PUB. SCH. EMPLOYEES v. WASHINGTON STATE, 155 Wn. App. 1047 (2010)

No. 64933-7-1.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
May 3, 2010.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 08-2-01861-7, Richard D. Hicks, J., entered May 1, 2009.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, C.J., concurred in by Leach, J., and Meyer, J. Pro Tem.

DWYER, C.J.

A court may issue a declaratory judgment only where a justiciable controversy exists between adverse parties. Because the repudiation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreements herein required the parties to begin all aspects of contract negotiations anew, their underlying dispute as to the validity of certain provisions in the nullified agreements became moot, requiring dismissal for lack of a justiciable controversy. Accordingly, we affirm.

I
In the late summer and in the early fall of 2008, the Public School Employees of Washington/Service Employees International Union, Local No. 1948 (PSE) negotiated and executed collective bargaining agreements for the 2009 to 2011 biennium on behalf of employees of Western Washington University (Western) and employees of Central Washington University (Central) with the universities. The Washington Labor Relations Office (LRO), a division of the Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM) — the state budget agency — represented Western in the negotiations. A law firm represented Central.[1]

The agreements shared several provisions in common that exempted certain types of employment-related disputes from the grievance procedures established by the agreements (the exemption provisions). With respect to the universities’ classification of employee job positions, the agreements provided that the universities would abide by the Washington State Department of Labor’s classification plan for state employee job positions. In addition, the agreements provided that any appeal from a classification plan would not be subject to the grievance procedures uniquely created in the agreements but, rather, would proceed according to procedures and standards set forth in the state administrate code, Title 357 WAC. Further, the agreements provided that certain actions related to employee discipline would be exempt from the grievance procedures. Neither oral reprimands of employees nor the specific content of employee performance evaluations would be subject to the grievance procedures established under the agreements.

On August 6, 2008, before the parties had completed negotiations and executed the agreements, PSE filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against LRO, [2]
challenging the validity of the exemption provisions. It sought a declaration that the exemption provisions violate the provision of the Personnel System Reform Act of 2002, chapter 41.80 RCW, which mandates that collective bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures culminating in binding arbitration of all disputes concerning interpretations of the agreements and that disciplinary actions of employees be processed entirely under procedures set forth in the agreements. See
RCW 41.80.030(2).[3] PSE also sought to enjoin LRO from including these and similar exemption provisions both in the collective bargaining agreements that the parties were in the process of negotiating and in future agreements. Although PSE disputed the validity of the exemption provisions, it ultimately ratified the proposed agreements containing them.

After the collective bargaining agreements were executed, they were submitted to OFM for budgetary review and approval pursuant to RCW 41.80.010(3).[4] On Page 4 December 17, 2008, OFM determined that the agreements were not financially feasible. In so doing, OFM effectively repudiated the agreements, sending the parties back to the negotiating table and leaving them free to reopen any part of the agreements in new negotiations. PSE has neither challenged OFM’s determination nor disputed that the parties were free to start the entire collective bargaining process anew after OFM made its determination.

Despite OFM’s repudiation of the collective bargaining agreements, PSE pressed forward with its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted LRO’s motion and denied PSE’s. It entered summary judgment of dismissal, citing two alternative bases for its ruling: (1) a justiciable controversy does not exist, and (2) the exemption provisions do not violate RCW 41.80.030(2). PSE appeals.

II
PSE contends that a justiciable controversy exists as to the validity of the exemption provisions. We disagree.

Pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW, a contracting party or a party whose rights are affected by a statute may obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a contract or the scope of its legal rights. RCW 7.24.020. The UDJA empowers courts to “settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.” RCW 7.24.120. Although the UDJA is “remedial,” RCW 7.24.120, and should be liberally construed, Clallam County Deputy Sheriff’s Guild v. Bd. ofClallam County Comm’rs, 92 Wn.2d 844, 848, 601 P.2d 943
(1979), “a party must satisfy certain threshold requirements before obtaining declaratory relief.” Bloome v.Haverly, 154 Wn. App. 129, 140, 225 P.3d 330 (2010).

A court may grant a request for declaratory relief only if a justiciable controversy exists between the parties.Bloome, 154 Wn. App. at 140 (citing Osborn v.Grant County, 130 Wn.2d 615, 631, 926 P.2d 911 (1996)). A justiciable controversy is

“(1) . . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.”

To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 144 Wn.2d 403, 411, 27 P.3d 1149 (2001) (quoting Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v.Ripley, 82 Wn.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137 (1973)). This requirement prevents a party from obtaining relief on hypothetical, speculative, or premature claims. Where these elements are not satisfied, we risk issuing a prohibited advisory opinion. Bloome, 154 Wn. App. at 141
(quoting Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862, 877, 101 P.3d 67 (2004))).[5]

The elements required for a justiciable controversy to exist herein are not satisfied. By rejecting the collective bargaining agreements, OFM rendered moot PSE’s claims that the agreements violate RCW 41.80.030(2). PSE acknowledges that OFM’s rejection of the agreements forced the parties to return to the negotiating table, where PSE was free to reopen all or part of the agreements or to request the involvement of a third party.[6] There is no contention that the parties were either bound by any term contained in the repudiated agreements or barred from negotiating terms different from those contained in the repudiated agreements. Although PSE asserts that LRO was resolute that any agreement for the universities must contain the disputed provisions, it is speculative as to whether a future agreement will necessarily contain similar provisions.

In essence, PSE seeks an advisory opinion. There are no actual contractual terms for a court to declare valid or invalid. Any declaration as to the validity of a repudiated contractual term would be divorced from an actual dispute. Such an advisory opinion is prohibited. To-Ro Trade Shows, 144 Wn.2d at 417 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 490, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Diversified Indus. Dev.Corp., 82 Wn.2d at 815). The trial court did not err.

Affirmed.