IN MATTER OF ARMSTRONG v. ARMSTRONG, 53497-1-I (Wash.App. 4-25-2005)

No. 53497-1-IThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: April 25, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No. 02-2-09089-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 11/26/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Anita L Farris.

Counsel for Appellant(s), Dan Robert Young, Attorney at Law, 1000 2nd Ave Ste 3310, Seattle, WA 98104-1019.

Counsel for Respondent(s), Kenneth Edward Brewe, Attorney at Law, PO Box 488, Everett, WA 98206-0488.

PER CURIAM.

Kristina Armstrong appeals from a decree of dissolution and related orders regarding the dissolution of her marriage to Matthew Armstrong.[1] To the degree the deficiencies in her briefing allow us to reach the merits of her claims, we do so and conclude that there was no error. We award Matthew attorneys fees pursuant to RAP 18.9(a) for being required to respond to a frivolous appeal.

An appellant proceeding pro se must comply with all procedural rules, In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993), and failure to do so may preclude review of the asserted claims. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999). This court generally will not consider arguments that are unsupported by meaningful analysis. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (insufficient argument); RAP 10.3(a).

In the argument portion of her brief, Kristina follows a pattern of quoting a series of headnotes from cases, interspersed with lengthy lists of citations to the record. She makes no effort to connect either the authority or the references to the record to her claims of error. Thus, while Kristina’s brief contains authority and citations to the record, she essentially provides no legal argument in support of her claims for relief. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, we have reviewed her assignments of error and conclude they lack merit.

Kristina’s complaints, as described in the conclusion to her brief, can be roughly grouped into three categories: claimed ineffective assistance by her own counsel, perjury and unethical conduct by Matthew and his attorney, and “judicial misconduct, judicial abuse of discretion and judicial prejudice” by the trial judge. Brief of Appellant at 56.

As for the first category of claims, contrary to Kristina’s contention, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that forms the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance in criminal proceedings has no application because the proceedings below were civil in nature. See In re Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 672, 101 P.3d 1
(2004); Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (1985). Kristina’s complaints about the three sets of attorneys she had at various times during proceedings in the trial court do not support a claim for relief here.

As for Kristina’s claims that Matthew and his attorney committed misconduct through “vagrant perjury,”[2] the record discloses that the proceedings below were acrimonious and that factual issues were contested at virtually every stage of the proceedings. But the trial record discloses no more than that Matthew had a different memory than Kristina did of the facts related to their cohabitation before and during their marriage. And Matthew’s counsel was entitled to advocate that her client was more credible than Kristina even if the trial court ultimately concluded otherwise, as it did on some issues. Kristina’s claims fail in this regard as well.

Regarding Kristina’s claims as to the trial judge, first, we reject her contention that the record shows that the judge displayed any bias or favoritism towards Matthew or his counsel. Through the difficult proceedings, the trial court at all times displayed even-handedness. The court did not hesitate to rule against Matthew on procedural matters and in many respects did not grant him the substantive relief he requested, and imposed costs or sanctions against him when appropriate.

As for the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, our scope of review is very limited. As stated in In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985), “trial court decisions in a dissolution action will seldom be changed upon appeal. . . . The spouse who challenges such decisions bears the heavy burden of showing a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.” The question is whether the trial court’s discretion was “exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, considering the purposes of the trial court’s discretion.” Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499, 507, 784 P.2d 554
(1990).

The parties began a meretricious relationship in 1996, married in 1999, and separated in 2002. No children were born of the marriage, but Matthew adopted Kristina’s daughter, Amanda. The primary assets of the parties were a house Matthew had purchased separately and an electronic alarm business they started during their time together. At trial, the parties disputed the division of assets and liabilities, the parenting plan, child support and maintenance. Each of the parties testified extensively and each produced expert testimony as to the value of the business.

At the conclusion of trial, the court gave a detailed written ruling on all issues. The court awarded Matthew the business and home, ordered that he make Kristina a transfer payment of $68,308.65, and evaluated and divided the parties’ personal property. The parenting plan indicated Amanda would reside with Kristina for the majority of the time, with alternate weekends, holidays, vacations and time in the summer with Matthew. As for the child support calculation, the court imputed income of $2,000 per month to Kristina based on her education and experience as a certificated teacher, and based Matthew’s income on what he had had earned before problems with the marriage and devaluation of the business that reduced his income. The court reserved the question of postsecondary education support because Amanda was only nine, and granted Kristina maintenance of $1,800 per month for one year following the dissolution.

We have reviewed the entire record of proceedings and discern no action by the trial court that could be considered an abuse of its broad discretion in these matters. As for the child support order, the court’s view of Kristina as employable in education or business was properly based on Kristina’s educational and work history. RCW 26.19.071(6); In re Marriage of Peterson, 80 Wn. App. 148, 153, 906 P.2d 1009 (1995). Similarly, the court’s view of the proper measure of Matthew’s income was well within the disputed evidence provided by the parties about the business. Deferring the question of postsecondary support was reasonable given that Amanda was nine at the time of trial and questions remained as to how her spina bifida condition would affect her future education. See Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 600, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (post-secondary educational support depends on individual circumstances).

The court’s overall resolution of the valuation of the real and personal property was likewise based upon findings that were supported by the evidence, including that the date of the meretricious relationship began when the parties began continuously cohabiting, rather than during an earlier period when they lived together while Matthew was still married to his first wife. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328 (1984). The court acted within its discretion by concluding the community was adequately compensated for its expenditures on the house by its beneficial use of the residence. In re Marriage of Miracle, 101 Wn.2d 137, 139, 675 P.2d 1229
(1984). And the trial court properly declined to award Kristina one half the value of a painting that the parties had previously owned because the court did not find the painting was part of the marital estate at the time of trial. See In re Marriage of White, 105 Wn. App. 545, 549, 20 P.3d 481 (2001).

As for the parenting plan, Kristina complains that the court did not place Matthew on a schedule requiring him to make phone calls to Amanda between visitations. But the court’s reasoning that a mandatory phone call requirement would be detrimental to Amanda’s best interests because it would simply lead to increased litigation was reasonable under the circumstances. The court did not abuse its discretion.

We have reviewed Kristina’s other challenges to the determinations of the trial court before, during and after trial, relating to sanctions, contempt, and attorneys fees. None have merit.

Matthew requests fees on appeal for under RAP 18.9(a). An appeal is frivolous under this rule if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal. State ex rel Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wn.2d 888, 905, 969 P.2d 64 (1998). We resolve all doubts in favor of the conclusion that an appeal is not frivolous. In re Marriage of Penry, 119 Wn. App. 799, 804, n. 2, 82 P.3d 1231 (2004). Even overlooking the deficiencies in Kristina’s briefing, the record discloses no issue for which there was a reasonable possibility of reversal. Matthew is therefore entitled to attorney fees under RAP 18.9(a).

Affirmed.