IN RE BAKER-DAVIS, 58091-4-I (Wash.App. 7-30-2007)

No. 58091-4-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
July 30, 2007.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 02-3-03360-5, Hollis Holman, J. Pro Tem., entered March 22, 2006.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Dena Baker-Davis appeals the superior court’s decision to award her former spouse, Darrell Blegen, $10,443.60 under the terms of a provision in their dissolution decree ordering her to pay a percentage of the attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS). She argues that the court lacked authority to enter judgment against her because Blegen’s request for judgment under the dissolution decree was included in a motion for contempt and the court did not find her in contempt. But the contempt issues are distinct from the court’s ability to enforce provisions of the dissolution decree. Because the court had authority to enforce the dissolution decree and it expressly based its entry of judgment on the terms of the decree, not the contempt statute, we hold that Baker-Davis’ contempt argument is without merit and affirm the judgment. And we award Blegen attorney fees and costs because this appeal is frivolous.

FACTS
Baker-Davis and Blegen dissolved their marriage. At the time of dissolution, they had a number of problems with the IRS. The dissolution decree specified that any costs and fees incurred defending against the IRS would be split equitably between the parties and that they “shall cooperate with one another in this process.” The court ordered Blegen to pay 68.6 percent and Baker-Davis 31.4 percent of any costs and fees incurred in defending against the IRS. Instead of cooperating with Blegen, Baker-Davis asserted she was an innocent spouse in the IRS proceedings.

Blegen moved for contempt based on alleged violations of the parenting plan and Baker-Davis’ failure to cooperate with him in defending against the IRS. He also sought a judgment for her share of his costs and fees in defending against the IRS based on the dissolution decree. At the hearing, Baker-Davis argued that she should be able to offset any amount owed to Blegen by her own attorney fees incurred in dealing with the IRS. The court denied the contempt motion but entered judgment against Baker-Davis for $10,443.60, representing her share of Blegen’s fees and costs incurred in defending against the IRS under the dissolution decree. And it denied her motion for offset without prejudice because it was not properly before the court. Baker-Davis appeals.

DISCUSSION
Baker-Davis contends that the court lacked authority to enter judgment against her because it did not find her in contempt. This argument ignores the fact that the court’s award of judgment was based on the dissolution decree, not the contempt statute. A court maintains jurisdiction in a dissolution action to make its property awards effective.[1] Here, the court was merely enforcing a provision in an unchallenged dissolution decree. Thus, the court had authority to award Blegen the percentage of fees and costs he was entitled to under that decree.

Baker-Davis also challenges the court’s refusal to consider her offset argument. The court dismissed her offset argument without prejudice because she never formally moved for offset and, thus, her offset argument was not properly before the court.[2] Because the offset argument was not properly raised below, we decline to consider it under RAP 2.5(a).

Blegen requests attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAP 18.9(a), which allows such an award when an appeal is frivolous. An appeal is frivolous if it presents “no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in merit that there is no possibility of reversal.”[3] Because this appeal is clearly frivolous, we award Blegen attorney fees and costs on appeal.

We affirm.