No. 51344-3-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: November 24, 2003 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 96-3-03771-4 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 10/14/2002
Counsel for Appellant(s), Lisa K. Clark, Law Office of Lisa K Clark, 6534 4th Ave NE Ste 103, Seattle, WA 98115-6470.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael William Bugni, Michael W. Bugni Associates, 11320 Roosevelt Way NE, Seattle, WA 98125-6228.
Karma L Zaike, Michael W Bugni Associates, 11320 Roosevelt Way NE, Seattle, WA 98125-6228.
COLEMAN, J.
A trial court has broad discretion when modifying an order of child support. In this appeal, George Lake challenges the trial court’s order increasing his child support payments to his former spouse. But because the trial court, having considered the relevant statutory factors, gave sufficient and tenable reasons for modifying the support order, we affirm.[1]
FACTS
In 1997, George Lake and Jo Cripps-Lake dissolved their marriage. Under the terms of the dissolution decree, the mother received primary residential care for the parties’ two daughters, Astrid and Caitlin. The father was ordered to pay support of $1,400 per month ($800 per month for Astrid and $600 per month for Caitlin) from June 1, 1999 through May 31, 2000. These figures were based on the father’s net income of $6,000 and the mother’s net income of $0.
In March 2000, a petition was filed seeking to reduce the father’s child support obligation based at least in part on the fact that the mother had by then been hired as a school teacher. The court granted the modification request because ‘[t]he previous order was entered more than two years ago, and there has been a change in the income of the parents.’ Based on the father’s net income of $5,734 and the mother’s net income of $3,856, the trial court designated the father as the transfer payment obligor and ordered him to pay the mother $1,125 per month in child support for the two children.
In 2001, the father moved for modification of the parenting plan and order of child support after Astrid moved in with him. In response, the mother sought to increase the father’s child support obligation. The parties eventually agreed to resolve the residential placement issue. They stipulated that there was an adequate basis for modifying the original parenting plan due to the fact that Astrid was now living primarily with her father.
Following a trial by affidavit, the court granted the mother’s motion for modification of child support and ordered the father to pay her $1,400 per month in child support for Caitlin’s care. This award was based on Arvey[2] calculations. In doing so, the court set the father’s monthly net income at $12,814.50. The mother’s monthly net income was calculated at $2,703.26. The court found the increased child support award was appropriate because ‘(1) the Father’s income is very high; (2) he has been substantially underpaying support since the last support mod in 2002 [sic]; (3) the Mother’s income has dropped since the last support mod; and (3) Astrid spends significant time with her Mother.’ This appeal followed.
DECISION
The father asks us to review the order increasing his child support obligation. Appellate courts have traditionally deferred to the trial court in the area of family law. In re Marriage of Maughan, 113 Wn. App. 301, 305, 53 P.3d 535 (2002). `This court reviews child support modifications and adjustments for abuse of discretion.’ In re Marriage of Clarke, 112 Wn. App. 370, 375, 48 P.3d 1032 (2002). A trial court abuses its discretion when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Newell, 117 Wn. App. 711, 718, 72 P.3d 1130 (2003).
The father challenges the method by which the trial court calculated the father’s net monthly income as $12,814.50 and the mother’s net monthly income as $2,703.26. These figures, however, were within the range of the evidence presented. Both parties submitted evidence regarding their incomes and expenses from 1999 to 2001. In making its calculations, the court considered the financial declarations submitted by the parties, federal income tax returns, pay stubs, and other documentary evidence.
In establishing the child support schedule, the Legislature intended to equitably apportion the child support obligation between both parents. RCW 26.19.001; In re Marriage of Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. 462, 467, 38 P.3d 1033, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1016 (2002). To meet that goal, courts are to consider `all income and resources of each parent.’ Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. at 469.
The father challenges the trial court’s finding that he had a gross monthly income of $20,000. It is undisputed that the father earned wages of $16,666 per month as a research scientist during 2001. The record also shows that the father earned $60,000 or more as a consultant in each of the preceding two years, and nothing in the record suggests that the father intended to get out of the consulting business. The father’s own financial records also indicate that, in addition to earning over $226,000 in wages, he received $13,000 from other sources in 2001. When these figures are combined together, they total over $240,000. Under the circumstances, the trial court can hardly be faulted for finding that the father had a gross monthly income of $20,000.
The father also argues that the court erred in deducting monthly pension plan payments of $407.66 from the mother’s gross income inasmuch as he did not receive a comparable deduction. The father, however, waived this argument by failing to object below. See In re Marriage of Burch, 81 Wn. App. 756, 761, 916 P.2d 443 (1996) (parent waived objection to grant of a health care credit in support calculation by failing to raise issue at trial court level). In any event, there is no showing that the father met the eligibility requirements of RCW 26.19.071(5)(g) and, therefore, was qualified for any deduction. On the other hand, the mother, who apparently makes mandatory retirement contributions as an employee of the Seattle School District, was entitled to the deduction. See RCW 26.19.071(5)(c).
We find no reversible error.
The father argues that the reasons given by the trial court to exceed the child support schedule were inadequate. He fails to support this argument with citation to authority or meaningful legal analysis. This court generally will not consider arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, pinpoint references to the record, or meaningful analysis. Arvey, 77 Wn. App. at 819 n. 1 (assignments of error unsupported by argument and citation to authority). Even assuming the issue is properly before us, we find no manifest abuse of discretion. Under RCW 26.19.020, the maximum net combined monthly income calculated in the child support schedule is $7,000. When the parents’ combined monthly net incomes exceed $7,000, a court may set support up to the maximum set forth on the child support schedule or it may exceed that amount upon written findings of fact. RCW 26.19.065(3). A court may exceed the support provided by the schedule “commensurate with the parents’ income, resources, and standard of living,” and consistent with legislative intent after considering the totality of the financial circumstances. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 804, 954 P.2d 330 (1998) (citation omitted). Here the trial court listed the following reasons for exceeding the support schedule ‘(1) the Father’s income is very high; (2) he has been substantially underpaying support since the last support mod in 2002 [sic]; (3) the Mother’s income has dropped since the last support mod; and (3) Astrid spends significant time with her Mother.’ While conflicting evidence was presented at trial regarding several of these findings, they are, nevertheless, all supported by the record.[3] See In re Marriage of Stern, 68 Wn. App. 922, 928-29, 846 P.2d 1387 (1993); In re Marriage of Rich, 80 Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234 (1996) (role of appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence). The challenged findings, in turn, support an award of child support beyond the child support schedule. See Clarke, 112 Wn. App. at 379-80; In re Marriage of Scanlon, 109 Wn. App. 167, 178, 34 P.3d 877 (2001) (`A court may reduce an obligor parent’s child support obligation if the children reside with that parent for a significant period of time.’); In re Marriage of Sievers, 78 Wn. App. 287, 308, 897 P.2d 388 (1995) (appellate court will defer to trial court’s determination for amounts beyond the statutory child support schedule).
The father next argues that the trial court erred by awarding the mother $5,000 in attorney fees. `The decision to award attorney fees is within the trial court’s discretion.’ In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 563, 918 P.2d 954 (1996). The father in this case focuses on a portion of the agreement reached between the parties that states: `Each party pays their own attorney fees in this matter.’ The father, however, concedes that this restriction does not apply to fees incurred by the parties in litigating the child support modification issue.[4] Given the protracted and contentious nature of the proceedings leading up to the support trial, the trial court was certainly well within its discretion in awarding $5,000 in attorney fees. See Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. at 473 (`A party challenging the award has the burden to prove that the trial court abused its discretion by making a decision that is clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable.’).
Finally, the mother seeks attorney fees on appeal. Determining whether a fee award is appropriate requires us to both consider the parties’ relative ability to pay and examine the arguable merit of the issues raised on appeal. Leslie, 90 Wn. App. at 807. Applying that standard here, we award reasonable fees to the mother, provided she complies with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.
ELLINGTON and BECKER, JJ., concur.