No. 28142-2-IIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
Filed: June 24, 2003 DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County Docket No: 97-2-07841-1 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 10/31/2001
Counsel for Appellant(s), Richard E. Sorrels (Appearing Pro Se), 9316 Glencove Road, Gig Harbor, WA 98329.
Counsel for Respondent(s), James Albert Densley, Pierce Co Pros Atty Ofc/Civil Div, 955 Tacoma Ave S Ste 301, Tacoma, WA 98402-2160.
Bertha Baranko Fitzer, Pierce Co Pros Ofc/Civil Div, 955 Tacoma Ave S Ste 301, Tacoma, WA 98402-2160.
BRIDGEWATER, J.
Richard E. Sorrels and Pierce County executed a stipulated agreement that enjoined accumulations of junk vehicles and other debris on Sorrels’s property. Sorrels was found in contempt of the agreement three times, and the trial court issued a warrant of abatement after the third contempt order on October 31, 2001. Sorrels challenges the most recent contempt order, finding him in contempt of various provisions in the stipulated agreement. He also challenges a discovery order and the amount of his supersedeas bond. We affirm.
FACTS
Sorrels owns property in Pierce County that is inundated with vehicles, vehicle parts, tires, machinery, and other materials. Pierce County became officially interested in the property in August 1997, when it and Sorrels executed a temporary stipulated order (TSO) that sought to enjoin further accumulations on the property.
The TSO imposed various binding terms and conditions. First, it enjoined Sorrels from storing `junk motor vehicles, parts, or hulks thereof’ on the property for more than 48 consecutive hours. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 47. If Sorrels desired to store such a vehicle longer than 48 hours, the TSO required that he notify Ray Clark, a Pierce County Code Enforcement Officer, or his designee, who would then inspect the vehicle and determine whether the vehicle was a `junk vehicle’ under the definition set forth at Pierce County Code 10.32. If the vehicle was a `junk vehicle,’ the TSO required its removal `forthwith.’ CP at 47.
Second, the TSO prohibited `additional rubbish, defined . . . as items having no reasonable value.’ CP at 47. Third, the TSO ordered that Sorrels remove `junk vehicles’ from his property at the rate of five vehicles per week. CP at 48. For purposes of this `junk vehicle’ provision, Pierce County District Court Two was to determine whether a vehicle fit the applicable definition. CP at 48. Fourth, the TSO required that Sorrels obtain a `Hydraulics Permit’ to remove a `metal pier’ that extended from his property into an adjacent body of water. CP at 49. Fifth, the TSO prohibited the storage of `any vehicles, trailers, rubbish, or structures within thirty feet of the ordinary high water line.’ CP at 49. Sixth, the TSO permitted `A maximum of three small seaworthy boats . . . orderly and neatly moored along or near the remaining dock.’ CP at 49. And finally, the TSO prohibited `discharges of sewage . . . into any septic system . . . except as allowed by permit or license.’ CP at 49.
The trial court first found Sorrels in contempt of the TSO in March 1998. The court determined that Sorrels had not removed the metal pier, that he maintained a Chinese `junk’[1] style boat that was `neither small nor seaworthy,’ and that he had more than the permitted number of boats on the property. CP at 149.
Before the next contempt hearing, Sorrels submitted documentation showing that he did not own the Chinese `junk’ and that he had revoked the boat owner’s permission to moor at his property.
The trial court then issued another order on Sorrels’s compliance in April 1998. The court revised a portion of its previous contempt order, finding that Sorrels was `not in contempt for the failure to remove the metal pier in as much as he filed the amended Hydraulics Permit Application.’ CP at 187. As to the Chinese `junk,’ the court noted that Sorrels’s `filing of documents regarding the ownership of the boat at such a late date appear to be a delaying tactic.’ CP at 187. The court found Sorrels in contempt for his continued failure to remove the boat. Sorrels states that, after this contempt finding, he removed the Chinese `junk.’
In May 2001, Pierce County moved for discovery. The County sought entry onto Sorrels’s property under CR 34(a)(2) to inspect vehicles, parts, hulks, piers, debris, trash, soils, etc. Sorrels objected to the trial court hearing the discovery motion because the parties had not conferred with respect to the motion as CR 26(i) requires. The trial court heard and granted the County’s motion, ordering inspection of the property to collect photographic evidence relating to Sorrels’s compliance with the TSO. The County entered and photographed Sorrels’s property on August 9, 2001.
In October 2001, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on Sorrels’s compliance with the TSO. These findings and conclusions appear to have been based primarily on photographs taken during the entry ordered after the County’s discovery motion. The court found that Sorrels has utterly and willfully refused to comply with the order by importing and/or storing (leaving) at least 50 junk cars, trucks, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trailers and hulks thereof on the parcels without complying with the conditions of the stipulated order. . . .[2]
. . . That [Sorrels] has . . . [failed] to remove trailers within the shoreline setback area. . . .[3]
. . . [That Sorrels] has allowed rubbish to accumulate on the property. The items left outside fit within the legal definition of solid waste and rubbish as defined by prior court orders. . . .[4]
That [Sorrels] was ordered to have no illegal septic sewer hookups, yet the investigation showed a three to four inch in diameter plastic pipe leading into the ground from one of the recreational vehicles.[5]
On the basis of these findings, the trial court found Sorrels in contempt of the TSO. The court then issued a warrant of abatement, which required the sheriff to abate the nuisance on Sorrels’s property by `removing and disposing’ of the various offending items. CP at 268. The court’s order did, however, give Sorrels an opportunity to remove and dispose of the property on his own, prior to the sheriff executing the warrant.
Although Pierce County states that it `entered the property and abated the nuisance’ in early 2002, Br. of Resp’t at 12, the record does not indicate whether the sheriff has yet executed the abatement order.
Sorrels filed a timely notice of appeal, designating for review the various contempt orders, the warrant of abatement, and the order granting the County’s discovery motion. Then, Sorrels moved for supersedeas stay without bond under RAP 8.1(e). Pierce County objected, requesting a supersedeas bond of $250,000. The trial court denied Sorrels’s motion and set the bond amount at $100,000. The trial court also granted judgment against Sorrels in the amount of $8,252.55 for attorney fees and costs.
Finally, there is some dispute over the issue of a trust. Pierce County claims that Sorrels is trustee over the real property that is the subject of the dispute. But Sorrels claims, through an exhibit attached to his brief, that Suzanne Swanson is trustee of the real property of one of the parcels involved and trustee of the personal property located at another concerned parcel. The record does not contain any documents that clarify the trust issue, and it does not appear that the trial court specifically dealt with the issue.
Analysis I. October 31, 2001 Contempt Order and Warrant of Abatement
Many of Sorrels’s assignments of error pertain to the trial court’s October 2001 contempt order and the subsequent warrant of abatement.
A. August 2001 Order Granting Motion to Compel Discovery
Sorrels claims that the trial court erred in granting Pierce County’s CR 34 discovery motion because the County did not comply with CR 26(i)’s conference and certification requirements.
Civil Rule 26(i), however, did not govern the County’s discovery motion. The motion sought entry to inspect Sorrels’s compliance with a prior court order. Sorrels cannot seriously maintain that the trial court lacked the power to ensure compliance with its prior order. See RCW 7.21.030(2)(c). As the trial court’s ordered inspection was nothing more than an exercise of a power previously contemplated by the County and Sorrels when they stipulated the TSO’s terms, it did not err by permitting the County’s inspection.
B. Execution of Warrant of Abatement Effect on Property Rights of Owners
Next, Sorrels claims that execution of the warrant of abatement worked a deprivation of property without due process in violation of article 1, section 3 of the state constitution and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Sorrels concedes, however, that his procedural due process claim addresses others’ rights and interests. After describing the removal of Mr. Velez’s Chinese `junk,’ Sorrels states that `His Rights were violated.’ Br. of Appellant at 12. In the sentence’s context, `His’ clearly refers to Velez. And after describing the removal of trust property, Sorrels states `Again Rights were violated.’ Br. of Appellant at 13. At no point in his argument does Sorrels characterize the rights or interests violated as his own.
Standing exists where the party has a distinct and personal interest in the case’s outcome and can show that she would benefit from the relief requested. Timberlane Homeowners Ass’n v. Brame, 79 Wn. App. 303, 307-08, 901 P.2d 1074 (1995), review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1004 (1996). The standing doctrine generally prohibits a party from suing to vindicate another’s rights. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 138, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805
(1988); Miller v. U.S. Bank of Wash., N.A., 72 Wn. App. 416, 424, 865 P.2d 536 (1994).
A party’s ability to sue to vindicate another’s rights and interests, known as third party standing, depends on whether the party can show that:
‘(1) the [party] has suffered an injury-in-fact, giving [her] a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the disputed issue, (2) the [party] has a close relationship to the third party, and (3) there exists some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect . . . her own interests.’ Mearns v. Scharbach, 103 Wn. App. 498, 512, 12 P.3d 1048
(2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1011 (2001).
As Sorrels’s claim relates to others’ property interests, he must establish a basis for third party standing in order to raise it. He has not even addressed the standing issue. Therefore, Sorrels’s due process claim addressing the rights of others fails.
And to the extent that Sorrels’s due process claim addresses his own property rights, that portion of the claim also fails. If Sorrels does have some personal, protectable right or interest in the property destroyed, his standing to challenge the County’s actions would extend no further than necessary to vindicate his right or interest. On that score, the process was clearly sufficient. There is no indication that Sorrels lacked notice before any contempt hearing or before the actual deprivation, and the trial court held adversarial hearings on Sorrels’s contempt three times once in March 1998, once in April 1998, and once in October 2001 before the challenged deprivation occurred. This was clearly sufficient. Thus, Sorrels’s procedural due process claim fails.
C. Contempt Findings
We review a trial court’s contempt finding for an abuse of discretion. Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995). We will uphold the finding if it has a proper basis. State v. Hobble, 126 Wn.2d 283, 292, 892 P.2d 85 (1995). Discretion is abused if it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 440, 903 P.2d 470 (1995).
Sorrels has not assigned error to any of the trial court’s factual findings made before the October 2001 contempt order and the warrant of abatement. As such, those findings are verities before this court. See State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Thus, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding contempt based on its undisputed findings.
1. Contempt for Maintaining Boats and Trailers
Sorrels argues that the contempt finding relating to boats and trailers on his property was an abuse of discretion because he moored no boats at his dock and the TSO said nothing about boats and trailers parked on dry land.
Sorrels correctly notes that he was not in contempt of the TSO’s moorage provision. The TSO stated, `A maximum of three small seaworthy boats may be orderly and neatly moored along or near the remaining dock.’ CP at 49. Exhibit 2 shows no boats moored at Sorrels’s dock.
But Sorrels’s moorage argument is inapposite because the trial court did not find that Sorrels violated the moorage provision. Rather, the trial court found that Sorrels `has utterly and willfully refused to comply with the order by importing and/or storing (leaving) at least 50 junk cars, trucks, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trailers and hulks thereof on the parcels.’ CP at 258. The court continued, `That the defendant has utterly failed and willfully refused to comply with [the TSO] by failing to remove trailers within the shoreline setback area.’ CP at 259.
Although the trial court did not specify which TSO provision the boats and trailers violated, the offended provisions are readily discernable.
They are (1) the provision requiring `no storing of any vehicles, trailers, rubbish, or structures within thirty feet of the ordinary high water line,’ CP at 49; and (2) the provision stating, `the defendant is hereby ordered to remove all vehicles, vehicle parts, and vehicle hulks which are determined to be junk vehicles.’ CP at 48.
The trial court ordered removal of all but two or three of the boats and trailers from Sorrels’s property,[6] finding that many of the boats and trailers were `junk vehicles.’ Sorrels has not challenged that finding. Thus, the trial court had tenable reasons for finding Sorrels in contempt of the `junk vehicle’ provision. And as set forth previously, Sorrels has not challenged the factual finding that vehicles and trailers were stored within 30 feet of high water. Thus, the trial court had tenable reasons for finding Sorrels in contempt of the high water provision.
As the trial court had tenable reasons for ordering removal of the boats and trailers, the contempt finding pertaining to those boats and trailers was not an abuse of discretion. 2. Contempt for Failing to Remove Pier
Sorrels argues that this court should reverse any finding of contempt for his failure to obtain a hydraulics permit and remove the pier extending from his property. Sorrels claims that he cannot have been in contempt because the pier was removed.
The TSO required that Sorrels obtain a hydraulics permit and remove the pier from his property. At the April 1998 contempt hearing, the trial court specifically found `that the defendant is not in contempt for the failure to remove the metal pier in as much as he filed the amended Hydraulics Permit Application; but, he shall diligently act toward . . . removing the metal pier . . . in order to avoid a finding of contempt.’ CP at 187 (emphasis added). The record reveals no further discussion or finding on the pier removal provision at the October 2001 contempt hearing or the order issued thereafter. But the warrant of abatement does order removal of the pier.
Because the trial court apparently did not find Sorrels in contempt of the pier removal provision in the October 2001 order, yet ordered the pier’s removal, the pier issue is somewhat obfuscated.[7] But this is not a major concern. As Sorrels claims to have already removed the pier, no harm should befall him via the order of abatement, which merely orders the pier’s removal. Further, Sorrels has not been harmed or otherwise wrongly coerced by an erroneous contempt finding as to the pier because the trial court amended its March 1998 contempt finding, which was the only instance in which Sorrels was found in contempt of the pier removal provision.
Therefore, Sorrels’s claim is meritless. 3. Contempt for Failure to Remove Vehicles and Other Personalty
Sorrels argues that the TSO did not require him to remove anything more than five vehicles and the aforementioned pier. As he removed those items, Sorrels argues, `Any orders finding Sorrels in contempt for failure to remove something from the property should be reversed.’ Br. of Appellant at 16.
With certain exceptions,[8] the trial court ordered removal of all vehicles, boats, trailers, tires, rims, motorcycles, and their hulks or parts, as well as rubbish, debris, piers, bulkheads, retaining walls, unpermitted sewer facilities, and rodent infestation. The order was based on findings of fact, which are unchallenged on appeal and describe various violations of TSO provisions. The findings state that Sorrels (1) stored or left `at least 50 junk cars, trucks, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trailers and hulks thereof on the parcels without complying with the conditions of the stipulated order,’ CP at 258; (2) failed to remove trailers from within the 30 foot shoreline setback area; (3) `allowed rubbish to accumulate on the property’ that fit within governing prohibitions against `solid waste’ and `rubbish,’ CP at 259; and (4) maintained a `three to four inch in diameter plastic pipe leading into the ground from one of the recreational vehicles.’ CP at 259.
Each finding pertained to a specific TSO term. The junk vehicle finding violated the junk vehicle provision; the vehicles within the 30-foot setback finding violated the 30-foot setback provision; the rubbish finding violated the rubbish provision; and the plastic pipe finding violated the septic system provision.
Although the TSO, in a narrow sense, may not have required Sorrels to remove anything other than the pier and five vehicles when executed, it was not merely a retrospective agreement. It was also prospective in the sense that it required continuing compliance. Because Sorrels did not comply with the TSO in the manners set forth above the contempt findings and subsequent order of removal were proper. 4. Contempt for Bringing `Additional’ Items onto Property
Finally, Sorrels argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt for bringing `rubbish’ and `junk vehicles’ onto his property.
The TSO set forth specific requirements for items brought onto the property after the parties executed the agreement. First, the TSO required Sorrels to notify a Pierce County Code Enforcement Officer when he intended to store any additional vehicles on his property. The TSO allowed the enforcement officer to reject the vehicle if the vehicle was a `junk vehicle’ under Pierce County Code 10.32, in which case Sorrels was required to remove the vehicle `forthwith.’ CP at 47. Second, the TSO prohibited additional `rubbish’ on the property. CP at 47. The agreement specifically defined `rubbish’ as `items having no reasonable value.’ CP at 47.
At the October 2001 contempt hearing, Sorrels testified that he had substantially complied, or at least attempted to comply with the TSO procedures for vehicle storage. Apparently unconvinced, the trial court stated in its oral ruling that Sorrels’s `efforts to contact [the enforcement officer] gets to the point of being ridiculous.’ Report of Proceedings (Oct. 31, 2001, pretrial motions and oral ruling) at 13. The trial court made a written finding that Sorrels `has utterly and willfully refused to comply with the order by importing . . . at least 50 junk cars . . . without complying with the conditions of the stipulated order.’ CP at 258. And as to the additional `rubbish,’ the court found that Sorrels `has utterly failed and willfully refused to comply with this order. The defendant has allowed rubbish to accumulate on the property. The items left outside fit within the legal definition of . . . rubbish as defined by prior court orders.’ CP at 259.
Sorrels has not assigned error to any of the factual findings.
Therefore, we must take the `rubbish’ and `junk vehicle’ findings as verities, and those findings clearly support the conclusion that Sorrels was in contempt of the TSO’s `additional’ property provisions. CP at 47.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
II. Validity of the Stipulated Temporary Order
Sorrels next contends that the contempt orders and warrant of abatement should be reversed because he never assented to the TSO provisions of which the trial court held him in contempt. Specifically, Sorrels argues that (1) the only TSO provision relating to boats and trailers was the moorage provision, (2) the TSO required the removal of just five vehicles, and (3) he complied with the TSO procedure for accumulating additional vehicles. Sorrels asserts that he complied with all of the TSO provisions that he agreed to.
This argument simply raises the same issues over again, casting them in different doctrinal terms. The heart of Sorrels’s argument is that the TSO’s written terms did not proscribe the conduct that he engaged in; he does not claim a lack of assent to the TSO’s written terms or that those terms are ambiguous or non-binding. Thus, the proper issue is not whether Sorrels assented to the TSO but whether his conduct violated the agreement’s clear terms.
As set forth above, Sorrels correctly notes that he was not in contempt of the moorage provision, but he ignores the scope of the restriction imposed by the 30-foot setback provision and the junk vehicle provision. The trial court found that certain boats and trailers violated these provisions and, as evidenced by the exceptions to the order of abatement, it found that at least two of the boats and trailers did not. Sorrels has not assigned error to these factual findings. Therefore, we accept the findings as verities, and Sorrels’s moorage argument fails once again.
The court can dispose of arguments (2) and (3) jointly. Although the TSO did require that Sorrels remove only five vehicles that Pierce County District Court Two determined to be `junk vehicles,’ another provision bore on the `junk vehicles’ issue: the TSO required Sorrels to notify the Pierce County Enforcement Officer of any additional vehicles that were to remain on the property longer than 48 hours, and the officer was then to determine whether the vehicle was a `junk vehicle.’ As set forth above, the trial court found that Sorrels `utterly and willfully refused to comply with the order by importing and/or storing (leaving) at least 50 junk cars, trucks, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trailers and hulks thereof.’ CP at 258. Sorrels challenges neither the finding that he refused to comply with the notification provision nor the finding that the vehicles he imported and stored were `junk vehicles.’ Therefore, we must accept that Sorrels was in contempt of those provisions, and the argument that Sorrels was not in contempt of any specific TSO provision by storing the junk vehicles fails.
III. Excessive Remedial Action
Sorrels asserts that, if he was in contempt of any TSO provision, then relief should have been limited to the removal of the offending items.
Sanctions imposed for contempt of court are within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 126, 853 P.2d 462, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993).
The court’s abatement order was a remedial sanction imposed to coerce compliance with the TSO. The order states, `The abatement of the public nuisance shall consist of removing and disposing at a licensed landfill or licensed recycling facility or sell or have deposed [sic] of at the Sheriff’s option any of the items to licensed auto haulers or wrecking yards.’ CP at 268.
Sorrels cannot reasonably argue that the portion of the order requiring removal of the offending items was excessive. The trial court certainly had that authority under RCW 7.21.030(2)(c), which allows an order `designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court,’ in this case the TSO. Therefore, Sorrels’s `excessiveness’ claim presumably addresses only that portion of the order that directs disposal at a landfill, wrecking yard, or other facility.
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must view the order directing disposal in proper context. Pierce County initiated this dispute on May 15, 1997 by filing a complaint to enjoin Sorrels’s activities, which the County alleged were a public nuisance. In response, Sorrels and the County executed the TSO in August 1997. The trial court then found Sorrels in contempt of various TSO provisions in March 1998, April 1998, and October 2001, and gave Sorrels multiple opportunities to purge his contempt and comply with the TSO. Finally, the October 2001 contempt order clearly set forth a procedure by which Sorrels could move offending items to other locations so that those items would not be removed and disposed of under the abatement order.
The case history makes clear that nothing short of forced removal would remedy the public nuisance on Sorrels’s property. And it is also clear that the trial court gave Sorrels adequate opportunity to avoid the disposal methods contemplated by the abatement order. As Sorrels chose to ignore the trial court’s orders rather than move his property, he cannot now challenge the trial court’s chosen disposal method. In light of Sorrels’s obstinacy and the trial court’s accommodating offer, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering removal and disposal of the offending items.
IV. Supersedeas Bond
A. Pierce County’s Objection
Sorrels argues that Pierce County’s objection to his motion for a supersedeas without bond was untimely. He claims that the County’s late objection warrants reversal of the trial court’s order setting the amount of the supersedeas bond.
Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.1(d) states, `A party may object to the sufficiency of an individual surety on a bond, to the form of a bond, or to the amount of a bond by a motion in the trial court made within 7 days after the party making the motion is served with a copy of the bond.’
Pierce County does not contend that its objection to Sorrels’s supersedeas motion was timely.[9] Therefore, we must decide whether reversal of the trial court’s order setting the supersedeas bond at $100,000 is the proper remedy for Pierce County’s untimely objection.
Pierce County states, `While [RAP 8.1(d)] does contain that [seven day] time limit, it does not follow that once the period has passed, the amount of bond (or lack thereof) is cast in stone.’ Br. of Resp’t at 25.
The County’s point is that the late filing was harmless because the trial court was not bound by the bond amount that the County requested in the objection. We agree. The trial court set the bond at $100,000, which was $150,000 less than the County’s request. As the County’s late objection neither bound nor greatly influenced the ultimate bond amount, the late objection is not a proper basis for reversing the trial court’s order.
B. Supersedeas Amount
Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.1(b)(2) states, The amount of the bond shall be the amount of any money judgment entered by the trial court plus the amount of the loss which the prevailing party in the trial court would incur as a result of the party’s inability to enforce the judgment during review. Ordinarily, the amount of loss will be equal to the reasonable value of the use of the property during review.
The trial court set the supersedeas bond amount at $100,000. The court found that, as of January 10, 2002, `the reasonable cost of clean up . . . is $27,000.’ CP at 304. The court also found that the amount `will increase during the pendency of the appeal,’ but it did not specify the amount or rate of increase. CP at 304. Nor did the trial court’s order mention any money judgments against Sorrels.
Although the trial court did not specify the costs that factored into the $100,000 figure beyond the $27,000 clean up cost, substantial evidence supports the chosen bond amount. Mark Luppino, a Pierce County Code Enforcement Officer, submitted an affidavit that estimated the potential costs. He stated, `Based on my inspection . . . I believe that a significant amount of contamination is taking place. If the soil and water were contaminated, the cost of cleanup would be substantial. Should this court allow a stay, a bond of $250,000 is appropriate to ensure that the plaintiff can properly remedy the damage done.’ CP at 274. And in addition to the estimated cleanup costs, Pierce County obtained an $8,252.55 judgment against Sorrels for its attorney fees and costs.
Together, the current and estimated clean up costs and the monetary judgment against Sorrels equal an amount much greater than the bond amount.
Therefore, the trial court had sufficient grounds for setting the bond amount at $100,000, and the bond was not excessive.
Sorrels also assigns error to the trial court’s order granting attorney fees and costs. But he fails to argue the issue or cite to legal authority. Without argument or authority to support it, an assignment of error is waived. Smith v. King, 106 Wn.2d 443, 451-52, 722 P.2d 796
(1986). Therefore, we decline review of the issue.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MORGAN, P.J. and HOUGHTON, J., concur.