No. 51458-0-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: July 28, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 85-3-02062-0 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 11/05/2002
Counsel for Appellant(s), John Wayne McDaniel (Appearing Pro Se), 2348 Alki Avenue S.W., #301, Seattle, WA 98116.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Patricia Y. Lawrence, Attorney at Law, 1500 114th St. SE, Bellevue, WA 98004-6902.
Karen Shanks (Appearing Pro Se), 3708 247th S.E., Issaquah, WA 98027.
COLEMAN, J.
This is the fifth of a series of appeals arising from Jack McDaniel’s 1991 petition to modify his child support obligation. After nearly 12 years and an admittedly `long and tortuous’ process,[1] the matter has been finally resolved by the trial court in a fair and just manner. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
McDaniel and Karen Shanks were divorced in 1987. Under the terms of the decree, McDaniel was ordered to pay support to Shanks for their two young sons. On December 19, 1991, McDaniel petitioned for modification of his child support payments due to a significant reduction in his income.
The trial court denied the petition, and McDaniel appealed.
On appeal in In re Marriage of McDaniel, No. 31340-1-I, No. 32450-1-I (consolidated), slip op. at 5-6 (Feb. 7, 1994) (McDaniel I), we reversed the modification denial, concluding that the trial court’s decision failed to address critical points of the petition, and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court granted modification based on McDaniel’s change in financial circumstances, and calculated the modified support owing for the period from August 1992 through March 1995. McDaniel again appealed to this court.
In that appeal, In re Marriage of McDaniel, No. 36892-3-I, slip op. at 12 (Sept. 8, 1997) (McDaniel II),[2] we reversed in part, holding that the minimum need standard from RCW 74.04.770 applied in all child support calculations, that, given McDaniel’s depleted estate, the trial court failed to enter written findings and conclusions stating its reasons for any deviation, and that the trial court had discretion to modify the support calculation retroactively to the date McDaniel first filed his modification of support petition. This court then remanded the matter for entry of the necessary findings and for consideration of whether the modification should be applied from the December 19, 1991, filing date. In so doing, we noted:
If the trial court determines that the modification should be effective before August 6, 1992, it must apply the minimum need standard as discussed supra, credit any payments that McDaniel made during that period in its calculation, and consider any impact that an earlier modification may have on its finding that McDaniel’s estate was depleted as of July 1992. McDaniel II, slip op. at 9 n. 19.
Following this remand, the trial court used July 1992 as the effective date of modification and found no basis for deviating from the minimum need standard.
On appeal from that decision, we agreed with McDaniel that the trial court did not support its decision with sufficient written findings and remanded for entry of findings and conclusions supporting an effective date of modification. In re Marriage of McDaniel, No. 44274-1-l, slip op. at 5 (Mar. 27, 2000) (McDaniel lll).
After several hearings, the trial court on remand entered the following pertinent findings of fact:
4. The support obligation of $1,000 per month for the period December 1991 through July 1992 brought Jack McDaniel’s income below the minimum need standard. Mr. McDaniel’s obligation for eight months was $8,000 ($1,000 mo. x 8 months).
5. There are no factors in this case which support a deviation from the need standard for the period December 1991 through July 1992.
6. Child support should have been set, per the need standard at $25.00 per child or $50.00 per month, which results in a reduction of child support for the period in the amount of $7,600. Child support for the time period December 1991 through July 1992 should have been $50 per month for eight months or ($50/mo x 8 = $400). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Order of Remand from Court of Appeals Division I, Decision Dated March 27, 2000, at 2 (CP 27).
Based on these undisputed findings, the court concluded that the minimum need standard should have been applied retroactively for the period December 1991 through July 1992, and that there was no basis to deviate from that standard. In an order filed on January 25, 2001, the trial court determined that McDaniel was entitled to a credit against his child support obligation in the amount of $7,600.
After the parties were unable to agree on the amount of interest attributable to the support overpayment, the trial court appointed a special master to assist in determining the proper amount of interest to be credited to McDaniel. After the special master completed his calculations, the trial court ordered that McDaniel be credited with $940 in interest on the amount of child support he overpaid. McDaniel moved for reconsideration, arguing that he was entitled to an additional credit adjustment of $1,920 in interest. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
DECISION
McDaniel asks this court to review various recent orders entered by the trial court concerning the modification of his support obligation. Appellate courts have traditionally deferred to the trial court in the area of family law. In re Marriage of Maughan, 113 Wn. App. 301, 305, 53 P.3d 535 (2002). `This court reviews child support modifications and adjustments for abuse of discretion.’ In re Marriage of Clarke, 112 Wn. App. 370, 375, 48 P.3d 1032 (2002). McDaniel contends for the first time that the trial court failed to award him full credit for the child support he overpaid from December 1991 through July 1992. He argues the court should have granted him an additional $525 in credit. Not only did the parties both agree that the amount of support overpayment was $7,600, but the figure was clearly within the range of the evidence presented. Nor is McDaniel entitled to an award of double credit.[3] We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court properly credited McDaniel with $7,600. McDaniel contends the trial court erred by limiting its credit for interest overpayment to $940. McDaniel argues he is entitled to additional credits of $1,920 and $112 as they represent additional costs attributable to the support overpayment. Having been credited with $7,600 in support overpayments, which is greater than the entire arrearage he owed in 1995, McDaniel argues he overpaid interest in an amount equal to $940 plus $1,920 plus $112. We disagree.
A parent who challenges child support decisions must show the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990). McDaniel’s argument is not the one he advanced at the October 22, 2002 hearing to determine the amount of overpaid interest. Relying solely on the calculations of the special master, which McDaniel’s trial counsel found to be `much more precise,’ counsel argued, `my client overpaid $3,874.’ When the trial court asked McDaniel’s trial counsel what portion of that amount was attributed solely to interest overpayment, counsel replied, `It’s true that [McDaniel] has overpaid interest in the amount of $940.’ Because the trial court’s calculation of interest overpayment is supported by the record, we cannot say the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in crediting McDaniel with $940. McDaniel contends he should not have been required to pay $738 of the special master’s fees. Juggling facts and figures from various trial court orders and other documents, McDaniel argues the appointment of the special master was unnecessary. Given the highly contested nature of the proceedings, the trial court can hardly be faulted for attempting to obtain an interest figure that was both accurate and precise. The parties were ordered to share the cost of the special master. There was no abuse of discretion. McDaniel contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration. Citing a sworn document from the special master, McDaniel argues his motion should have been granted. But this `clarifying statement’ was first presented to the trial court in support of McDaniel’s motion for reconsideration. Because the record shows the trial court refused to consider that evidence, it is not appropriate for us to consider the document on appeal. See Holaday v. Merceri, 49 Wn. App. 321, 329-30, 742 P.2d 127
(1987) (holding trial court should not consider new evidence presented in motion for reconsideration when that evidence could have been presented at trial). McDaniel contends the trial court erred in not awarding him attorney fees due to Shanks’ intransigence. From 1995 onward, argues McDaniel, `Shanks used false statements, procedural abuses, and dilatory actions to prolong litigation.’[4] McDaniel has failed to provide an adequate record for us to review the issue. His unsupported assertions about Shanks’ conduct are simply not sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Wright, 78 Wn. App. 230, 239, 896 P.2d 735 (1995). Shanks seeks an award of sanctions under RAP 18.9(a) and CR 11. According to Shanks, McDaniel’s use of the courts `undermines the integrity of the legal system.’[5] Considering that McDaniel was arguably the prevailing party in four of his five appeals, we do not view him as unduly obstreperous or intransigent. And while McDaniel has not prevailed here, we cannot say his appeal presented no debatable issues or possibility of reversal. Therefore, we deny Shanks’ request for sanctions. See In re Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 707, 829 P.2d 1120 (1992).
Affirmed.
SCHINDLER and AGID, JJ., concur.