No. 46659-3-I.The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Filed: August 20, 2001 DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 98-1-01923-5, Hon. Sharon Armstrong, April 28, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Richard E. Greene, Asst City Attorney — Criminal Division, 1414 Dexter Horton Bldg., 710 2nd Ave., Seattle, WA 98104.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Christine A. Jackson, The Public Defender, 810 3rd Ave Fl 8, Seattle, WA 98104.
RONALD E. COX, J.
At issue is whether the superior court erred by reversing Michael Cole’s conviction for driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree. There was sufficient evidence to show that at the time of the alleged driving infraction, Cole had previously held a driver’s license and that the State had suspended that license. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court order and reinstate the conviction. Cole received a speeding ticket in January 1995. He failed to respond to the ticket, and in April the Department of Licensing sent him an order suspending his `driving privilege[s]’. The order stated that the suspension would become effective on May 12, 1995, unless he resolved the outstanding infraction. On the morning of August 4, 1997, a Seattle police officer stopped Cole for speeding. Cole could produce no identification or proof of insurance, and a computer check revealed that his license was suspended. Cole told the officer that his license was suspended. The officer cited Cole for speeding, `no insurance,’ and driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree.
The City of Seattle charged Cole with one count of driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree, in violation of Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 11.56.320(D). Cole waived his right to a jury trial, and agreed to submit the case on a stipulated record. The trial court convicted him as charged. On appeal, the superior court reversed, concluding that `there was insufficient evidence to establish that Michael Cole was ever issued a Washington Driver’s License.’ The court determined that, ‘[b]ecause Cole had no driver’s license, his driving privilege could not be suspended and he could not, as a matter of law, be found guilty of [violating] SMC 11.56.320(D).’
We granted the City’s request for discretionary review.
The City first argues that the superior court erred by concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Cole had ever been issued a Washington driver’s license. The City is correct.
As does the superior court in a RALJ appeal involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record established at trial.[1] In doing so, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.[2] We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the prosecution’s favor and interpret the evidence most strongly against the defendant.[3] We assume the truth of the prosecution’s evidence and all inferences that the trier of fact could reasonably draw from it.[4]
The City charged Cole with the crime of driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree, in violation of SMC 11.56.320(D). That section of the City’s municipal code provides, in pertinent part, that:
A person who violates this section when his or her driver’s license or driving privilege is, at the time of the violation, suspended or revoked solely because
(6) the person has failed to respond to a notice of traffic infraction, failed to appear at a requested hearing, violated a written promise to appear in court or has failed to comply with the terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation is guilty of driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree, a misdemeanor.[5]
Thus, the City was required to prove that Cole held a driver’s license or driving privilege and that the license or privilege was suspended or revoked at the time of the charged infraction. The trial court expressly found that Cole had a license at some time prior to the infraction. The superior court disagreed. In reversing the conviction, the court reasoned that ‘[b]ecause Cole had no driver’s license, his driving privilege could not be suspended and he could not, as a matter of law, be found guilty of [violating] SMC 11.56.320(D).’.
We agree with the trial court, and hold that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found that Cole had a driver’s license when the Department took the suspension action in the spring of 1995. Significantly, Cole admitted to the police officer who stopped him for speeding on August 4, 1997 that he was driving with a suspended license. Specifically, Officer Napper wrote in his police report that Cole `had said his lic. was DWLS/R 3 ‡.’ This evidence is unrefuted in the stipulated record that was before the trial court. Moreover, the 1997 certification letter summarizing Cole’s driving record and the 1995 order of suspension both set forth Cole’s `license number’ as `COLE*ML413B4.’ The April 1995 order of suspension explicitly states that `your driving privilege will be suspended for failure to appear/pay/comply on citation #I000007296.[6] The order also explains that, ‘[i]f the suspension goes in effect, you must pay a reissue fee in addition to any other licensing fees, before a new license can be issued.[7] These all show that Cole had a driver’s license to suspend in 1995. From our review of the record, it appears that the arguable ambiguity of the letter of certification from the Department’s custodian of records caused some confusion. The form letter of certification from the Department states, in pertinent part, that the:
official record indicates on August 04, 1997, the following statements apply to the status of [Cole]:
Had not reinstated his/her driving privilege. Was suspended/revoked. Had not been issued a valid Washington license.
Although the letter contains the words `no license’ near the top, and states that Cole ‘[h]ad not been issued a valid Washington license,’ it is not clear whether this means that Cole had no license as of August 4, 1997 after it was suspended in 1995, or whether he had never been issued a license. The most reasonable interpretation of the letter in light of Cole’s admission to the citing officer and the license number in the Department’s records, is that, as of August 4, 1997, he had not yet reinstated either his driving privilege or license after losing it in 1995, and had not since been issued another valid Washington license. Considering the above evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and most strongly against Cole, as we must, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Cole had a driver’s license or driving privilege when the Department took the suspension action in the spring of 1995. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that Cole had held a Washington driver’s license prior to the 1997 infraction. We conclude that the City presented sufficient evidence to support Cole’s conviction for driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree. Accordingly, we reinstate the conviction.
Because we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments. .
We reverse the superior court order and reinstate the conviction.
WE CONCUR: KENNEDY, J., APPELWICK.