IN RE THE PARENTAGE OF CONARRO, 161 Wn. App. 1018 (2011)

No. 64634-6-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: April 25, 2011.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-5-00536-3, Patricia H. Clark, J., entered November 24, 2009.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Dwyer, C.J., and Becker, J.

APPELWICK, J.

Conarro appeals pro se the dismissal of his petition for establishment of parentage. We affirm.

FACTS
The marriage between Patrick and Kathy Conarro[1] dissolved in 2000 in Colorado. Two children were born during the marriage. One of the children, I.C., was born on August 26, 1993. A September 19, 2003, paternity test showed that Conarro was not the father of I.C. In January 2009, Conarro filed a petition for establishment of parentage in King County Superior Court. Conarro sought a declaration that Clifford Pitcher was the father of I.C.

The trial court dismissed the action.[2] Conarro apparently requested reinstatement. The trial court then denied Conarro’s motion to reinstate the case for the following reasons:[3]

[(1)] This court does not have jurisdiction over the parties. [(2)] The petitioner is the “presumed father” and this action was not brought [within] two years of the child’s birth. And [(3)] This matter was adjudicated in Colorado under District Court, County of El Paso, Colorado #99DR4070 Feb 18, 2009.

Conarro appeals the denial of the motion to reinstate the petition.[4]

DISCUSSION
Conarro appeals the trial court’s refusal to reinstate his petition for establishment of parentage. Our review of dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is de novo. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 200-01, 961 P.2d 333 (1998). We generally review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Lilly v. Lynch, 88 Wn. App. 306, 321, 945 P.2d 727
(1997). Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 683, 15 P.3d 115 (2000).

The appellant bears the burden of providing a record from which the appealed issues can be decided. Brothers v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash., 88 Wn. App. 398, 409, 945 P.2d 208 (1997). When the appellant fails to provide an adequate record for review, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling. See Hyatt v. Sellen Constr. Co., Inc., 40 Wn App. 893, 897, 700 P.2d 1164 (1985). Because Conarro fails to meet these burdens with respect to the jurisdiction and res judicata findings by the trial court, we cannot consider his arguments on appeal and must affirm.

Even if the court had jurisdiction and was not precluded from reaching the issue by res judicata, we would still agree that the trial court properly found the petition was untimely. A man is presumed to be the father of a child if he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage. RCW 26.26.116(1)(a). According to Conarro’s motion to terminate child support, I.C. was born during the marriage.[5] A presumption of paternity established under this section may be rebutted only by an adjudication under

RCW 26.26.500 through 26.26.630. RCW 26.26.116(2). RCW 26.26.530[6] provides a time limit on challenging a presumption of paternity:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, a proceeding brought by a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father must be commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child.
(2) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a child and the child’s presumed father may be maintained at any time if the court determines that:
(a) The presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; and
(b) The presumed father never openly treated the child as his own.

Conarro’s action was filed 16 years after the birth of I.C. His action is prohibited as being filed more than two years after the birth of I.C. unless he can show that section two of the statute applies. In the limited record before us, Conarro alleges that Kathy was engaged in a sexual relationship with Pitcher during the probable time of conception. But, no evidence in the record suggests that Conarro was not cohabitating or engaging in sexual intercourse with Kathy during the time of conception. And, Conarro does not dispute that he treated I.C. as his own during his seven year marriage and beyond. Therefore, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, it properly dismissed Conarro’s petition as untimely.

We affirm.