No. 50879-2-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: September 22, 2003. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 00-5-00477-9. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/09/2002.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Kimberly Holloway (Appearing Pro Se), 3119 Colby Ave. #10, Everett, WA 98201.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Vernon Beach (Appearing Pro Se), 708 91st Pl. S.W., Everett, WA 98204.
PER CURIAM.
Kimberly Holloway appeals a decision denying her request to modify a parenting plan and maintaining Vernon Beach as the primary residential parent for their son, T. H. Holloway contends the court failed to consider Beach’s work history and reliance on his parents in evaluating his parenting of T. H. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTS
Holloway and Beach are the parents of T.H. In October 2000, the superior court entered an agreed order of parentage, an order of child support, and a final parenting plan designating Vernon Beach as the primary residential parent. Both parents subsequently sought to modify the parenting plan. Holloway requested that she be named the primary residential parent. In July 2002, the court denied Holloway’s request and entered a final parenting plan again designating Beach as the primary residential parent. The court found that Holloway had not shown a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification.
DECISION
Under RCW 26.09.260(1) and (2)[1] , a court may modify a parenting plan if (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the child’s best interests will be served by modification; (3) the present environment is detrimental to the child’s well-being; and (4) the harm caused by the change in parenting plan is outweighed by the advantage of a change in the plan.[2] A party seeking modification must overcome a strong presumption favoring continuity in a child’s life, and a court’s decision regarding modification of a parenting plan will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.[3]
Holloway challenges the superior court’s denial of her request for modification, arguing that the court failed to consider Beach’s work history and reliance on his parents in evaluating his parental abilities. She fails, however, to address the statutory criteria for modification or the applicable standard of review. As noted above, a parent seeking modification must not only demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances, but must also demonstrate that modification is in the child’s best interests, that the present environment is detrimental to the child’s well-being, and that the benefits of a change in the parenting plan outweigh any harm. Holloway nowhere discusses the application of these criteria to this case. This is fatal to her appeal.[4] In any event, our review of the record indicates that the court was well within its discretion in denying modification.
The evidence established that there had been positive and negative developments in both parents’ lives since the implementation of the original parenting plan. After reviewing those developments, the family court investigator continued to recommend that Beach be the primary residential caregiver. The superior court expressly considered Beach’s work history, asking him specifically about his current and prior employment. The court was also aware of the assistance Beach receives from his parents.[5] In the end, the court concluded that there had not been a substantial change of circumstances and denied the request for modification. The court was within its discretion in doing so. Holloway next contends Beach has not followed the court’s oral directive for `the parties . . . to bring a motion before the court commissioners to fix support and the support obligation.’ Holloway is also at fault, however, since the court plainly directed both parties to bring the motion for support. If support has not yet been set, the parties are directed to have it set within 60 days of the filing of this opinion.
Affirmed.[6]
SCHINDLER and COX, JJ., concur.
(1) . . . {T}he court shall not modify a prior custody decree or a parenting plan unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree or plan, that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party and that the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
(2) In applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential schedule established by the decree or parenting plan unless:
. . . .
(c) The child’s present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child, . . .
(1993); In re Marriage of Pape, 139 Wn.2d 694, 715, 989 P.2d 1120
(1999).