No. 22777-4-IIIThe Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three.
Filed: April 5, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No. 02-2-06705-5. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/23/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Salvatore F Cozza.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Jessica Lynn Freeman (Appearing Pro Se), c/o Ray Batten, 1518 E. 20th, Spokane, WA 99203.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Frank C. King, Attorney at Law, 626 N Mullan Rd Ste 11, Spokane Valley, WA 99206-3857.
KATO, C.J.
Jessica Freeman pledged her property as security for an appeal bond in a case in which her parents were defendants and against whom a judgment of $1,300 was entered. When the judgment was not paid, the Williamses, judgment creditors, foreclosed on the property. Ms. Freeman redeemed the property and sued the Williamses, claiming they provided her with an incorrect accounting and committed waste on the property. The court granted summary judgment dismissal of her complaint. Ms. Freeman appeals; we affirm.
In 1995, the Williamses won a judgment against Ms. Freeman’s parents and a trust of which she was the beneficiary. Ms. Freeman pledged her property as security for the appeal bond.
The Williamses were unable to collect on the judgment. They thus filed a complaint against Ms. Freeman and obtained a judgment against her as the surety. Thereafter, they foreclosed on her property. On February 8, 2002, the Williamses bought the property at a sheriff’s sale.
On September 16, 2002, Ms. Freeman filed a demand for an accounting and a notice of intent to redeem. The Williamses provided the accounting on September 24. On October 25, Ms. Freeman redeemed the property. On October 30, 2002, Ms. Freeman filed an action for an incorrect accounting pursuant to RCW 6.23.090(3) and also claimed waste pursuant to RCW 6.23.100. On October 13, 2003, the Williamses were served.
On December 26, 2003, the Williamses moved for summary judgment and an award of fees and costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.250 and 4.84.270. They argued Ms. Freeman’s claims were time-barred and she was collaterally estopped from bringing her action. The court agreed and granted the motion for summary judgment. Ms. Freeman appeals.
We review an order of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. City of Seattle v. Mighty Movers, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 343, 348, 96 P.3d 979 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting CR 56(c)). Because the facts here are undisputed, we decide whether summary judgment was properly granted as a matter of law. Id.
The court granted summary judgment to the Williamses because the action was untimely. The complaint was filed pursuant to RCW 6.23.090 and RCW 6.23.100. RCW 6.23.090(2) provides that if the person entitled to redeem the property wants to bring an action for an accounting, he or she may do so `within thirty days after such redemption, but not later.’ This is the statute of limitations for this type of action. See Citizens Interested in Transfusion of Yester-year v. Bd. of Regents, 86 Wn.2d 323, 328-29, 544 P.2d 740 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds in Jones v. Stebbins, 122 Wn.2d 471, 477, 860 P.2d 1009 (1993).
CR 3(a) provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint or service of the summons. RCW 4.16.170 permits the tolling of the statute of limitations for an action at the time the complaint is filed so long as service is commenced within 90 days of the filing of the complaint. The 30-day window for filing an action under RCW 6.23.090 expired on October 30, 2002, the date the complaint was filed. In order for the action to be timely, Ms. Freeman would have had to serve the Williamses within 90 days of that date. She did not. The complaint was untimely. See Wothers v. Farmers Ins. Co., 101 Wn. App. 75, 79, 5 P.3d 719
(2000); Lockhart v. Burlington N.R.R., 50 Wn. App. 809, 811, 750 P.2d 1299, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1022 (1988).
Ms. Freeman also filed an action under RCW 6.23.100, which permits a court to restrain the commission of waste on the property during the redemption period. At the time Ms. Freeman filed this action, the redemption period was over and she did not have a cause of action under RCW 6.23.100. The court properly dismissed this claim as well.
Ms. Freeman asserts that her action for an accounting could have been brought under RCW 4.16.040(3), which has a six-year statute of limitations for an accounting. She also contends her action for waste was pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(1), which has a statute of limitations of three years. She argues that the liberal pleading rule requires the court to construe the pleadings to permit her causes of action. She concedes that the references to chapter 6.23 RCW are inartful, but asserts they are not fatal.
The purpose of pleadings is to put the court and opposing parties on notice that an issue is being raised. King County v. Boundary Review Bd., 122 Wn.2d 648, 660, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993). Pleadings, taken as a whole, are liberally construed. Slater v. Bird, 40 Wn.2d 848, 849, 246 P.2d 460 (1952). But while an inexpert pleading will be accepted, an insufficient one will not. N.W. Line Constructors Chapter of Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 104 Wn. App. 842, 848, 17 P.3d 1251 (2001). A pleading that does not give the opposing party notice of what the claim is and on what ground it rests is insufficient. Id. at 848-49.
Here, the complaint specifically pleaded claims for relief pursuant to RCW 6.23.090 and RCW 6.23.100. Nothing in the pleading gave the Williamses notice that Ms. Freeman was basing her claims on any other legal theory. Therefore, the rule that pleadings be liberally construed does not require this court to determine she was bringing a general claim for an accounting or waste.
Ms. Freeman did not bring her claims within the time prescribed by statute. Because the complaint was time-barred, we need not address the collateral estoppel arguments.
The Williamses have requested fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.250, .270 and RAP 18.1. RCW 4.84.250 entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees and costs in an action for damages less than $10,000. RCW 4.84.270 deems the defendant the prevailing party if the party seeking relief recovers nothing. Because the Williamses prevailed on appeal, they are entitled to fees.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, J. and SCHULTHEIS, J., concur.
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