violates the interstate commerce clause `by prohibiting all landlords and tenants from entering into contracts that exempt them from the mandatory attorney fee provisions of RCW 59.18.410‘; whether `the mandatory attorney fee provisions of [RCW 59.18] violate a tenant’s substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’; whether `the mandatory attorney fee provisions of [RCW 59.18] create a special privilege, in violation of Article One, Section Twelve of the Washington Constitution’ in a couple of different ways; whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by not requiring that the landlord post a bond.[4]
We first inquire whether RCW 59.18.410 mandates an award of attorney fees. It provides that when entering a final judgment, the trial court `may award statutory costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.’[5] It does not provide that a trial court shall award such costs and fees. It permits but does not mandate an award of fees.
Each of Edsel’s constitutional arguments rests on the premise that RCW 59.18 mandates an award of fees. That premise being flawed, each of his constitutional arguments is also flawed. Moreover, he does not support his constitutional arguments with meaningful legal authority or reasoned explanations, and thus we need not address them.[6]
In addition to his constitutional arguments, Edsel claims that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Siemer failed to comply with RCW 59.18.020.[7] We hold that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction whether or not Siemer complied with RCW 59.18.020.[8]
Citing RCW 59.18.380, Edsel argues that the trial court erred by not requiring a bond. The cited statute requires a bond before final judgment. Neither RCW 59.18.410 nor any other statute requires a bond after final judgment. Final judgment was entered here, so a bond was not required.
Edsel has not prevailed, and the landlord has not participated. Accordingly, neither side shall receive fees or costs on appeal.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT, J. and VAN DEREN, J., concur.
Every duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.