REINHART v. ANDERSON, 143 Wn. App. 1030 (2008)

No. 59529-6-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
March 10, 2008.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-01710-1, Palmer Robinson, J., entered January 12, 2007.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Barbara Reinhart appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for leave to file an unlawful detainer action. Because her claims to the subject property had been previously adjudicated and because she fails to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s decision denying her leave to file her suit and dismissing the action, we affirm.

FACTS
Following the nonjudicial foreclosure of property located at 450 South 181st Street in Seattle, Barbara Reinhart began filing various claims in King County Superior Court asserting her right to the property. After the trial court dismissed one case on summary judgment in May 2000, several trial court judges entered orders under a variety of cause numbers restraining Reinhart from filing any pleadings regarding the issue of ownership of the property without leave of the court. Based on multiple violations of these restraining orders, the trial court repeatedly imposed terms and sanctions in various amounts.

On January 5, 2007, Reinhart filed a motion for leave to file an unlawful detainer action and various requests for relief regarding the 450 South 181st Street property. Reinhart named Peter Anderson, Gregory Boone and “Jane/John Doe Occupant(s)” as defendants. On January 12, the trial court reviewed Reinhart’s pleadings, as well as four prior orders entered in 2002 and 2004 under two different cause numbers, denied the motion for leave to file, and dismissed the action in its entirety on its own motion. The trial court noted, “Plaintiff’s interest in the subject property has been extinguished. Plaintiff has been ordered not to file any more pleadings with respect to the ownership of this property.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 90. On February 7, the trial court denied Reinhart’s motion for default judgment, dismissed the case, and ordered the clerk not to accept any pleadings not required for appeal.[1]

Reinhart appeals.

ANALYSIS
Reinhart assigns error to the trial court’s statement that her “interest in the subject property has been extinguished.” CP at 90. Citing King County auditor’s records, Reinhart makes a number of factual assertions. She claims that she owns the property through chain of title. In the alternative, she claims she acquired title through adverse possession. She also contends that no contractual relationship existed regarding her deed to the property and that she did not receive timely notice of any default or foreclosure. Reinhart further claims that defendants Anderson and Boone were not bona fide purchasers of the property. Additionally, she contends that she was deprived of her property in violation of various constitutional provisions and that the applicable statute of limitations does not bar her attempt to recover possession of the property. But our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court properly relied on prior court orders dismissing her claims regarding the foreclosure, possession, or sale of the property.

In particular, Judge Deborah Fleck entered an order denying plaintiff’s motion for stay of proceedings on October 23, 2002, in King County cause 00-2-02731-1 KNT stating that Reinhart’s claims “have been extinguished by prior orders” and restraining her “from seeking any further relief under this cause number or any other cause number relating to the possession and sale of the real property located at 450 South 181st Street.” CP at 144. On May 25, 2004, Judge Fleck denied Reinhart’s motion for reconsideration in the same case as untimely and noted, “The relief requested in the instant motion does not differ from the relief requested in prior motions of plaintiff, which has been ruled upon on multiple prior occasions.” CP at 146.

In King County cause 02-2-04191-4 KNT, Reinhart named Boone and Anderson, current or previous residents on the property, as defendants. Judge Fleck filed an order of dismissal, restraining plaintiff from filing further pleadings, and imposing sanctions on June 11, 2002. The order states that Reinhart’s claims in the case arose from the nonjudicial foreclosure of the same property and lists four prior orders restraining Reinhart from filing additional pleadings regarding the property without leave of the court or imposing terms and sanctions for violating such orders, or both. The order notes that Reinhart’s original request for relief relating to the foreclosure was denied by summary judgment order on May 5, 2000, and that Reinhart “subsequently filed the within cause number which attempts to litigate the ownership of the real property located at 450 South 181st Street.” CP at 171. Finding that the unlawful detainer action requested essentially the same relief that had been denied in multiple previous rulings, Judge Fleck dismissed the case, restrained Reinhart from filing additional pleadings regarding the property without leave of the court, and imposed terms and sanctions for her violation of previous orders. On July 2, 2002, Judge Fleck filed an order denying plaintiff’s request for leave of court to amend pleadings, or in the alternative to stay action, again barring Reinhart from filing further pleadings relating to the real property located at 450 South 181st Street.

Nothing in the record indicates that Reinhart appealed any of these orders or obtained any other postjudgment relief. Where a prior judgment has a concurrence of identity with a subsequent action in (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made, res judicata prevents relitigation of already determined causes. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995). Because the orders demonstrate that Reinhart’s claims to the property, as against Anderson and Boone as current or previous residents, have finally and conclusively been adjudicated, her proposed unlawful detainer action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Reinhart next contends that the prior orders, and therefore the January 12, 2007 and February 7, 2007 orders, are void “because of civil, constitutional and/or criminal supervening illegalities.” Br. of Appellant at 28. She first argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the prior orders because she was disabled at the time of their entry and “[u]ntil all of B. Reinhart’s disabilities regarding Anderson et al. are removed the statute of limitations does not begin to run pursuant to RCW 4.16.190 and RCW 4.16.260.” Id. at 30. But nothing in the record indicates that any of Reinhart’s claims were dismissed based on any statute of limitations or that the tolling available for personal disability provided by RCW 4.16.190 had any application to any of the prior orders. Moreover, because Reinhart did not appeal the prior orders or obtain any postjudgment relief, the prior orders are not properly before this court.

Reinhart next argues that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction to enter the January 12 order because she did not receive service of process of the court’s motion and she noted her motions for hearing by the Ex Parte Department rather than the Chief Civil Department. But a party waives any claim of lack of personal jurisdiction by asking the court to grant affirmative relief or otherwise consenting, expressly or impliedly, to the court’s exercising jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Steele, 90 Wn. App. 992, 997-98, 957 P.2d 247
(1998). By filing her motions and complaint, Reinhart requested affirmative relief and consented to the court’s exercising personal jurisdiction.

Reinhart also claims the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the following factual allegations: (1) Cal Western Reconveyance “deceptively advertised for sale of the property” Br. of Appellant at 33; (2) the crime of official misconduct was committed to deprive Reinhart of the property; (3) the crimes of false advertising and collection of unlawful debt were committed; (4) Reinhart’s signature on the Deed of Trust and Note were obtained by deception or duress; and (5) Anderson and Boone are trespassing on the property. She also contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it relied on void prior orders.

Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action Shoop v. Kittitas County, 108 Wn. App. 388, 393, 30 P.3d 529 (2001). Whether a particular court has jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wn.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999). The Washington Constitution provides that the superior court has original jurisdiction in “all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property. . . .” Const. art. IV, § 6. Beyond her factual allegations and conclusory statements, Reinhart provides no meaningful legal analysis, relevant authority, or logical explanation to support her claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because the case involved the title or possession of real property, the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction here.

Reinhart challenges the order prohibiting her from filing pleadings regarding ownership of the property without leave of the court. She argues that the order “fail[s] to establish facts upon which [such] relief . . . can be granted. . . .” Br. of Appellant at 36. She also contends that the order violates her constitutional right to access to the courts. But the court may, in its discretion, place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who abuses the judicial process. In re Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. 74, 78, 787 P.2d 51 (1990) (approving moratorium upon party filing any motions pending resolution of trial). A court may even enjoin a person from participating in litigation based on a pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation, provided the order is not more comprehensive than necessary to remedy the proven abuses. Whatcom County v. Kane, 31 Wn. App. 250, 253, 640 P.2d 1075 (1981).

Here, the court did not deny Reinhart all access to the courts, but specifically designed the order to prevent further duplicative litigation regarding the foreclosure, possession, or sale of a particular piece of property. Considering Reinhart’s history of filing lawsuits — undeterred by prior sanctions and after the court had already considered and rejected the same claims she raises — we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the order.

Finally, Reinhart contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for default because the named defendants did not appear or present any defense. But the trial court denied her motion for leave to file her unlawful detainer action. Because the trial court dismissed the entire action on January 12, the defendants were not required to respond to Reinhart’s motion for default filed on January 19 and the trial court did not err by denying the motion for default on February 7.

Affirmed.

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