No. 51245-5-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: September 22, 2003. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 01-3-02356-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 10/18/2002.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Karen A. Harmon (Appearing Pro Se), 318 West Garfield #2, Seattle, WA 98119.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Janet Lee Comin, Attorney at Law, 800 5th Ave Ste 4100, Seattle, WA 98104-3100.
PER CURIAM.
Karen Harmon appeals the trial court’s judgment against her following post-decree proceedings in her dissolution action with her former husband Dana Harmon. Because the limited record available discloses no error by the court in ordering Karen to pay damages for property she agreed would be Dana’s but then allowed her sister to take, we affirm.
FACTS
Karen and Dana Harmon were married in 1990. During the marriage, they acquired a house and other property. They separated and filed for dissolution in 2001. After two days of trial in February 2002, the parties reached agreement on all issues and read the agreement into the record.
The agreement as to property included a written disposition of personal property that was signed by both parties and their attorneys. With respect to furnishings and other large items, the agreement listed specific items that Karen would receive and allocated all `upstairs,’ `main floor’ and `basement and garden belongings except those listed for Karen’ to Dana.
The written agreement was incorporated into the decree of dissolution that was entered by the court on March 19, 2002. Around March 12, Karen’s sister, Virgina Massett was assisting her in moving out of the house. Virginia identified a trunk, antique mirror, table and decorative birdcage as items she had left at the house some years earlier for Dana and Karen to use, but had not intended to be gifts. Virginia took the items and sent Dana and his counsel a letter that stated that they were her personal property and beyond Karen’s authority to give to Dana in the dissolution. Through counsel, Dana requested the return of these and other items that he believed were his under the terms of the decree. He disputed that Virginia had ever owned them and asked for the items to be returned to the him or for a cash value equivalent to be paid. Karen responded that Dana should not have entered the decree if he thought that property issues were unresolved and that she had no control over what her sister had done in any event.
Although Karen returned some items to Dana, the parties were unable to reach agreement and Dana brought a motion for contempt. A court commissioner characterized Dana’s motion as a motion for `Enforcement / Contempt /Return of Property’ and after a hearing, ordered Karen to return certain specific items that did not include the items Virginia had taken and referred other property issues to the trial judge.
A Superior Court judge granted Dana’s motion to partially revise the commissioner’s ruling and directed that judgment against Karen be entered in the amount of $1,475 in damages for items removed from the family home and $500 for attorney fees. Karen appeals this order.
ANALYSIS
An appellant proceeding pro se must comply with all procedural rules,[1] and failure to do so may preclude review.[2] It is the appellant’s burden to provide a record sufficient to review the issues raised on appeal.[3] Here, Karen has provided no transcripts of either the hearing before the commissioner or the revision court, which substantially limits the ability of this court to review the proceedings. Karen first argues that the court’s decision must be reversed because no formal findings were entered. But what is at issue in this case is an order on a motion for revision. Under CR 52(a)(5), findings on motions are generally not required. Contrary to Karen’s claim, in the absence of a transcript of the hearing showing that the court’s decision was based on a theory that requires written findings, the lack of findings does not imply a finding against Dana. And, because the court’s enforcement action did not have the effect of extending or reducing the rights given to either party in the original property settlement as incorporated into the decree, there was no improper modification of the decree in violation of RCW 26.09.170(1).[4] Karen’s second argument is that Dana’s conduct barred him from seeking any equitable relief by the doctrine of `unclean hands.’
But the trial court, faced with contested facts, resolved the conflict against Karen. Dana’s version was that Karen intentionally gave her sister marital property awarded to Dana under the written agreement and that he had not delayed delivering property to Karen. We defer to the trial court’s resolution of the factual dispute.[5] The court could also properly conclude that Dana reasonably attempted to resolve the situation amicably rather than immediately halting the entry of the decree when he discovered what had happened to the items Virginia claimed, and that Dana therefore was not estopped from seeking relief when Karen proved intransigent. Karen’s third argument is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. She argues that only those provisions of a property division that are related to a support obligation may be enforced by contempt proceedings.[6] But the court interpreted Dana’s motion as an alternative request to enforce the decree, a request that the court has the power to grant.[7]
Damages for the value of property wrongfully withheld are appropriate in such enforcement actions, and the trial court has the power to determine the correct amount of damages.[8] Karen also complains that the property was never marital property in the first place and that it did not exist at the time of the decree. These arguments, however, go only to the trial court’s resolution of the factual dispute.
Finally, Karen contends there is no legal basis for the court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of $500. She argues that the court could not have applied the dissolution statute because it did not consider the financial resources of either party.[9] But the financial situation of the parties was thoroughly explored in the dissolution proceeding and the enforcement proceeding was part of the same action. Moreover, it is implicit in the court’s award of damages that Karen wrongfully created the need for the hearing by her intransigence, another recognized ground for award of fees.[10] With the availability of these two potential grounds, in the absence of a complete record of the proceedings, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees.[11]
Affirmed.
GROSSE and COX, JJ., concur.
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