No. 52162-4-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: November 1, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No. 01-2-03809-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 04/02/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Ronald X Castleberry.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Ronald Alan Franz, Law Offices of Ronald A. Franz, 2224 Marine View Dr, Tacoma, WA 98422.
Anthony John William Gewald, Attorney at Law, 601 Union St Ste 2600, Seattle, WA 98101-2302.
Quentin Wildsmith, Lasher Holzapfel Sperry Ebberson PLLC, 601 Union St Ste 2600, Seattle, WA 98101-4000.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Jennifer Suzanne Divine, Helsell Fetterman LLP, 1001 4th Ave Plaza Ste 4200, Seattle, WA 98154.
KENNEDY, J.
Index Industries, Inc., employed Ron Prichard and Wayne Stearns as members of its executive management team. The two had written employment contracts specifying that notice payment (severance pay) would be paid upon their discharge, even if their employment contracts had expired, where the discharge was not for cause. After their employment contracts expired, Prichard and Stearns were fired. They requested notice pay as provided by their respective employment contracts. Although their discharges had not been for cause, Index Industries subsequently discovered conduct on their part that the trial court ultimately found would have given Index Industries grounds to fire them for cause, and refused to make the payments. Prichard and Stearns brought this lawsuit, which was tried to the bench, seeking the notice pay provided by their contracts. Index Industries counter-sued on various grounds. The court found that Prichard and Stearns were entitled to notice pay, whether or not there had been cause for their terminations, because the clause in their contracts providing that no notice pay would be given where the discharge was for cause had expired by the time the questionable conduct occurred. The trial court also awarded Prichard and Stearns attorney fees under a mediation clause in their expired employment contracts.
Index Industries prevailed on one of its counterclaims, and the trial court offset the plaintiffs’ judgments for notice pay accordingly. Without assigning error to any of the trial court’s findings of fact, and without providing a verbatim report of the trial proceedings, Index Industries appeals seeking de novo review of the trial court’s construction of the employment contracts, and seeking to have the plaintiffs’ attorney fee awards set aside. We affirm the trial court’s rulings for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
FACTS
Index Industries, Inc., was founded in 1975 by the father of the current company shareholders Mary Anderson and Jim Englund. Anderson and Englund each hold 50 percent of the outstanding company stock, and during all relevant times for purposes of this opinion, each served on the board of directors. During the period from 1995 through February 5, 2001, there was only one other member of the board of directors, CPA Larry Hawes. Anderson and Englund were frequently at loggerheads regarding the management and operation of the business, and Hawes regularly cast the deciding vote on the board of directors.
Mary Anderson served as president of Index Industries from 1994 until November 1996, when she was forced out of that position by the other directors. Until June 1997, the company was run by three employees whom the board designated as managing directors, though none of these employees served on the board of directors. In June 1997, the board appointed the director of finance, Steve Goldberg, to serve as the company president, with broad powers to run the company, set salaries, and give bonuses and other forms of compensation. Goldberg served as president of the company until he voluntarily resigned effective January 2, 2001. Upon his departure, Ron Prichard and Wayne Stearns were told to keep running the company as usual. Although they stepped in as managing directors at this juncture, neither Stearns nor Prichard ever served as a corporate officer or as a member of the board of directors.
With Goldberg’s departure, Jim Englund tried to assume the presidency, but abandoned his efforts after only two weeks. In late January 2001, Mary Anderson announced that she was assuming the presidency.
Wayne Stearns was hired by Index Industries, Inc., in 1987 and worked there continuously until Mary Anderson abruptly fired him on February 5, 2001. His position when he was fired was vice president of operations. Ron Prichard was hired by the company in 1993 and worked there continuously until Mary Anderson abruptly fired him on February 5, 2001, as well. His position when he was fired was vice president of sales. It is undisputed that Anderson fired Prichard and Stearns because she knew that they did not welcome her back as president of the company, given the circumstances of her prior forced removal from that position, and she doubted that she could work with them. Because their previous written contracts had expired and they were at-will employees, Anderson needed no cause to terminate them and knew of none.
Stearns had an annual employment contract with Index Industries running from June 1997 through June 1998, and another running from August 26, 1998, through August 26, 1999. This second contract was never renewed, and he continued to work as an at-will employee until the date of his discharge. Prichard had three annual employment contracts, the first running from December 1997 through December 1998, the second running from December 1998 through December 1999, and the third running from January 1, 2000 through January 1, 2001. This final contract was never renewed, and Prichard continued to work as an at-will employee until the date of his discharge. Stearns’ and Prichard’s most recently expired written employment contracts contained identical clauses stating as follows:
4. COMPENSATION
Commencing the Effective date and continuing during employment, the Company agrees to compensate Executive as follows: . . .
. . . .
4.2 Notice Payments. The Company shall pay Executive a Notice Payment calculated by applying the Executive’s base salary rate then in effect for one of the following periods, as applicable, before all customary deductions but excluding sick leave, vacation pay and increases contracted or anticipated after the date of calculation of this payment, as follows:
(a) Six months of Executive’s base salary calculated as described above, upon the effective date of a notice of termination pursuant to paragraph 6.1(a);
(b) Three months of Executive’s base salary calculated as described above, upon the effective date of a notice of termination pursuant to paragraph 6.1(a), if this Agreement expires as provided in paragraph 6.3; or
(c) That number of days up to thirty (30) of the salary so calculated, equal of the number of days of notice given by the executive under paragraph 6.2.
4.3 No Notice Payment. No Notice payment shall be made in the event of a discharge of Executive for cause, or in the events provided in paragraphs 6.1(c) and (d).
. . . .
6. TERMINATION
6.1 Employment of Executive pursuant to this Agreement may be terminated as follows:
(a) Ten days after the sending to the Executive of a written notice of termination by the Company
(b) The occurrence of cause of termination. `Cause’ shall include the following, without limitation, the occurrence of one or more of the following events:
(i) Willful failure or refusal to carry out the lawful duties and responsibilities of Executive;
(ii) Violation by Executive of a state or federal criminal law involving the commission of a crime against the Company or a felony the violation of which impairs the ability of the Executive to perform;
(iii) Habitual or repeated misuse by Executive of alcohol or controlled substances; deception, fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty by Executive; any incident materially compromising Executive’s reputation or ability to represent the Company with the public; any act or omission by Executive which substantially impairs the Company’s business, goodwill, or reputation, or any other misconduct; or
(iv) Any other material violation of any provision of this Agreement.
(c) The death of the Executive.
(d) The absence of the Executive by reason of illness or other incapacity or inability of Executive to perform under this Agreement for more than 80 cumulative business days in any twelve month period.
. . . .
6.3 Expiration of Term of Agreement. Unless extended by both parties in writing, this Agreement shall terminate one (1) year following the Effective Date.
6.4 Termination Compensation. If this Agreement terminates for any reason, Executive shall receive payment of the salary earned through the date of the termination. Payment of any Notice Payment upon termination shall be governed by paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3.
Clerk’s Papers at 412-15 (Prichard); Clerk’s Papers at 422-25 (Stearns); emphasis ours.
After they were fired, Stearns and Prichard requested notice pay under these provisions of their employment contracts; when the company failed to pay them, they brought this lawsuit. The company counter-sued them on various claims, only one of which was successful, as described below. In late 1999, Goldberg approached Prichard and Stearns and indicated that he was `burned out’ and needed to take a month of leave. Goldberg told Prichard and Stearns that they should also receive an additional month of leave because of their efforts on behalf of the company. The board of directors approved Goldberg’s additional leave, and discussed leaves for Prichard and Stearns, as well. The board indicated that it would approve leaves for them to compensate them for the extra work they had done in 1999 and 2000.
Goldberg took his additional leave during the summer of 2000. Prichard and Stearns could not take their additional leaves because the company was simply too busy, and they could not get away. They concede that the board never considered whether their additional leaves would be considered accrued vacation or how it would affect Index Industries’ regular 200 hours personal leave accrual limit mentioned in the employee handbook.
After Goldberg resigned the presidency effective January 2, 2001, Prichard and Stearns were instructed to run Index Industries `as usual.’ Prichard and Stearns met and discussed what they were going to do about their month of additional leave that had been approved by the board but not taken. They decided to cash out the accrued, unused vacation time that each of them currently had on the Index Industries books, and to book the extra month (173.33 hours) of leave in its place. They did so, without discussing the matter with the board of directors.
Stearns and Prichard met with Anderson at the end of January 2001, and she informed them that she would be taking over the presidency. Immediately after Anderson assumed the presidency, she fired both Stearns and Prichard, on February 5, 2001, all as previously discussed.
The court found that at the time Anderson fired Stearns and Prichard, neither she nor the board of directors was aware that the two employees had booked an extra month of leave in January. Prichard and Stearns received this month of leave in their final paychecks. Index subsequently refused to pay the two employees the notice leave payments described in their employment contracts.
At the ensuing bench trial, the court examined both Stearns’ and Prichard’s most recent employment contracts, and determined that both contracts had expired a year after their last effective dates because they were not extended in writing as required by Paragraph 6.3. The court then held that because Stearns’ and Prichard’s contracts had expired before they were terminated, they were at-will employees at the time of their discharges. The court further held that Stearns’ and Prichard’s actions cashing out accrued vacation time and booking the extra month of leave was outside the course of Index Industries’ business as usual; thus they were not authorized to take these actions when they were told, in January, to take over the operation of the company. The court determined that these actions resulted in Prichard and Stearns receiving unauthorized payment for 173.33 hours of vacation a piece, and that the company was entitled to recover these payments.
Neither side contests these findings or conclusions.
The court pointed out that Paragraph 4.2(b) of both Prichard’s and Stearns’ employment agreements specified that executives were entitled to notice payment of three months of their base salary if the agreement had expired pursuant to Paragraph 6.3, prior to their terminations. The court held that under Paragraph 4.2(b), Prichard and Stearns were each entitled to severance pay of three months of base salary, `whether or not there was cause for their termination.’ Clerk’s Papers at 134, Finding of Fact 29. The court also found that Paragraph 4.3, providing that there would be no notice payment in the event of a discharge for cause, was not applicable after the contracts expired:
Paragraph 4.3, which provided that no notice payment would be made in the event of a discharge of an executive for cause, is not applicable after the expiration of the annual contracts. The only ground for cause that Index had for the discharge of Mr. Stearns or Mr. Prichard was the cashing out of accrued personal leave and booking of the additional month of personal leave, all of which occurred after the expiration of each plaintiff’s annual contract. There were no other allegations of misconduct during either executive’s employment which would have provided sufficient basis for discharge for cause.
Clerk’s Papers at 134-35, Finding of Fact 30; emphasis ours. See also, Conclusion of Law 3, Clerk’s Papers at 136 (`The for-cause exception of Paragraph 4.3 of the agreements was no longer applicable after the annual term the agreement expired under Paragraph 6.3 and was not renewed by the parties in writing.’)
Because the only ground for cause that Index Industries had for the discharge the cashing out of accrued vacation and booking of additional leave occurred after the expiration of each employee’s annual contract, the court held that the two employees were each entitled to notice payment of three months salary at the time of their termination on February 5, 2001. The court offset these awards by the amounts owed to Index Industries for the vacation cash-outs. The court awarded attorney fees and costs to Prichard and Stearns. Index Industries appeals.
DISCUSSION I. Interpretation of Employment Contract
Index Industries does not assign error to any of the trial court’s specific findings of fact. Instead, it argues that the trial court erred when it determined that Prichard’s and Stearns’ employment contracts entitled them to notice pay, whether or not there was cause for their termination, and requests de novo review of the trial court’s conclusions of law. Where no assignments of error are directed to any of the findings of fact, the findings are generally accepted as verities on appeal. McIntyre v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc., 24 Wn. App. 120, 600 P.2d 619 (1979) (interpretation of employment contract) (citing Bignold v. King County, 65 Wn.2d 817, 399 P.2d 611 (1965)).
Further, a trial court may rely on extrinsic or parol evidence to determine whether a contract existed and also to determine the intent of contracting parties when interpreting ambiguous provisions. See, e.g., Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 143 Wn.2d 349, 364, 20 P.3d 921
(2001); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 15 Wn. App. 314, 319, 549 P.2d 54 (1976). De novo review of a trial court’s findings regarding the interpretation of a contract is improper where a trial court hears witness testimony that was necessary to the trial court’s ultimate determination of the intent of the parties in forming a contract. Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Loveless, 5 Wn. App. 551, 553-54, 489 P.2d 368 (1971).
Both parties stated at oral argument before this court that the trial court heard testimony regarding the formation of the employment contract, but neither side has provided this court with the verbatim report of proceedings. Prichard and Stearns contend in their brief that the trial court heard testimony from both sides concerning their intentions in entering into the agreement, and argue that Index cannot properly be heard to challenge the trial court’s `interpretation’ of the contract without having provided this court with the verbatim report of proceedings. Index Industries replies that the trial court erred in failing to `construe’ the contract in accord with its plain language, and that this court should construe the contract de novo, in accord with its plain language, and thereby reverse the trial court.
Washington courts recognize a distinction between `interpretation’ of a contract, the process by which the trial court determines what objective meanings the parties gave, when contracting, to the language used, and `construction’ of a contract, the process by which the court determines the legal operation of the contract. See, Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 663, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).
Index Industries contends in its reply brief that the trial court never interpreted the contract at all, but instead merely construed it, purportedly in accord with its plain language but erred in that process by failing to pay heed to the plain language which says in the introductory words of paragraph 4 that the compensation clauses commence with the effective date `and continu[e] during employment.’ The company also points to paragraph 6.4 of the contract which says that if the agreement terminates for any reason, the executive shall receive payment of the salary earned through the date of termination but that `[p]ayment of any Notice Payment upon termination shall be governed by paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3.’ Clerk’s Papers at 415 (Prichard); Clerk’s Papers at 425 (Stearns); emphasis ours.
Although the parties agree that trial court heard testimony regarding the formation of the contract, neither its oral ruling nor its findings of fact expressly identify any disputed factual issues regarding the meaning that the parties gave to the language used. Moreover, reading the contract in a vacuum, as we must in the absence of the verbatim report of the trial testimony, Index Industries’ `plain language’ argument appears reasonable on its face although we cannot say as a matter of law that such is the only reasonable construction.
Citing Owens v. Press Publ’g Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956) Stearns and Prichard argue that the trial court’s construction of the contract was correct as a matter of law, even without considering the extrinsic evidence at trial. In Owens, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that severance pay rights based on longevity of employment that accrued while a collective bargaining contract was in force vested at the termination of the contract by virtue of common law, but once the contract expired of its own limitation, it was no longer an integral part of the direct contract of hire between the employer and the employee `unless there be explicit provision otherwise.’ 120 A.2d at 448. Thus, when the plaintiffs were fired, they were entitled to severance pay that had accrued to their respective accounts during the term of the collective bargaining agreement, but not to that which would have accrued if the contract had not expired of its own terms. Id. at 448-49.
Here, of course, there is an `explicit provision otherwise,’ and it is the legal effect of that provision that is at issue. Accordingly, we do not find Owens particularly helpful. But the trial court seems to have relied upon it, at least in part, and it may have done so based in part on testimony at the trial that it found persuasive regarding objective intent of the parties. The trial court certainly was not persuaded by Index Industries’ “plain language” arguments Although Index Industries contends in its briefing that the trial court heard no testimony regarding the parties’ respective intentions as objectively measured by the language they used in forming the contract, Prichard and Stearns tell us that the trial court did hear such testimony. Without the verbatim report, we cannot review the record in order to resolve this dispute. Neither can we be certain, in the absence of the verbatim report, whether we are dealing with a pure finding of fact based on testimony at trial, a mixed finding of fact and a conclusion of law based in part on trial testimony, or a pure conclusion of law that has been entirely mislabeled as a finding of fact a contention that Index Industries does not make.
Ultimately, it is the obligation of the party that is challenging a trial court’s ruling to provide this court with an adequate record to permit appellate review. See generally, RAP 9.2. In the absence of the verbatim report, we decline to speculate as to which side’s briefing most accurately describes the nature of the trial testimony, and we decline to overturn the trial court’s ruling that Prichard and Stearns were entitled to notice pay under the terms of their expired contracts of employment regardless of whether there was cause for their discharges.
II. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Index Industries alternatively asserts that the trial court erred by failing to find that Prichard and Stearns independently owed the company fiduciary duties, and that they were ineligible to receive any additional compensation after termination because they breached those fiduciary duties when they cashed out their vacation pay. Index Industries did not make its fiduciary duty argument to the trial court below, and we will not consider it on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
Index Industries did argue below and does argue on appeal for expansion of the after-acquired evidence rule to completely eliminate the ability of employees to claim contractual rights to notice pay where the employee was initially discharged without cause, but the employer subsequently found misconduct sufficient to support a dismissal for cause. See, Haag v. Revell, 28 Wn.2d 883, 889, 184 P.2d 442 (1947) (citing 35 Am. Jur. 471, sec. 37: `It is not necessary that an employer, in order to justify a dismissal, show that in dismissing his employee he in fact acted upon some proper ground of dismissal. It is sufficient if a ground of dismissal existed at that time.’). Index Industries has not persuaded us that this rule is applicable to the present case.
The after-acquired evidence rule primarily provides an employer a defense to an employee’s claim that he or she was wrongfully discharged. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 37 Wn. App. 386, 681 P.2d 845 (1984) (employee misconduct discovered after discharge sufficient to defend wrongful discharge claim, but not separate harassment claim), abrogated on other grounds by Allison v. Housing Authority of City of Seattle, 59 Wn. App. 624, 799 P.2d 1195 (1990); Haag, 28 Wn.2d 883. The rule does not operate as a total bar to all employee suits against employers, but serves to limit damages for wages that the employee might have earned after the time the dischargeable offense was discovered. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361-62, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995).
Additionally, before an employer may rely upon after-acquired evidence of misconduct and thereby seek to limit the damage award based on wrongful termination, `it must first establish the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee would have been terminated on those grounds alone once the employer discovered the wrongdoing.’ Janson v. North Valley Hosp., 93 Wn. App. 892, 901, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63). There are no findings that establish that Prichard’s and Stearns’ unauthorized conduct was of such severity that they would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the conduct had been discovered before Mary Anderson took over as the president of the company. It is clear from the trial court’s undisputed findings that the board of directors had previously approved Prichard and Stearns taking additional leave, although the fine details had not been worked out in their cases, as they had been with Goldberg. It is also clear that Mary Anderson and Jim Englund frequently disagreed as to management decisions, so that Larry Hawes had to cast the deciding vote with respect to disputed matters. The trial court made no finding that Prichard and Stearns had not earned their additional leaves, but only found that they were not authorized to cash in their accrued vacation pay and post the additional leaves as they did, because such was outside the scope of business as usual. Thus, pending further board action, which never came to pass, Prichard and Stearns were required to repay the monies. In sum, the trial court made no finding as to whether Prichard and Stearns would have been discharged for cause based on the conduct, if it had been discovered before they were fired for another reason entirely after Mary Anderson took over the presidency. The court’s findings only establish that their cashing out of vacation pay was the only grounds upon which Index might have discharged the two employees for cause. Index Industries did not argue below that the court should find that it would have discharged the two employees had it learned of the conduct before their terminations. The trial court’s failure to enter any such findings must be construed against Index. M/V La Conte, Inc. v. Leisure, 55 Wn. App. 396, 401, 777 P.2d 1061 (1989). Thus, we find that Index failed its burden of proof at trial with respect to this argument.
III. Attorney Fees
Finally, Index contests the trial court’s grant of attorney fees and costs to Prichard and Stearns. Prior to trial, the parties attempted mediation pursuant to the mediation provision in Prichard’s and Stearns’ employment contracts. The mediation occurred on January 10, 2003, and the mediator, retired Judge Finkle, recommended that Prichard and Stearns each pay $15,000 to Index to settle all claims. The mediation provision provided:
8. MEDIATION . . .
. . . If the mediation is unsuccessful, in that one party refuses to follow the suggestions of the mediator, then the party refusing to follow the suggestions of the mediator shall pay the requisite fee, subject to any compensation that may later be awarded by the court in any judicial proceeding on the same dispute. The mediator shall be the final decision maker as to whether or not mediation is successful. The decision as to success or failure shall be made promptly, and in any case within sixty (60) days after the mediator is first retained, unless both parties agree explicitly and in writing that the time for a decision may be extended. If the mediation is unsuccessful, and it is judicially determined that the party refusing to follow the suggestions of the mediator is liable to the other party for as much as or more than the mediator has required of that party, then the party refusing to follow the suggestions of the mediator shall be liable to the other party for the other party’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the mediation and throughout the court proceedings, including the cost of consultants and experts, and in any appeal.
Clerk’s Papers at 417-18, 427-28.
On January 10, 2003, Prichard and Stearns expressed their willingness to accept the mediator’s recommendation, but Index Industries refused to accept it. Accordingly, trial preparation continued, and a motion for summary judgment was filed, briefed, and scheduled to be heard on February 7, 2003. Two days before the hearing, Index Industries called the mediator and expressed willingness to settle in accord with the previous recommendation. But this time, Prichard and Stearns refused. The summary judgment motion was argued, and Index Industries’ conspiracy claim against the plaintiffs was dismissed.
After trial, Prichard and Stearns moved for attorney fees pursuant to RCW 49.48.030 and the mediation provision of the parties’ employment contracts. The trial court held that it was undisputed that the parties utilized the mediation provision in the employment contracts, and that Index Industries refused to accept the recommendation of the mediator. Thus, the court ruled that Prichard and Stearns were `entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs under the mediation provision of their employment agreements with [Index].’ Clerk’s Papers at 68.
Index Industries asserts that the trial court erred in granting costs and fees to Prichard and Stearns because it accepted the mediator’s recommended settlement on February 5, 2003, within 60 days of the formal mediation session, but that Prichard and Sterns refused to pay the recommended amount at that time. Index Industries alternatively argues that the contract required the mediator, not the court, to determine who rejected the settlement and that this court should remand for a finding by the mediator. Prichard and Stearns counter that they initially agreed to accept the mediator’s recommendation, but that Index refused to accept the agreement until after they had already incurred thousands of dollars in additional attorney fees and until after they had clearly demonstrated the lack of merit of the conspiracy claim although that claim was not actually dismissed until two days later.
No case directly addresses the standard of review of a court’s ruling regarding a mediation clause such as this one. However, because the trial court’s findings in support of the award may have been based at least in part on trial testimony by the parties not presented on appeal, we are disinclined to look behind the ruling. See, e.g., Thor v. McDearmid, 63 Wn. App. 193, 205, 817 P.2d 1380 (1991) (a presumption exists in favor of the trial court’s findings due to its ability to measure the credibility of the witnesses and the party claiming error has the burden of showing they are not supported by substantial evidence).
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling, if that is the proper standard of review. The mediation clearly was unsuccessful. Neither side asked Judge Finkle to place the blame for that lack of success on one party or the other. Given the timing here, and the fact that Index Industries initially refused to accept Judge Finkle’s recommendation, only to express a willingness to accept it after Prichard and Stearns had expended thousands more in attorney fees, on the eve of a ruling on the pending summary judgment motion, we agree with the trial court’s apparent assessment of the matter: Judge Finkle could not possibly have placed the blame for the failure of this mediation upon Prichard and Stearns, for that would have been unreasonable in the circumstances. The trial court had a tenable basis for its ruling. We find no abuse of discretion here. Moreover, Prichard and Stearns also request attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RCW 49.48.030, which provides for the award of attorney fees “[i]n any action in which any person is successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary owed to him[.]’ RCW 49.48.030. RCW 49.48.030 is a remedial statute that `must be construed liberally in favor of the employee.’ Bates v. City of Richland, 112 Wn. App. 919, 939, 51 P.2d 816 (2002) (addressing action by police retirees against city for statutory rights to pension benefits). Although chapter 49.48 RCW contains no definition of `wage,’ courts have applied the definition contained in a related statute, RCW 49.46.010(2), which reads in pertinent part: “[w]age’ means compensation due to an employee by reason of employment.’ Bates, 112 Wn. App. at 940 (citing Hayes v. Trulock, 51 Wn. App. 795, 806, 755 P.2d 830 (1988)).
In Barrett v. Weyerhaeuser Co. Severance Pay Plan, 40 Wn. App. 630, 633, 700 P.2d 338 (1985) the court noted that severance pay is a means of recompense for the economic exigencies, privations and detriments resulting from the permanent separation of the employee from service. “`In a real sense, it is remuneration for the service rendered during the period covered by the agreement.'” Id. (quoting Owens v. Press Publishing, 120 A.2d at 545-46. Although the trial court did not base the attorney fee award on RCW 49.48.030, the statute provides an additional ground for affirming the award. Prichard’s and Stearns’ actions for notice pay were clearly actions for compensation due to them by reason of their employment and encompassed by the broad terms of RCW 49.48.030.
On these same grounds, we grant Prichard’s and Stearns’ request to be awarded their reasonable attorney fees incurred for defending this appeal.
We affirm.
APPELWICK, J., and GROSSE, J., Concur